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Abstract 
 
This dissertation presents the findings of an investigation into the governance of 
privatisation (equitisation) in Vietnam from an institutionalist perspective. It examines 
the political economy of privatisation policy, in terms of both theory and practice, to 
answer the following research question: What constitutes and influences the 
privatisation policy discourse and the implementation process, and in particular how is 
the governance of the latter to be understood? Privatisation developed under the 
influence of neoliberalism as a policy in developed economies, where its success has 
been uneven, conditional and contested. It was introduced into developing countries as 
a one-size-fits-all solution, regardless of the embryonic status of their institutional 
development. Practical experiences of transition economies in the CEE and the former 
CIS and the developmental states in East Asia reveal alternative approaches to 
privatisation, with contrasting outcomes. Because the transfer of assets from public to 
private ownership involves ideological arbitrariness and contestation between private 
interests, privatisation is a politically constructed project – a political construction. 
Broad economic and social objectives can only be achieved if the process is properly 
governed, and productive efficiency improvement will only be realised if it is based on 
the development of an institutional framework. In its approach to privatisation, the 
Vietnamese party-state has vacillated between neoliberalism and developmental states, 
with neither philosophy being pursued completely or successfully. This dissertation 
argues that, as Vietnam faces the challenge of sustaining economic growth, it should 
pursue the philosophy of the developmental state, and that a broad range of economic 
and social development stakeholder objectives – including the state’s need for capacity 
to coordinate investments and achieve social equity – should be taken into account in 
privatisation, rather than the sole objective of supporting narrowly-defined shareholder 
values. 
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Introduction 
 
The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by means of privatisation (equitisation) 
has been one of the most significant policies of the Vietnamese economic renovation 
known as Doi moi. Before the enactment in 1990 of the Company Law that allowed for 
private corporations, these enterprises had represented most of the formal business 
sector, with the remainder consisting of household enterprises and collectives. Hence, 
the implementation of privatisation policies has profoundly affected the performance 
of the economy since that time and has prompted subsequent reform strategies. On the 
other hand, the political and philosophical dimensions of these policy changes hint at a 
close engagement on the part of the indigenous governing elites with neoliberalist 
ideals – which have essentially shaped the country’s transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy.  
 
At the micro-level, the transfer of state ownership of the SOEs to private owners 
helped transform the face of the society and the economic stake of each family, 
especially those in urban areas like mine in Hanoi. In the introduction to this 
dissertation, which is oriented more towards practice and policy than pure theory, I use 
the personal experiences of my typical middle-class family to illustrate the real impact 
of privatisation. Exactly two decades ago nearly all members of my extended family 
worked for the public sector and SOEs; at present, half of them still work there, while 
the rest work for the private sector. Yet, there are mixed sentiments in regard to 
privatisation. One of my aunts has always believed her SOE’s assets were siphoned off 
by the former managers before the enterprise was sold. My parents-in-law were 
initially happy when the new owners of the SOE in which they worked promised to 
raise salaries and improve lunches. However, these benefits were soon eclipsed by a 
large amount of unpaid overtime, and recently one of the couple took voluntary 
retirement. Interestingly, as older people rarely have the opportunity to speak out, the 
youth-dominated public media (ostensibly representing popular ideas) often 
characterise voluntary early retirement as a sign of ‘efficiency’!  
 
Such stories are not unique. They have been illustrated in field surveys of SOE 
privatisation, such as those of Fforde (2004), Gainsborough (2008), and Cheshier 
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(2010), and are frequently reflected in interviews with bureaucrats about their attitudes 
towards privatisation policy. Yet the philosophical and political economic 
underpinnings of these policies remain unclear. Hayton (2010) and many other 
observers of the ‘new Vietnam’ (Painter 2003; Evans & Bui 2005; Beresford 2008; 
Masina 2008; Thayer 2010; Beeson & Pham 2012; Schewenkel & Leshkowich 2012) 
have written with curiosity about the ‘cacophony’ of ‘amorphous’ adaptations to both 
neoliberalism and the developmental state philosophy – ‘a marriage of convenience’, 
according to Bui (2015, p. 82), between Westernised reforms and the insistence of 
socialist statism.  
 
When I was an undergraduate student in the mid-1990s, we were told with pride a 
famous story about a foreign minister who – at a time when the economy was centrally 
planned – had used all his allowance to buy an important book at the international 
airport: the economics text-book written by Paul Samuelson. That episode might have 
represented the introduction of mainstream economics into our country! In the 1990s, 
however, I also observed on the library shelves a number of translated books 
introducing the ‘Asian miracles’. Both these literary sources have informed the policy 
discourse of Vietnam up to the present, but neither of the philosophies has been fully 
effective. One asserts the ‘axiomatic truths’ of neoclassical economics as to the 
importance of the market in the organisation of economic activities, while the other 
presents political economic theories of state involvement in this process. In the official 
policy discourse it is common to hear slogans such as ‘Let the markets work!’. Yet the 
legitimacy of the economic role of the state has been an important element in the 
political legitimacy of the party-state. No wonder understanding Vietnam has never 
been straightforward for international observers.  
 
For indigenous governing elites and the academic establishment, it is no less complex. 
Throughout the 1990s, most economic reforms focused on trade liberalisation (support 
of the export-oriented strategy of agricultural and textile production through active 
engagement in global and regional free trade frameworks, which in turn have required 
opening up domestic markets for imports and foreign investment), introduction of 
market-based competition and development of market-conforming institutions. During 
this period, the SOEs remained nearly intact, with only limited equitisation on a pilot 
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basis. Rhetorically, the initial party-state policies were all in accordance with the 
model of the developmental states in that they insisted on the importance of a 
coordinating role for the state. At the same time, however, the spirit of neoliberalism 
was clearly alive and well at the beginning of the reform process, as evidenced in the 
party-state’s slogan, ‘Rich people, strong nation’ – which constructed an individualised 
‘commercial nationalism’ (Nguyen-Thu 2016).  
 
The state and market should not be represented as opposites, although the tension 
between neoliberalism and developmental state seems to suggest that they are. That the 
state and the market are not mutually exclusive was evident as the party-state 
simultaneously pursued ambitious plans to consolidate large SOEs with a view to them 
becoming champions for national competitiveness and the ‘cornerstone’ of the 
economy, while smaller SOEs (independent enterprises or branches of these large 
SOEs) were rapidly privatised. As a result, the number of SOEs sharply declined. The 
outcomes of consolidation – the large business groups (BGs) and general corporations 
(GCs) – were, however, largely undermined by de facto (spontaneous) privatisation 
and over-investment into non-core businesses which led to corruption and bad debts. 
The credit crunch in domestic financial markets, combined with the global financial 
crisis (GFC), then slowed economic growth from an average annual GDP growth rate 
of 7.6% in 1991-2008 to nearly 6.0% in 2008-2016. The more obstacles the economy 
encounters, the more closely is the neoliberal agenda embraced and, consequently, the 
more a wholesale approach to privatisation is adopted. At present, however, despite far 
fewer SOEs, the economy has not performed better.  
 
It will be argued here that both the policy makers and academic analysts – inspired by 
the neoliberal belief in the superiority of private ownership – have paid too much 
attention to the argument for efficiency improvement as evidenced by the financial 
performance of the firm and shareholder values. I will show that the enrichment of 
shareholders does not always harmonise with national enrichment or the protection of 
consumers’ interests. In fact, neoliberal beliefs have been endorsed in the face of 
abuses of privatisation and at the expense of examining how privatisation should be 
governed to maximise the attainment of broad national economic and social 
development goals. Truong and Ngo (2016, p. 22) have been among the few academics 
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to observe the lack of clarity around the specific conditions for successful privatisation 
and what impacts it might have on firms and the national economy.  Yet, despite 
having raised the issue, these authors do not go on to address it; rather, they focus on 
the argument that privatisation can be expected to improve financially-evidenced 
efficiency, although even here they do not come to a definite conclusion. 
 
Research Questions and Central Arguments 
The following policy questions and challenges can be identified. What constructs the 
argument for privatisation and determines the outcomes of its implementation? What is 
the appropriate approach to privatisation policy? How should privatisation policy be 
governed to maximise its contribution to national economic and social development? 
Under what conditions does privatisation produce desirable effects on national 
economic and social development objectives, especially the industrialisation of the 
country?  
 
Such questions are also the research questions that are addressed in this dissertation, 
which is developed on the central argument that privatisation needs to be governed and 
subject to policy by the state rather than presumed to be effectual on the grounds of 
claims for the superiority of market forces and private ownership. Essentially, the 
belief that businesses can be free from political interference is mythical; all economies 
are political economies in which the act of privatisation has to be designed and 
implemented. Furthermore, the focus on financially-evidenced efficiency and on 
shareholder values is too narrow to reflect the broad range of national social and 
economic development objectives – especially national industrial policy – to which 
privatisation should be directed. Finally, I argue that the developmental state 
philosophy is the most appropriate model for Vietnam to follow if it wants to achieve 
sustained economic growth, industrialisation and social equity.    
 
Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised around four chapters. Chapter 1 examines the definitions and 
configuration of privatisation, its generation as a policy in developed countries, its 
introduction to developing countries under the influence of the triumphant 
neoliberalism of the 1990s, its foundational rationale and associated theoretical debate. 
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Overall, this chapter provides a philosophical basis for understanding privatisation. 
Chapter 2 complements this account with detailed analysis of practical experiences in 
privatisation. This second chapter examines the privatisation process from the 
formation of policies to implementation in order to highlight the differences between 
wholesale privatisation, driven by a political ideological bias against the role of the 
state, and gradual privatisation under effective governance by the state. Two groups of 
countries have been selected for close analysis – the transition economies in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former CIS (Commonwealth of Independent 
States), and East Asian developmental states. These are relevant to the context of 
Vietnam, which has experienced both transition from state socialism and a certain 
amount of emulation of the developmental states. 
 
Chapter 3 analyses privatisation in Vietnam not only in regard to specific policies of 
the party-state but also against the backdrop of economic reform within the political 
economy of the country as a whole. The governing elites appeared to acknowledge the 
bad record of privatisation in the CEE and former CIS transition economies and the 
good record of developmental states. Why then have Vietnam’s privatisation 
outcomes, though not as chaotic as in the former, been less effective than in the latter? 
This central chapter draws on various analytical accounts, especially those of Painter 
(2003) and Masina (2008) and bridges important gaps within and between these works. 
Although I do not examine in detail the privatisation of particular industries or specific 
aspects of the process, as other researchers often do, my analysis represents an original 
contribution to our knowledge of privatisation as an overall policy trajectory in 
Vietnam, which admittedly remains quite limited, especially from a political economy 
perspective.    
 
In this chapter, I have chosen to use an array of newspaper articles (cited in footnotes) 
as sources of secondary data to show how the local policy discourse is shaped by the 
story-telling of the press. In today’s world, the primary working skill of all politicians 
may well be reading newspapers. As well, the Vietnamese media play a distinctive role 
in the implementation of such a process. When an institute or governmental agency 
wants to publicise its research or reports, it often organises workshops with the 
participation of the press, whose articles are thereafter ‘enriched’ by these data. The 
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resulting articles are like data-reports, although of course the stories are told in an 
entertaining fashion for the general public. The local academic journals, however, do 
not provide much more depth. Analysis seems to be expensive and rare. This is partly 
because the public media are controlled by the paternalistic party-state. Hence more 
data and information are available in newspapers than in the resources of the agencies 
and institutes themselves or in academic journals. Most of the Vietnamese references 
quoted in the main text are from the journal articles, books and research reports I 
collected in hard copy format.  
 
Chapter 4 summarises these central arguments and proposes a governance framework 
for privatisation – based on the findings discussed in the previous chapters – which 
would contribute to the achievement of national economic and social development. It 
also addresses the research questions of the dissertation. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
This dissertation is based on qualitative research within the institutionalist, 
developmental states perspective. In and of themselves the traditions of political 
economy provide a useful theoretical framework. Institutions are defined as ‘working 
rules of … collective action’ governing individual economic activities (Commons 
1931, p. 468) or, with reference to neoclassical individuals rather than collectivities, 
‘humanly devised constraints [rules of the game] that structure political, economic and 
social interaction’ (North 1991, p. 97). Although the discussion here does not directly 
concern the debates between the traditions of ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutional economics 
(OIE and NIE) – characterised by emphasis on, respectively, the whole (holistic 
approach) or parts (individualist approach) in the interdependent governance of social 
relations – its advocacy of the developmental states in contrast with neoliberal 
prescriptions clearly supports the values of ‘old institutionalism’ (Langlois 1989; 
Rutherford 1989).  
 
The choice of an institutionalist perspective is of significance and relevance in delving 
into how the privatisation in Vietnam has worked and should be approached and 
solved. Only such a perspective can explain in detail the way the policy of 
privatisation in a range of countries is shaped. Essentially, privatisation policy is about 
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the extent and nature of changes in the rules of the game (institutions) necessary to 
ensure the realisation of growth, development and the delivery of social welfare. While 
deference to market institutions underlies privatisation, Vietnam’s leadership has 
remained concerned, in line with the country’s socialist past, with the issue of state 
capacity through regulation, the provision of finance, and the forging of international 
agreements, and so on, to direct the path of national social and economic development 
and to maintain a path consistent with the legacies, culture and struggles of the nation 
of Vietnam.  
 
Moreover, both the experiences of developmental states and of transitional economies 
with privatisation effectively challenge the methodological individualism of the 
approach of new institutionalists to the evolution of rules of the game. Undeniably, 
neither the choice of a gradual approach to privatisation in Northeast Asian economies 
and the rush for wholesale privatisation in the CEE and CIS were the sort of 
‘institutional change arising out of [the ‘rational’ choices of individuals, or] the 
unintended consequences of the actions of individuals’ (Rutherford 1989, p. 300), as 
new institutional economists often postulate (Agassi 1975; Langlois 1989). In each 
case the direction (and process) of institutional development was the consequence of 
the choices made by political leadership. Private interests have come to bear in one 
degree or another on institutional development; but this has in no way reflected the 
methodological individualism widely propounded by neoliberally-inspired, new 
institutionalists who, despite certain departures from the neoclassicism (Engel 2010) in 
effect keep ‘many of the core assumptions of mainstream economics unscathed’ 
(Hodgson 1993, p. 3).   
    
Before leaving these introductory remarks about the institutionalist, developmental 
states perspective it is fitting to set against the latter perspective that of neoliberalism, 
which became popular in advanced capitalist countries in the later twentieth century. 
Acknowledging the ‘significant discrepancy between neoliberal theory and practice 
with respect to the size and scope of the state’ (Cahill 2014, p. 14), it can be said that 
neoliberalism is a political philosophy which holds that human societies work best for 
themselves if individuals are left to pursue their individual interests with the help of 
exchanges within free markets, between sovereign individuals, of one product of 
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human activity for another or of one product for the medium of exchange. The state is 
restricted to issuing the medium of exchange and ensuring rights to property in the 
products of human activity (or those which can be held by some individuals to the 
exclusion of others). The version of neoliberalism introduced to transition economies 
such as Vietnam (as much as other transition economies in the CEE and former CIS) – 
where the social structures that are necessary to actualise neoliberal ideals had not been 
yet created – became a mere ‘elite ideology’ (Cahill 2014, p. 119), promoted only by 
those who could secure property rights and thereby the value of production. 
Neoliberalism is supported by the flagships of new institutional economics, such as 
property rights theory, agency theory and public choice theory, and by the dominant 
policies of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. As will be discussed in the 
case of Vietnam, the embedding of neoliberalism within the party-state has been 
limited by a grudging admiration for the developmental states created in East Asia and 
the concessions represented in the post-Washington Consensus, according to which 
non-market institutions (including formal state regulations) are to be accepted if not 
enthusiastically welcomed. It might be argued that, in practice, an institutionally 
adaptive form of neoliberalism has been introduced. However, while privatisation 
policy is a product of heavily promoted neoliberal ideals, it is also constrained by the 
Vietnamese party-state’s realisation that the private sector has to be guided by the state 
if national economic and social development is to be achieved.  
 
Hence, it is to be inferred here that the Vietnamese state should emulate the strategies 
of the developmental states for collaboration between the public and private sectors in 
general and, in particular, their strategies for the privatisation of SOEs. Although it can 
also be argued that these economies are hard to emulate, the strong evidence of 
effective statism the developmental states have provided enables this dissertation to 
make the case for regarding the development states as the most credible mode of 
economic governance, including the governance of privatisation, to ensure catch-up 
industrialisation and sustained economic growth and development for the people as a 
whole.   
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Chapter 1 
Privatisation: Definition, Diffusion and Theoretical Debate 
 
Privatisation is commonly defined as the transfer of ownership of enterprises or assets 
from the public sector to the private sector and, in the case of a particular state-owned 
enterprise (SOE), may be partial or complete. The earliest impetus to privatisation 
occurred in the United Kingdom (UK) under the conservative government of Margaret 
Thatcher. From there it spread to capitalist countries of Western Europe and the 
Anglophone world. As discussed in Chapter 2, it was subsequently implemented in the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) and in the developmental states of East Asia. 
  
By the late 20th century, privatisation was being championed by the World Bank (WB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as an appropriate strategy not only for the 
developmental states of East Asia but also for the two largest emerging market 
economies of China and India and for most states in Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
Whereas privatisation was initially practised in countries that had extensive formal 
institutional structures to complement and support the market, this was not the case 
beyond the developed world. Although there was ample evidence that supportive 
institutional structures were essential to the success of privatisation in improving the 
capacities of previously state-owned enterprises (SOEs), no reservations were 
expressed when international organisations made privatisation a condition for the 
receipt of official development assistance. 
 
Various theories associated with neoclassical economics have been employed in the 
defence of privatisation in principle. The merit of such theories has been subject to a 
good deal of criticism, and some observers have concluded that there is another, 
political agenda behind the ostensible aim of improving the productive efficiency of 
the enterprises in question (for example, Butler 1989; Cahill & Beder 2005). 
Specifically, privatisation enables select private interests to access the profits 
generated by these enterprises. In cases where the SOE that is to be privatised enjoys a 
monopoly position, this outcome can be prevented by promoting competition, which 
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may require the provision of financial incentives for the establishment of rival private 
enterprises. Where the enterprise is a ‘natural monopoly’, it can be avoided through 
careful regulation of management decisions in the newly privatised enterprise. In either 
case, what is the point of privatisation? 
  
This chapter briefly describes the definition and configuration of privatisation and the 
particularities of the use of the term in Vietnam. The reasons for the formation of 
SOEs are explained. This is followed by an account of how privatisation kicked off in 
the developed countries and was later introduced into developing countries. Finally, 
the theoretical debate between proponents and critics of privatisation is elaborated.  
  
1.1 Definition 
According to Wright (1993), privatisation is ‘an integral aspect of the attempt to 
decrease the size and accountability of the state to its citizens’ (p. 1). Specifically, it is 
directly involved in the downsizing of the role of the state in delivering goods and 
services by ‘shifting of public duties to private organisations’ (p. 3). This broad 
conceptualisation covers a huge range of activities, outputs and outcomes. Wright’s 
reference to a reduction in the size and accountability of the state can also be seen in 
the context of ‘the discipline of market forces’. From this perspective, privatisation is 
largely defined in terms of the traditional dichotomy between the state and the market, 
covering ‘a wide continuum of possibilities, between denationalisation at one end and 
market discipline at the other’ (Ramanadham 1989, p. 4).  
 
The term privatisation, however, is not interchangeable with the term ‘marketisation’ – 
in principle, it need not involve subjecting enterprises to market rules and, conversely, 
SOEs may be subjected to market rules. According to Cook, Kirkpatrick and Nixson 
(1998, p. 4), ‘[t]he precise relationship between privatisation and private sector 
development is not intuitively obvious’. Starr (1988), for instance, emphasises the 
distinction between privatisation and liberalisation, or the introduction of competition. 
Several authors prefer to use a narrow definition of privatisation to distinguish it from 
alternative policy solutions that do not involve ownership change, such as corporate 
restructuring through the introduction of market-based incentives, competition and 
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monitoring schemes (Cook, Kirkpatrick & Nixson 1998; Marangos 2002; Adams & 
Mengistu 2008).  
 
Ownership transfer is the focal point of narrow definitions of privatisation. Butler 
(1989, p. 1), for example, defines privatisation as ‘the transfer of the ownership of 
enterprises (or of the means by which the state currently supplies goods and services) 
from the public sector to the private sector’. Such a definition, in which contracting-
out and deregulation are seen as ramifications of privatisation, has been widely 
accepted (Kay & Thompson 1986; Cook & Kirkpatrick 1988; Bienen & Waterbury 
1989; Ramanadham 1989; Vickers & Yarrow 1991; Hodge 2004). 
     
The concept of privatisation can, however, be narrowed even further by restricting it to 
assets transfer alone. In this approach, privatisation is seen as ‘a transfer of ownership 
and control from the public to the private sector, with particular reference to asset sales 
[…] to curtail the state’s economic role’ (Van de Walle 1989, p. 601), or ‘the 
deliberate sale by a government of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or assets to private 
economic agents’ (Megginson & Netter 2001, p. 321). When control rights are 
implicitly presumed to be the effect of ownership transfer and the target of 
privatisation, the question arises as to what threshold of ownership is needed to acquire 
control. According to Nellis and Kikeri (1989), SOEs or public enterprises (PEs) are 
those firms in which more than 50% of the ownership is held by the government. This 
implies an extremely narrow definition of privatisation, namely, when ‘divestiture’ 
brings state ownership in SOEs to below 50% (Major 1993). In practice, this is not 
always necessary. If the ownership structure is sufficiently dispersed, one investor can 
gain control even with less than 50% ownership1.   
 
1.2 Configuration 
Privatisation can be configured differently in relation, for instance, to pace, breadth of 
coverage and methods. Differences in configuration depend on the industries involved 
and the broad objectives of privatisation. In terms of methods, privatisation can be 
carried out by means of direct sales, distribution of vouchers, management-employee 
                                                          
1 Some authors’ definitions of privatisation include the requirement for a switch between the public 
and private sectors. In other words, ownership transfer within the state sector (cross-ownership) is not 
recognised as privatisation (Starr 1988; Major 1993). 
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buyout, or contracting-out. It may involve a wholesale approach leading to rapid mass 
privatisation or a gradualist strategy might be adopted. Privatisation differs according 
to the characteristics of the industrial sectors in which the SOEs are doing business, 
such as commodities markets, natural monopolies or by-fiat monopolies, or provision 
of public goods and services. Last but not least, privatisation can differ depending on 
the scope and scale of the targeted SOEs.  
 
Direct sale of the SOE’s assets has been the most popular method of privatisation 
(Cook, Kirkpatrick & Nixson 1998), since it is the quickest and most straightforward 
way of transforming ownership. A government may sell the whole or part of its 
ownership of the targeted SOE to outsiders either through private sales (or trade sales) 
in the form of tender offers to strategic investors, or by initial public offering (IPO), 
also known as a public float, or by issuing new shares (share-issue privatisation, SIP) 
to expand the range of equity owners (Bortolotti & Milella 2008). While private sales 
are often preferred because they result in sustainable financial and managerial 
provision, public offerings have the benefits of enhancing transparency and 
encouraging ownership by small investors. A combination of these two measures is 
most desirable. If direct sales are to be conducted effectively, however, the 
establishment of a stock-exchange and the development of financial markets are 
indispensable prerequisite conditions. Depending on the extent of the transferred 
ownership, a change in corporate governance structure may be expected to entail a 
change in the management of the firm. It is often argued that full privatisation is 
necessary for management to be really shaken. Nevertheless, if a restructuring 
program2 is actively pursued prior to or contemporaneously with direct sales, a partial 
privatisation involving sales to private investors who remain as minority shareholders 
may have a substantial impact on managerial efficiency (Gupta 2005).  
 
Besides direct sales, the state may undertake a free distribution of equal shares, in the 
form of vouchers, to the population at large. This measure seems to guarantee the 
greatest equality of access to ownership of SOEs. In the 1990s, this was the second 
                                                          
2 Restructuring measures may include: organisational changes (e.g. merging, administrative 
rationalisation); leasing or liquidating some of the business units to focus on core businesses; writing 
off or swapping debts; enhancing the autonomy of management; and introducing new incentive 
rewards, sales targets, investment criteria, or pricing principles (Ramanadham 1989, pp. 5-10).   
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most popular policy adopted in many transitional economies in Eastern Europe and the 
former CIS, particularly those with small populations (Marangos 2002). Alternatively, 
the government can decide to sell the SOE’s shares to the current management and 
employees of that SOE. Management buy-outs make those contributing to the 
company feel rewarded, thus encouraging their commitment, while at the same time 
state property remains – in a vague sense – ‘public’ and there is less impact on social 
welfare. As Marangos (2002) points out, however, both voucher distribution and 
management-employee buyout have often led to the eventual accumulation of shares in 
the hands of a few private domestic or foreign investors, especially when indigenous 
financial and managerial capabilities were embryonic.  
 
Other flexible forms of privatisation, such as contracting-out, outsourcing, the granting 
of concessions (sole rights to supply in certain areas and necessary infrastructure 
previously owned by SOEs), and public-private partnerships (PPPs), have been widely 
adopted by developed countries, especially in the English-speaking world. In 
contracting-out, outsourcing, and the granting of concessions, the government shifts 
the functions of direct production and delivery of a variety of public goods and 
services to private (or non-profit) vendors through competitive tendering procedures 
with the promise of cost effectiveness and service improvement. In this way, the public 
sector is downsized, as its traditional assets and jobs are relocated to the private sector 
while its main tasks are transformed to those of regulation and project management 
(Hodge 2004; Forrer et. al. 2010). According to Forrer et al. (2010), choices in regard 
to contracting out (to continue to make or to buy in), initially developed for firms 
operating on a profit-maximising basis (Williamson 2002), are integrated within the 
framework of the new public management (NPM) reforms which, inspired by 
neoliberalism, attempt to introduce ‘business thinking’ into the public sector’s 
activities.  
 
Public-private partnerships – most often employed in infrastructure development – 
represent something of an exception due to the long-term collaboration between the 
state and the private sector that is involved, and the extent to which the latter is 
engaged throughout in the processes of decision-making, design, and production or 
delivery of public goods and services. According to Forrer et al. (2010), the role of the 
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state is extended rather than ruptured in PPPs, in contrast with privatisation, while 
Hodge (2004) argues that such engagement with private firms involves ‘far-reaching 
contracts’ that transform the role of the state in a fundamentally similar manner. 
Whatever form is adopted and whether or not there is proper fiscal control and risk 
minimisation, the state remains accountable for guarding the public interest, and this 
requires an advanced capacity for monitoring the necessarily detailed rules and 
constraints of the contracts (Hodge 2004; Forrer et al. 2010). This explains why these 
forms of privatisation are often rather successful in developed countries, where 
enabling institutions have already been established. 
 
As previously mentioned, a privatisation program may be either ‘wholesale’ or 
‘gradualist’. The wholesale (or shock-therapy) approach advocates selling the SOEs 
‘as much as possible’ and ‘as fast as possible’, and was often endorsed by the 
transitional economies in Eastern Europe and the former CIS and by most countries in 
Latin America. The gradualist strategy has mainly been adopted by OECD 
governments, who were earnest proponents of privatisation but, interestingly, 
proceeded in their privatisations only with very careful planning, step-by-step 
implementation, and allowing for partial and flexible adjustments: ‘while the UK sold 
20 firms in the space of 10 years, for example, Mexico sold 150 in the space of six’ 
(Medeiros 2009, pp. 109-110).  
 
According to Vickers and Yarrow (1991), privatisers should carefully consider the 
settings or circumstances in which the SOEs exist and develop policy responses 
accordingly. There are several possibilities. First, some SOEs compete with private 
enterprises in the supply of commodified goods and services such as cars, airplanes, 
ship-building, banking and insurance that have little or nothing of the character of 
public goods and services. Second, some SOEs operate natural monopolies or by-fiat 
monopolies; for example, in water supply or electricity distribution (although power 
generation can be efficiently provided by several producers). Third, there are the 
providers of pure public goods and services. While the first type of SOE can be 
privatised with an eye mainly to economic concerns (for example, industrial policy), 
the privatisation of other types of SOEs needs careful planning to prevent adverse 
impacts on social welfare. Privatisation can also be examined with respect to the scope 
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and scale of the SOEs involved, especially within transition economies (Lipton & 
Sachs 1990b, Major 1993; Aslund 2007). Small-scale privatisations, normally of local-
level SOEs such as chains of shops and kiosks, are often implemented more easily 
since the tricky problem of asset valuation can be avoided through public auctions. In 
contrast, privatisation of large-scale enterprises can be highly challenging and 
controversial: ‘[h]ere, all the political, economic, and technical problems of 
privatisation coalesced […] resulting in extensive and complex legislation’ (Aslund 
2007, pp. 155-157).  
 
1.3 Vietnamese Terminology around Privatisation 
Privatisation has been understood in Vietnam in the narrowest sense, yet in a way that 
is consistent with the practice of Vietnam’s political economy. Even though Vietnam 
has moved towards a market economy, the straightforward usage of the term 
‘privatisation’ (tu nhan hoa) still sounds too capitalist to be accepted in a socialist 
country. Importantly, corporate law was only enacted in 1990, and joint-stock 
companies did not exist before then. Thus, when the Governmental Decision 202/CT 
was issued in 1992 to transfer some SOEs to private ownership as a pilot scheme, 
privatisation was interpreted as ‘equitisation’ (co phan hoa), which meant the 
transformation of the SOE into a joint-stock company so that private investors could 
become owners.  
 
In fact, a distinction is made between a one-member limited liability company, in 
which the state is the sole owner, and a joint-stock company, in which any proportion 
of ownership may be held by the private sector. Both procedures involve what Western 
countries know as ‘corporatisation’ (the creation of a corporate structure of 
organisation). The formation of a joint-stock company is called ‘equitisation’ and 
privatisation is understood as equitisation. The equitisation procedure not only suits the 
financial and managerial capabilities of the indigenous investors, but also accords with 
the gradual approach of the Vietnam party-state to the pursuit of privatisation.  
 
While equitisation mainly targets SOEs in manufacturing industries, other forms of 
privatisation, such as contracting-out, outsourcing, concessions and PPPs, have been 
widely implemented in enterprises that provide more purely public goods and services. 
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Such procedures are notionally known as commercialisation and socialisation. For 
example, public education and health care facilities are allowed to deliver 
commercialised-service units (i.e. for fees above the normal officially regulated rates) 
while still being required to maintain traditional low-fee services for the population at 
large and to compete with new private providers. Thus, commercialisation in the 
public sector has been complemented by deregulation and liberalisation, allowing for 
the entry of competing private suppliers, supposedly in order to meet various consumer 
demands. Public transport and public media provide other examples of mixtures of 
neoliberal reforms.  
 
Nevertheless, the boundaries of these terms are blurred – like ‘privatisation’, neither 
‘deregulation’ nor ‘liberalisation’ has an official Vietnamese equivalent – and the 
processes are subsumed under the broader term ‘socialisation’ (xa hoi hoa). This term 
is widely used by local people to refer to the mobilisation of private resources for 
public sector activities (such as the construction of a park or the sponsorship of festival 
fireworks) and, especially, to private contributions of the local population to jointly-
funded infrastructure development projects at district and village levels. Remarkably, 
while competitive bidding is now enforced by detailed regulations covering public 
procurements and outsourcing activities, this is not the case with contracting-out, 
concessions and PPPs in urban sewage collection, mining and transport infrastructure 
development, respectively. This reflects limitations on the state’s capacity to engage in 
contracting over an uncertain future3.  
 
Although Vietnamese terminology around privatisation is unique, Vietnam has 
experienced, in varying degrees, all forms of privatisation. Equitisation has been 
adopted in the local discourse as a variant of privatisation in the narrow sense and has 
been implemented within a distinct policy agenda whose main concern is for the 
economic aspects of privatisation, while commercialisation and socialisation have been 
approached loosely and broadly. In this dissertation, the term privatisation is used in a 
general sense to refer to the transferring of ownership of SOEs from the state to the 
                                                          
3 After a period of enthusiasm for PPPs, local officials have recognised more obstacles and uneven 
outcomes in practice. See: Bao Anh, ‘”Con duong PPPs”: khong nhu ly thuyet [PPPs application is unlike 
what theories promise]’, 24 February 2017, viewed 31 March 2017, http://www.vneconomy.vn).    
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private sector; this may include, but is not necessarily confined to, the narrow 
definition.  
 
1.4 State Intervention and the Formation of SOEs 
Since SOEs are the objects of privatisation policy, it is worth briefly discussing their 
formation and philosophical foundations. Despite the diversity of national political 
economic contexts, economic development models in which state interventionism 
plays a dominant role have been widely pursued. Whether or not one can associate 
state interventionism and the formation of SOEs with grand political economic 
theories such as Keynesianism, the rise of the welfare state and Marxism, they were 
undeniably part of the rapid growth of the world economy, driven by the ‘pursuit of 
full employment’ and ‘accelerated pace of technical progress’ after World War II 
(Shonfield 1965, pp. 63-67).  
 
According to Lavi-Faur (2005), the influence of classical laissez-faire economic 
policies declined within the capitalist world after the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Thereafter, the Keynesian interventionist state gained a significant foothold in the 
worldwide policy arena, especially after World War II (WWII). As a result, the welfare 
state and ‘active government’ were widely adopted in developed countries in the West, 
thanks not only to Keynesianism but also to the expansion of the social democratic 
movement beyond the Scandinavian countries (Shonfield 1965). At the same time, 
command and central planning, or at least the creation of ‘mixed economies’, informed 
to various degrees by socialist doctrine, were no less popular choices of Eastern bloc 
and many other newly independent, least developed countries (LDCs), (Nellis & 
Kikeri 1989). As Van De Walle (1989, p. 602) explains: 
 
First, it was widely thought that nationalisation and PEs [public enterprises] in 
general would provide governments access to much needed revenues […] with 
which they would be able to finance investment in priority sectors of the 
economy. Second, public production corresponded closely to an ideological 
climate in which the private sector was held in low esteem and a large public 
role in the economy was seen as necessary for rapid and sustained 
development. 
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In other regions, the visible hand of the state was enhanced. In Latin America, this 
took the form of protectionist and import-substitution policies (Manzetti 1999), while 
in Northeast Asian developmental states, the bureaucracy even played the role of chief 
architect for the implementation of national industrial policies, an idea that is discussed 
extensively by Woo-Cumings (ed. 1999).  
 
Although the extent to which statism was responsible for post-war economic success is 
still debated, support for the state’s ‘steering and rowing’ roles in the economy led to 
nationalisation and the formation of new enterprises in various industries that were 
SOEs from the start. Developed economies normally had a relatively smaller share of 
SOEs than their developing counterparts, yet they were no less significant. In the UK, 
for example, they accounted for ‘exactly 10% of the GDP, [with] GBP 55 billion in 
turnover and 1.75 employees’ by 1979, compared with an average of 17% or even 40-
60% of GDP in developing countries (Nellis & Kikeri 1989, p. 659).  
 
Political factors, of course, were also active in the establishment of SOEs in many 
countries. In Latin America, for example, SOEs resulted from the ‘nationalisation of 
public utilities, telecommunications, oil and mineral production […] as a means of 
fostering industrialisation and promoting the national private sector in the face of 
foreign competition’ (Medeiros 2009, p. 112). Other developing countries in Africa 
and Asia saw state involvement in economic activity not just as a means of tackling 
massive market failures, but as symbolic of their independence from their colonial 
legacies, especially the foreign private sector. SOEs taken over from the old colonial 
powers were also viewed by the new governments as a vehicle for delivering 
patronage rewards (Nellis & Kikeri 1989; Van De Walle 1989). In summary, after 
WWII, the state played a dominant role in the economy, leading to the formation of a 
significant SOE sector in various countries which, nevertheless, differed greatly in 
terms of historical legacy, level of economic development and industrial strategy.    
 
1.5 Privatisation in the Developed Countries 
Just as SOEs were formed to solve ‘market failures’ (coordination failures of the 
market), the reverse policy – denationalisation or privatisation – was prompted by the 
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alleged need to solve ‘government failures’. This development reflected an underlying 
shift in political economic doctrine.  
 
Initially, privatisation was introduced by Western European economies to address 
specific macro- and microeconomic issues, rather than as a universal policy. There 
seems to be a consensus in the literature that the wave of privatisation began with the 
conservative Thatcher government in the UK in 1979 (Ramanadham 1989; Van de 
Walle 1989; Hodge 2004; Megginson & Netter 2005; Ormerod 2014). Thatcher took 
power at the time of a record state budget deficit, and privatisation was seen as an 
attractive policy choice (Walker & Walker 2000; Parker 2009). Research during the 
previous decade purported to show that the SOE sector was inefficient and relied 
largely on state subsidies, which contributed significantly to the budget deficit. These 
studies were used to justify the privatisation of SOEs. According to several sources at 
the time (cited in Molyneux & Thompson 1987), SOEs in the UK were ‘third rate’ in 
their level of efficiency and they had no impact on ‘improving the allocation and 
effective use of resources’. Yet, as Parker (2009, pp. 17-18) points out, efficiency did 
not always improve as expected when SOEs were de-nationalised, and ‘not all of the 
nationalised industries were consistently poor performers’.  
 
In fact, both Kay and Thompson (1986) and Vickers and Yarrows (1991) emphasise 
that there had actually been no empirical evidence showing the superiority of the 
private sector over the public in terms of productivity. Nevertheless, the UK instituted 
a massive divestiture of state assets and the privatisation movement spread across 
Western Europe. Italy, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal followed the UK’s lead 
and these six countries became the world’s leading privatisers, accounting for 29% of 
the total number of asset transactions and 48% of the revenues raised (Bortolotti & 
Milella 2008, pp. 33-36). In general, privatisations were first implemented in the 
manufacturing and finance sectors – although British Petroleum (BP) and Cable and 
Wireless were the first to be privatised in the UK – followed by energy, 
telecommunications, transport and utilities in the 1990s. Privatisation peaked during 
this period but slowed abruptly at the turn of the century. In other West European 
countries, new governments confronted the pressures of tighter fiscal regulations in an 
integrated European Union. While privatisation was preferable to increased taxes, the 
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share float was also used as a strategy to gain popularity, with the prospect of 
financially positive outlooks (Bortolotti & Milella 2008).  
 
Overall, the privatisations that took place in Western Europe in general and the UK in 
particular have been assessed as rather successful (Vickers & Yarrow 1991; Bortolotti 
& Milella 2008; Ormerod 2014), albeit with many reservations. First, while the 
objectives of improving business performance and customer service appear to have 
been achieved, there was no robust reduction in the fiscal deficit, according to 
calculations by Bortolotti and Milella (2008, pp. 58-60). In fact, there was often a 
trade-off between fiscal and efficiency effects (Kay & Thompson 1986; Van De Walle 
1989). For example, the privatisation of National Freight emphasised the improvement 
of management incentives, while that of BP and Britoil emphasised revenues, and the 
privatisation strategies that were adopted differed accordingly (Vickers & Yarrow 
1991, p. 122).  
 
The implementation of each process of privatisation was accompanied by important 
policy changes, including the introduction of regulatory policies for competition. 
These latter included policies encouraging new market entries, the creation of 
‘contestable markets’ where none had existed before, and the imposition of regulatory 
constraints on market power where monopolistic power remained. As Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988, p. 79) observe: 
 
[I]n many circumstances, the competitive process provides an incentive system 
that impels private firms to behave in ways that are broadly consistent with 
efficient resources allocation. But such circumstances do not always hold […]. 
There is then a need for regulatory policy to influence private sector behaviour 
by establishing an appropriate incentive system to guide or constrain economic 
decisions.  
 
Additionally, independent and effective state regulators need to be established to 
protect consumer interests, particularly with regard to price control (using methods 
such as rate-of-return or RPI-X and yardstick competition to set a ‘fair rate of return’ 
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or ‘price cap’), and binding firms with ‘non-commercial obligations’ (Vickers & 
Yarrow 1988, 1991; Beesley & Littlechild 1989; Van De Walle 1989; Parker 2009).  
 
Second, privatisation was expected to fortify financial market development yet its 
success depended on the maturity of financial institutions and the stock market, not 
only in terms of absorption capacity (so the firm’s equities are not under-priced in a 
share-issue privatisation) but also of the institutional constraints the financial market 
imposes on private firms, such as transparency, management and employee incentive 
improvements through share options (Bortolotti & Milella 2008).  
 
Third, the financial market importantly allows a right-wing government to fulfil one of 
the political aims of privatisation, that is, to create a ‘popular capitalism’ by widening 
equity ownership as much as possible - ‘numbered in millions’ - through SIP (Vickers 
& Yarrow 1991, p. 123). According to Bortolotti & Milella 2008, pp. 60-61), however, 
part of the bipartisan political motive was to compete with the redistributive policies of 
the Left and prevent any attempt at re-nationalisation. In fact, most of the shares were 
then accumulated by institutional shareholders.   
 
Fourth, though privatisation was implemented on a large scale, corporate governance 
in privatised SOEs was not changed on a corresponding scale due to a propensity for 
partial privatisation and the popular use of ‘golden shares’4. With the exception of the 
UK, where the average percentage of capital sold reached nearly 90%, most countries 
in Western Europe engaged in partial privatisation of around 60.8% (34.5% via public 
offers and 75.5% via private sales); overall, during 1977-2003 the majority of state-
ownership was sold in only 59% of the 1,133 deals. Golden shares have been widely 
used to protect privatised firms in industries relating to national security from foreign 
mergers and to grant the state some sort of special voting rights in privatised utilities 
(Bortolotti & Milella 2008, pp. 62-67).          
                                                          
4 According to Bortolotti and Milella (2008, p. 67), ‘golden shares can broadly be defined as the 
complex of special powers granted to the state and the statutory constraints in privatised companies’. 
Golden shares allow the state to have representatives on boards of directors, to consent to or to veto a 
variety of important issues, and to constrain the ownership structure or voting rights or the companies 
in regard to national interests. These capabilities can be exerted ‘even without owning the majority of 
stock in the company or a single share of capital’ (Bortolotti & Milella 2008, p. 67), and are observable 
most frequently in sectors of defence, telecommunications, oil and gas, utilities, and transportation.   
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Fifth, it must be remembered that privatisation did not proceed smoothly in the UK. 
When privatisation reached the railways sector, considerable controversy ensued 
(Ormerod, 2014), and the government had to renationalise the financially-troubled 
Railtrack.  
 
In summary, privatisation in Western Europe – though of great scope and scale – was 
generally implemented gradually and deliberately, and there was clear recognition that 
some institutions had to be created along with or as prerequisites for privatisation to 
ensure a successful outcome. This has also been evident in the privatisation practices 
of other OECD countries beyond Western Europe, such as Australia and Japan (see 
Chapter 2).  An exception is the United States, where contracting-out has been the 
major form of privatisation due to the minimal size of the SOE sector in the economy.  
 
Privatisation experiences in Australia appear to have been no less vigorous than those 
in Britain. From the middle of the 19th century, Australia was characterised by what 
has been called a ‘colonial socialism’, establishing a ‘supportive partnership’ between 
the public and private sectors that continued well into the 20th century. On one hand, 
the Australian government profoundly influenced the economy either indirectly 
through ‘regulatory and allocative’ policies or directly by participating in the market 
through a large number of SOEs. On the other hand, private business interests were 
both advanced by and absorbed into public policies (Butlin, Barnard & Pincus 1982, 
pp. 4, 10-12).  
 
For a long time Australia had a large SOE sector, ranging from ‘transport and 
communications, water and sewage, electricity and gas, [to] banking and finance’ 
(Butlin, Barnard & Pincus 1982, p. 236) which, by 1990, accounted for 7% and 9% of 
GDP and employment, respectively (Abbott & Cohen 2014). Although most SOEs 
enjoyed a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic position, they were ‘run with much less 
attention to maximum overall profit [than were private firms]’ (Butlin, Barnard & 
Pincus 1982, p. 238). Given the significant level of autonomy granted by government, 
cross-subsidisation within a multidivisional industrial organisation, such as the Post 
Office (Butlin, Barnard & Pincus 1982), was sufficiently effective to create an image 
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for these enterprises of better performance compared to SOEs in many other countries 
(Hodge 2004). Nonetheless, according to Hodge (2004), privatisation proceeded in 
Australia during the 1990s at both the national and state levels on a scale that ranks it 
third in the OECD, with a total value of over A$95 billion (Walker & Walker 2000, p. 
8). The largest privatisations included: Victorian electricity generators and distributors 
(from 1992-98, A$22.5 billion); gas distributors (A$6.3 billion); Commonwealth Bank 
(through four stages, from 1991-97, A$8.1 billion); Qantas (two stages, from 1993-96, 
A$2.1 billion); 49.9% of Telstra (two tranches, from 97-99, A$30.3 billion); and 
airports in major cities (from 1997-2007).  
 
In Australia, the use of direct sales prevailed over public share floats, which were 
reserved for large privatisations, and there were only a few cases of staff-buyouts. The 
revenues were mainly used to help pay government debt (Walker & Walker 2000; 
Hodge 2004; Abbott & Cohen 2014). In general, privatisation in Australia has been 
assessed as having had mixed results. Improvements in productivity followed the 
privatisation of Qantas and major airports, although these may be attributed to 
corporatisation prior to the sales and, particularly, to the regulatory policies that helped 
introduce competition rather than to the privatisation itself (Abbott & Cohen 2014). 
Telstra, by contrast, is a notorious case of failed privatisation, due not only to under-
pricing (Walker & Walker 2000) but also to a range of issues that typically arise in the 
transformation of a state monopoly into a private equivalent. Privatised Telstra went so 
far as to refuse to make network improvements if the government did not increase its 
funding or put in place other favourable policies (McLaren 2016).         
 
Most significantly, privatisation remains an on-going process in Australia today, 
attracting a high degree of public concern and dispute. One notable recent example 
was the discussion about the sale of the electric ‘poles and wires’ in New South Wales 
(NSW) against the backdrop of a state election. Until recently, public ownership has 
characterised all four components of the electricity market (generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail) in Western Australia, Northern Territory, and Tasmania. The 
private sector similarly controls all of the electricity industry of Victoria and South 
Australia. The Australian Capital Territory has chosen a joint-venture approach, while 
NSW and Queensland have privatised the generation and retail parts of the industry 
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but kept transmission and distribution in public hands. In other words, there exist 
flexible solutions for running the electricity value chain depending on the political 
economy of each state.  
 
Essentially, there is no sign that any mode of ownership is superior if the price of the 
utility is used as a benchmark (RMIT ABC Fact Check 2016). In fact, power bills are 
dependent on a variety of factors, including not only the costs of each segment of the 
value chain and the particular environmental policies of the state government involved, 
but also the household consumption stereotype. Assessment must also take into 
account the business’s capacity for and commitment to technological improvements in 
the network and services, especially whether it allows innovation and use of new 
energy sources - for example, the ability of energy companies to buy-back the surplus 
energy from households’ solar generation. All of these matters were covered in the 
debates between the parties’ candidates in the NSW election of 2015, in which the 
Coalition parties proposed the sale of 50% of AusGrid & Endeavour Energy 
(distributor) and 100% of TransGrid (transmission), while retaining another distributor 
– Essential Energy – as wholly state-owned (Kozaki & Brown 2015). It was clearly 
indicated that the revenues of about A$20 billion expected from the sales were to be 
invested in the development of key state infrastructure projects that would otherwise 
be financed from taxes or public debt (Foschia 2015). The proponents of privatisation 
won the election, but the new government’s agenda was approved by the state 
parliament only after the government committed to putting all the above issues relating 
to the efficiency of the future network into the sales contracts, and to referring the bid 
to the Foreign Investment Review Board to ensure there was no conflict with national 
security. In the event, TransGrid was sold to a consortium of Canadian, Middle Eastern 
and local investors for over A$10.2 billion (Gerathy 2015). 
 
In an election in Queensland at about the same time, however, the party proposing 
privatisation was defeated. Woods and Lewis (2015) cited an online survey showing 
that most of the Australian respondents were sceptical about the promise of efficiency 
and benefits of privatisation. Only 25% agreed with the idea that ‘Selling-off public 
utilities to private companies will help the economy’; 36% agreed that ‘Private 
companies can run public utilities more efficiently than the governments’; 72% agreed 
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with the proposition that ‘Water and electricity suppliers are too important to be sold 
off’; and 70% agreed that ‘Prices always increase more when the services are 
privatised’ (70%).   
 
Again, the Australian experience in privatisation is consistent with that of other 
developed countries in having outcomes that were uneven and controversial. 
Essentially, the success of privatisation is not unconditional. Of course, ideology 
helped to drive the push for privatisation in developed economies, yet the process 
proceeded with rule-based, gradualist and deliberate planning, particularly in relation 
to the readiness of necessary enabling institutions. In developed countries, the process 
appears to be nearly corruption-free and no spontaneous privatisations5 have occurred. 
Public and private forms of ownership continue to coexist today, and remain 
interconnected in vast areas of the economy in most developed countries (Bortolotti & 
Millela 2008).   
 
During the 1970s, as previously noted, the performance of SOEs in developed 
countries was generally under-rated by neoliberal economists and privatisation was 
acclaimed ‘as a policy strategy in the developed economies’ (Parker & Kirkpatrick 
2005, p. 526). The implementation process in developed countries has, however, been 
lengthy and the outcomes have been uneven, conditional, politically shaped, and 
debatable. Hence the introduction of privatisation as a panacea for developing 
countries by international financial institutions during the 1990s must be seen as 
problematic.  
 
1.6 Introducing Privatisation into Developing Countries 
Regardless of the above-mentioned institutional differences and reservations, 
privatisation was introduced into developing countries by international financial 
institutions, most notably the WB and IMF, as a one-size-fits-all policy. This section 
                                                          
5 Spontaneous privatisation often occurs in transition economies, mostly due to the vaguely defined 
property rights that result from an inadequate institutional framework. As enhancement of managerial 
autonomy was part of the SOE restructuring programs before privatisation, many managers took this 
opportunity to appropriate the SOEs’ assets. As Boycko, Sleifer and Vishny (1995, p. 60) explain, ‘[i]n 
1991-1992, it was common for a firm to sell so-called surplus assets, or even final output, at a discount 
to a company privately owned by the manager. Once this process is complete, managers effectively 
become full owners’. 
39 
 
examines how privatisation was introduced into groups of developing economies that 
differed greatly from each other in terms of history, political economy, and the 
performance of their SOEs.    
 
Normally, the SOE sector has a greater share in developing economies than in 
developed ones. This may reflect the fact that market failures are more prevalent in the 
former than in the latter (Stiglitz 1989). It has been argued that there is no empirical 
evidence showing ‘that a large state sector tends to be associated with lower than 
expected economic growth’ (Jalilian & Weiss as cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick et al. 
1997, p. 846). That is to say, developing countries are not poorer because of a large 
SOE sector. While the SOE sector in European developed countries accounted for 
‘between 10% and 15% of GDP […] before the[ir] first privatisation[s]’ (Bortolotti & 
Millela 2008, pp. 41-42), the ratio for Latin American and East Asian developing 
economies ranged from 10-17%, and for African countries from 17-20% – with some 
exceptions as high as 40-60% in Egypt, Zambia, Algeria (Nellis & Kikeri 1989, p. 
659). According to Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988, pp. 5-6):  
 
Public enterprises are found in almost all types of economic activities in LDCs. 
They are traditionally concentrated in the public utilities and natural resources 
sectors, but are also prominent in manufacturing in a large number of countries 
[… especially, more than] the industrial countries.  
 
In centrally-planned socialist economies at the point of ‘transitioning’ to capitalism, 
the SOE sector has been absolutely dominant. For example, in China and Vietnam, the 
SOEs – leaving aside the collective farms and traders – used to form the only 
officially-recognised business sector. Not being able legally to establish business 
entities, the private economic activities at household and individual levels were often 
associated with the black market. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former 
CIS, the share of property held by the SOEs was almost the totality (85-90%) of the 
national assets (Major 1993, p. ix). In spite of the difficulty in putting together 
consistent data, Major (1993, p. 24) suggested that the number of SOEs available for 
privatisation ‘ranged between 2,400 in Hungary and 45,000 in the USSR’. 
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By the early 1990s, many of the transitional and developing countries faced huge 
economic difficulties. While the transitional economies had to cope with the break-up 
of the Soviet Union and COMECON, the economic challenges of other groups of 
developing countries derived from various causes – for example, the debt crisis, 
currency devaluation and capital flight in the case of Latin America and deficit state 
budgets and inflation in the cases of Asia and Africa. It should not be forgotten that 
almost the whole world, including developed countries, also faced economic downturn 
caused by the oil crisis from the mid-1970s. The possible exceptions were Japan and 
the four newly industrialised economies (NIEs) in East Asia, whose remarkable growth 
record generated envy among their developing friends and worried their developed 
partners. In such a context, the developing nations and transitional economies had to 
seek the help of international financial institutions, especially the WB and IMF. These 
institutions then insisted on structural adjustment, including the privatisation of SOEs 
as one of the key conditions for assistance (Cook & Kirkpatrick 1988; Bienen & 
Waterbury 1989).  
 
According to research by the WB’s experts, SOEs in developing countries often 
operated at a low level of efficiency (World Bank 1994; 1995). Notwithstanding 
favourable state policies and vast provisions of state resources, most of them were not 
returning profits. Many that did post profits did so because of monopoly power or 
subsidies. It was argued that profits came at the expense of investment for the 
development of other sectors, especially those in the hands of private enterprises. In 
any case, the state budget deficit could not bear the ongoing cost of subsidies. It was 
also claimed that management of the SOEs was often compromised by political 
considerations (Van De Walle 1989), that managers therefore had to pursue many 
purposes other than focusing on profitability, and that managers lacked business 
managerial skills (Nellis & Kikeri 1989, pp. 663-664). These managers, who have 
been characterised as ‘bureaucrats in business’, had neither the autonomy to solve the 
SOEs’ problems nor the accountability for outcomes that their counterparts in the 
private sector had (World Bank 1995).  
 
The institutions argued that the only way to respond to these problems was to reform 
the SOEs by means of privatisation, based on the finding that ‘successful SOEs 
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reformers divested more, especially where the initial size of the state enterprise sector 
was large’ (World Bank 1995, p. 5). Further, the WB conveyed the value of the 
wholesale approach and the superiority of the private sector in their advice to recipient 
economies – as if the benefits from privatisation should be taken for granted. The 
recipients were told to sell ‘big firms first’ to reap larger potential benefits, writing off 
SOE debt ‘to unload a company’ from financial burdens, and ‘firing SOE employees 
prior to privatisation’ to reduce labour disputes (World Bank 1995, pp. 20-21). Thus, 
privatisation, as an on-going practice in developed countries, was introduced by the 
WB into all developing countries, despite the great differences in the contexts and 
structures of their economies. 
 
According to Cramer (1999), the term ‘privatisation’ was not initially used in the 
WB’s prescriptions. In the World Development Report 1983, the Bank only talked 
about SOE reform in general, involving prescriptions such as introducing competition, 
market pricing, and reducing state support, especially by way of subsidies. The 
prevailing mindset, it appeared, was that ‘competition is more important than 
ownership’ (Cramer 1999, p. 2). By the 1990s, however, the WB began to express 
impatience with the slow pace of SOE reform and placed the blame entirely on the 
failure to transform ownership. Since then, the Bank has described privatisation as a 
breakthrough measure to achieve the primary objective of efficiency enhancement. In 
other words, it has shifted attention away from acknowledged conditions for effective 
privatisation. 
 
An example was the report on Bangladesh privatisation and adjustment (World Bank 
1994, p. 13) in which the WB advocated privatisation for 
three inter-related classes of reasons: the positive effects on government’s 
fiscal situation; improvement in the efficiency of enterprises following 
privatisation; and signalling effects that will promote greater investment, and 
consequently higher growth in the medium-term.  
 
More tellingly, these propositions were mainly supported by examples of large-scale 
privatisation in other countries (the UK, Chile and Argentina) which, the WB insisted, 
had been successful, regardless of the differences between these political economies 
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and between them and the Bangladesh case. Although it might have been true that 
SOEs in that country were unprofitable, the WB’s main argument revealed its 
overwhelming bias against the public sector through its unjustifiable embellishment of 
the private sector: 
 
In profit-making SOEs, the case for privatisation is no less compelling […] The 
principal argument in favour of privatisation is improvement of efficiency 
under private ownership […] State-owned enterprises have a multiplicity of 
goals […] maximising profits being a dismal fifth out of six objectives […] No 
enterprises can hope to compete with the private sector when profit 
maximisation is not their primary objective (World Bank 1994, pp. 13-16).  
 
Indeed, the WB overlooked the basic distinction between these two types of 
ownership, rooted in the rationale for their establishment, which was not to make them 
appear as ‘alternatives to one another’ (Cook, Kirkpatrick & Nixson 1998, pp. 4-5). In 
its enthusiastic endorsement of the superiority of the private sector’s performance, the 
WB even promised that privatisation of SOEs in the financial, utilities and 
transportation sectors could benefit private firms by making ‘key inputs become 
available on a timely, market-priced basis’ (World Bank 1994, p. 19). This is 
unconvincing in that, in the absence of competition, efficiency improvements are as 
unlikely to show up in higher profits as they are in lower prices.  
 
Similar views were repeated in the WB’s subsequent reports on Adjustment in Africa 
(1994), Bureaucrats in business (1995) and Privatisation in Africa (1998) which, 
according to Cramer (1999, p. 3), influenced most of the policy discussion of the 
1990s in which privatisation was taken for granted as ‘unquestionably beneficial’ and 
‘the irreversibility of [public sector] reforms’ was reinforced. Ever since the notion of 
the superiority of ownership transfer gained legitimacy, the discourse has only 
concerned the desirable scale and pace of privatisation rather than the extent of its 
suitability in each country or its effective implementation.  
 
In summary, from being part of a package of reforms to meet the primary objectives of 
increased revenue and efficiency, initially in the UK, privatisation has been promoted 
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as an objective in its own right and presented to developing countries as some kind of 
panacea for their different economic issues (Cramer 1999). The philosophical 
underpinnings of this prescription, however, have been widely critiqued.  
 
1.7 The Washington Consensus, Neoliberalism and Later 
Modifications 
Why did the WB become so strongly engaged with privatisation? To find a satisfactory 
answer, it is necessary to understand the overall theoretical framework within which 
this approach was adopted and the politics of the self-proclaimed ‘autonomous’, 
‘apolitical’ organisation (Wade 1996). It has been widely recognised that a consensus 
– the so-called Washington Consensus, about the desirability of a package of 
neoliberal policies prevailed in Washington – more specifically, within the WB, the 
IMF and the US government (Biersteker 1990). This is the broader framework of 
privatisation (Cramer 1999). The package prescribes ten policies, including 
privatisation of SOEs6, which represented a comprehensive approach in favour of the 
then fashionable wave of globalisation and market liberalisation at the end of the Cold 
War (Williamson 1990). It was a manifestation of orthodox economics and Western 
political triumphalism. In fact, these policies are to be found in most of the economic 
integration agendas and international assistance programs of the ensuing two decades.  
 
Following its retreat in the 1930s and the three subsequent decades, neoclassical 
economics experienced a resurgence during the 1970s as part of the development of 
neoliberalism, and has dominated economic policy-making since the 1990s. In contrast 
with Keynesianism and other heterodox ideologies, the orthodoxy of the 1990s 
proposed an expansion of market rules and the private sector. In addition to claiming 
the ‘triumph of capitalism’ in the CEE and the former CIS, the orthodoxy argued that 
the success of economies in East Asia – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore – were also due to capitalism and neoclassical policy prescriptions, 
notwithstanding academic accounts such as that of Chalmers Johnson (1982) on the 
Japanese model of economic growth. In its report on The East Asian miracle, the WB 
                                                          
6 The market-based and liberalised policies address the following ten areas: fiscal deficits, public 
expenditure priorities, tax reform, interest rates, exchange rates, trade policy, foreign direct 
investment, privatisation, deregulation, and security of property rights (Williamson 1990). 
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(1993) interpreted the success of these NIEs as reflecting best policy practices based 
on sound neoclassical principles, although it did admit that the evidence was not clear 
(Biersteker 1990; Wade 1996). The successes were attributed to pro-market policies 
which, according to Balassa (as cited in Kiely 1998, p. 64), included ‘limited 
government intervention in the economy, a low level of price distortion … [and] an 
outward-oriented strategy of export promotion’. Implicit in those policies is a belief in 
the superiority of the private sector over the state. Particularly, in regard to 
privatisation, it is said that as long as private enterprise is kept free of political 
interference, managers will concentrate on profit maximisation under the supervision 
of self-interested shareholders and within the constraints of the disciplined financial 
market. In other words, if the private sector can avoid public hindrances, it can 
improve productivity (Nellis & Kikeri, 1989). 
 
By the mid-1990s, as the practical outcomes of these policies proved to be less fruitful 
than expected (Cramer 1999), the ‘pure’ neoliberal perspective of the Washington 
Consensus was slightly revised to acknowledge an acceptable economic role for the 
state in supporting the market – the state can be market-friendly and capable of ‘good 
governance’. In its report on The East Asian Miracle, the World Bank (1993, p. 10) 
stated: 
 
[T]he appropriate role of government is to ensure adequate investments in 
people, provide a competitive climate for private enterprise, keep the economy 
open to international trade, and maintain a stable macro economy.  
 
The WB advocated a market-friendly government that only intervened reluctantly in 
deference to the superior efficiency of the market and conformed to either international 
or domestic market disciplines. Otherwise, it proposed, the main roles of the state 
should be those of neutral arbitrator and transparency enhancer (Kiely 1998). Good 
governance means ‘not just less government but better government – government that 
concentrates its efforts less on direct interventions and more on enabling others to be 
productive’ (World Bank as cited in Kiely 1998, p. 68). Such a pro-market government 
represents good governance (Kiely 1998). The WB’s recommendations do reluctantly 
recognise the reality of state intervention (Gainsborough 2010). Thus, the adapted 
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version of the Washington Consensus calls for a regulatory supportive role of the 
government to the markets (Braithwaite 2008) but ‘not a director of the private-sector 
exchanges’ (Wade 1996, p. 5). Accordingly, for privatisation to work, the state was 
urged to be ‘politically desirable, politically feasible and credible’ (World Bank 1995). 
In fact, this may represent ‘a more invasive form’ (Gainsborough 2010, p. 477) or the 
‘durability’ (Cahill 2014) of the neoliberal agenda rather than any supposition of its 
retreat. 
 
The Washington Consensus was seriously challenged by the Japanese government 
(Wade 1996, p. 4). The adapted version of the policy recommendations did result from 
the power contest between the US and Japan during 1990s as the latter with its statist 
philosophy was rising as a ‘miracle’ model of economic growth. What is of greater 
concern is the resultant ‘unchallenged consensus’, the set of commitments which 
smaller developing countries had to make unconditionally as ‘a proxy or indicator of 
national resolve or “political will” in order to obtain [the loans and] international 
approval’ at the cost of social and economic consequences in the longer term of which 
they were unaware (Biersteker 1990, p. 478). As against the claims that the 
commitments were economically rational and politically neutral, the World Bank 
demands of borrowers were the result of contestation within the organisation. In 
general, however, the core neoliberal tenets remained unchanged. Theoretically, the 
Washington Consensus was underpinned by a set of economic philosophies, including 
the traditional presumptions within neoclassical economics – the neoliberal concepts of 
individualism and a free market (or minimal state). Mainstream neoclassical 
economics continues to valorise individualism, private enterprise and free markets. 
This position was endorsed by several neoliberal thinkers during the 1970s. Frederik 
Hayek – the well-known exponent of individualism – posited a sort of Darwinism 
according to which a market economy comprising rugged individualists is ‘conducive 
to change and growth’ (Stilwell 2002, p. 148). Concurrently, Milton Friedman (1970) 
famously stated that corporate executives, provided they comply with the law, should 
perform only the one task of making as much money as possible for their shareholders, 
implicitly equating best business financial performance with socially optimal benefits. 
This is the argument derived from classical economics – that, thanks to the invisible 
hand of the market, the self-interested pursuit of individuals or companies will 
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generate social good. Within the voluminous literature written on privatisation, 
however, very few authors have confronted the extensive criticisms of the underlying 
presumptions.  
 
1.8 Philosophical Underpinnings of Privatisation 
Further support for privatisation came from the theory of the firm, the theory of 
property rights, agency theory, and public choice theory. These doctrines belong to 
new institutionalism, which served as the theoretical foundation for the resurgence of 
neoliberalism, with privatisation as one of its flagship instruments. 
 
1.8.1 Theory of the Firm 
A novel theory of the firm was developed by Ronald Coase around the issue of 
minimising transaction costs. According to Coase (1937), the private corporation is the 
structure that allows transaction costs to be minimised and, thus, the boundary of the 
firm is also the boundary of efficiency. Implicit in this view is the superiority of the 
private sector (Williamson 1981).   
 
1.8.2 Theory of Property Rights 
The theory of property rights argues that the more ownership is concentrated in private 
hands, the more incentives are created to exert residual rights to the asset, and vice 
versa (Alchian 1965; Demsetz 1967). According to Alchian (1965, p. 827), ‘the 
possibility of concentrating one’s wealth in certain areas permits greater correlation of 
personal interest and effort in line with wealth holdings’; hence only ‘private owners 
have strong incentives to use their property rights in the most valuable way’ (Alchian 
& Demsetz 1973, p. 22). On the other hand, due to the free rider problem, people tend 
to over-utilise assets in public ownership for their own benefit, at the expense of 
externalisation of costs to the society as a whole. Consequently, transaction costs are 
often raised within the public sector, inherently leading to inefficiency. These were not 
new ideas in classical economics. It was ‘Adam Smith [who] wrote in the Wealth of 
Nations that people are more prodigal with the wealth of others than with their own’ 
(Adams & Mengistu 2008, p. 80). So, according to property rights theorists, ownership 
does matter in relation to efficiency.  
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1.8.3 Agency Theory 
Agency theory, with its concern that there are always problems in the relationship 
between principal and agent, is also invoked in the argument for privatisation. 
Principals and agents, the theory proposes, might pursue different goals and interests 
while, due to information asymmetry, it is hard for the principal to ensure that the 
agent acts in accordance with the principal’s strategy (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama 
& Jensen 1983b). Risk-sharing may occur as ‘the principal and agent have different 
attitudes toward risk’ (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 58). Greater risk aversion on the part of an 
agent, for example, might increase agency costs and thus reduce returns to residual 
claimants. While principal and agent are regulated by the financial market and the 
labour market, respectively, external monitoring mechanisms of the stock market and 
takeover market can exert ‘pressure to orient a corporation’s decision process toward 
the interests of residual claimants’ (Fama & Jensen 1983a, p. 313), thus lowering the 
agency costs for private firms. Such agency problems, it is argued, are endemic to 
SOEs since their real owners – the dispersed population – are often negligent in 
supervising the state bureaucratic managers. Explicitly, agency theory has entrenched a 
belief in the superiority of the market mechanism and corporate structure in terms of 
shareholder value maximisation, which is used to favour privatisation.    
 
1.8.4 Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory resembles agency theory insofar as it views the citizens and the 
state as being in a principal–agent relationship. Does the current political-economic 
process permit citizens to supervise their alleged representatives? Stilwell (2002, p. 
203) explains that public choice theory – a kind of bridge between neoclassical 
economics and political science – ‘represents politicians and bureaucrats as subspecies 
of Homo economicus, self-interested individuals whose actions are calculated 
responses to vote-maximising processes’. Thus, they appeal to private interests and 
only coincidentally act in accordance with genuine public interests. Instead, state 
power is appropriated by private interests. Government for the people, by the people 
and of the people is undermined. According to Buchanan (1979, p. 46), ‘government 
or political organisation is shown to “fail” in certain respects when tested for the 
satisfaction of idealised criteria for efficiency and equity’. Hence, while both the 
market and government have their own failures, the market mechanism is still a better 
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option because it is the place where all rational individuals can act freely in pursuit of 
their interests.  
 
[S]ince there is little reason to believe that the private interests that have 
"captured" legislators will reflect the interests of the poorer members of 
society, public choice theorists have suggested that privatisation might even 
have a progressive effect by reducing such exploitative activity in the public 
sector (Wright 1993, p. 17).  
 
As a result, ‘public choice theory has been the rationale most widely advanced for 
privatisation attempts’ (Wright 1993, p. 6). Interestingly, however, the pendulum 
seems to have swung from suspicion over self-interested politicians to optimistic belief 
in the impartiality of politics-free markets. 
 
1.8.5 Application to Privatisation 
These doctrines have provided different kinds of theoretical foundations for 
privatisation, but they refer to principles or normative propositions (what should 
happen) rather than to empirical evidence. For example, there is a common proposition 
that SOE managers often serve particular economic and political interests instead of 
the goals of productive efficiency (Adams & Mengistu 2008) and that the latter would 
be achieved were enterprises located in the private sector. WB experts – for example 
Nellis and Kireki (1989, p. 662) – express concerns about managerial competency: 
‘Boards of Directors are, in the main, composed of civil servants who defend 
ministerial interests rather than promote the welfare of the firm’. It can be argued that 
this statement begs the questions of what shapes ministerial interests and what 
evidence exists to show that ownership transfer will improve the performance of 
SOEs. Nevertheless, they persist in claiming that privatisation would bring the 
following benefits: (i) ‘less political interference’; (ii) managerial incentives ‘linked to 
productivity and profitability norms’; (iii) the exposure of firms to ‘the discipline of 
commercial financial markets’; and (iv) supervision of firms by the ‘self-interested 
shareholders’ with ‘commercial profitability as the main objective’ (Nellis & Kireki 
1989, p. 663). This is a typical example of how neoliberal thought has been integrated 
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into advocacy of privatisation7. Given such views, it is not hard to see why suggestions 
for privatisation have extended into numerous areas, including the provision of most 
public goods and utilities.  
 
1.9 Critiques of Privatisation 
Critics of neoliberal views on privatisation, who include former supporters of the 
Washington Consensus, have identified a range of concerns that challenge the 
theoretical foundation of privatisation arguments. These are discussed below. 
 
1.9.1 Institutional Prerequisites for Privatisation 
Joseph Stiglitz, a leading WB advisor at the time of privatisation’s ascendancy, called 
for modifications to the propositions of the Washington Consensus which came to be 
known as the Post-Washington Consensus. According to Cramer’s (1999) account, 
Stiglitz concluded that privatisation was still necessary to ‘reduce the temptation’ to 
rely on the state for ‘state subsidy and protection’ (p. 5), but argued that 
 
‘...the advocates of privatisation may have overestimated the benefits and 
underestimated the costs.’ [Although] most people at the time would have 
preferred to have proper regulatory systems and competition in place before 
privatisation […] privatising without the appropriate prerequisites in place 
‘seemed a reasonable gamble’ (pp. 3-4). 
 
Stiglitz’s embrace of competition and regulation as necessary complementary policies 
to privatisation is indeed consistent with the conclusions of many earlier scholars (Kay 
& Thompson 1986; Vickers & Yarrow 1988, 1991; Beesley & Littlechild 1989; Van 
De Walle 1989). For example, Mansoor and Hemming had written that ‘allocative 
efficiency is a function of market structure rather than ownership’ (as cited in Van De 
Walle 1989, p. 605).  
 
Similarly, Cook, Kirkpatrick and Nixson (1998, p. 4) proposed that  
 
                                                          
7 Another example was Privatising Russia, in which property rights theory and public choice theory 
were brought fully into play by advocates of the shock therapy approach to privatision (see Boycko, 
Sleifer & Vishny 1995).    
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…the achievement of privatisation has been insufficient in itself to ensure 
private sector growth. […] In one sense, of course, the transfer of public sector 
assets to the private sector, ceteris paribus, increases the number of private 
sector enterprises. But at another level, a smaller or weaker public sector may 
paradoxically dampen or constrain the dynamism and growth of the private 
sector.  
   
It seems that developing countries have placed too much dependence on privatisation, 
often cluttered with multiple objectives that might even have been at odds with each 
other (Cramer 1999). Moreover, the fundamental problems with developing countries 
often seem to be with the implementation (due to technical and political constraints) 
rather than the design of policy (Cook & Kirkpatrick 1988; Bienen & Waterbury 1989; 
Van De Walle 1989). Accordingly, on one hand, the effectiveness of privatisation 
transactions is hampered by inadequate managerial capacity, the inability of fledgling 
capital markets to meet demands for technical advice and funding for large-scale 
investments, and a lack of administrative capacity for regulating firms after 
privatisation. On the other hand, privatisation is also challenged in regard to the 
distribution of its private benefits, especially insofar as that is influenced by patronage 
and by ethnic, religious and regional affiliations.  
 
Stiglitz’s emphasis on the need for state-led improvements in the institutional 
framework for privatisation (rather than retreat by the state) indicates that the gradual 
approach towards privatisation is more suitable than shock therapy, since a lengthy 
process is required for the state to carry out all necessary ‘institutional change[s]’ – 
particularly, perhaps, in fostering competition, which is considered by some as being 
of the highest priority (Kolodko as cited in Cramer 1999, p. 5). In effect, Stiglitz’s 
argument is that the market and the state have opposite strengths and weaknesses, and 
that the two should complement rather than replace one another – that is, state 
governance of privatisation (Hodge 2002).  
 
1.9.2 The Broad Theoretical Case against Privatisation 
Stiglitz (2008a, p. xi) criticises the neoliberal belief that private ownership intrinsically 
outperforms the public sector as ‘simpleminded’. Similarly, King and Pitchford (1998, 
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p. 314) assert that the rationale for privatisation is only ‘superficially attractive … [but] 
lacking intellectual rigour’. The topic of how broad and differently-shaped 
privatisation programs should be is hardly ever addressed by neoliberals. This may be 
explained by the fact that the neoliberal argument, contrary to its proponents’ claims, 
has ‘less to do with efficiency’ than with ideological prejudices (Stiglitz 2008a) and 
the conflict of political interests (Butler 1989; Cahill & Beder 2005). It is argued that 
differences of efficiency between the public and private sectors are not easy to discern 
but can only be learnt from ‘historical experience’ (Rowthorn & Chang 1992; King & 
Pitchford 1998; Quiggin 1999, p. 42). A priori claims are essentially constructed from 
‘myths of the Left and Right rather than on any objective assessment of costs and 
benefits’ between the two options (Quiggin 1999, p. 44).  
 
Several authors have attacked the frequent argument of productive efficiency 
improvements as measured by financial indicators of privatised firms. For example: 
 
Many private firms are monopolies […] To the extent that customers are 
captive, profit figures, and hence share prices, may no longer provide a good 
indication of enterprise efficiency (Rowthorn & Chang 1992, p. 4). 
 
Shareholder maximisation in particular did not result in (Pareto) efficiency. 
[…] The fact that, on average, private firms seem more profitable than public 
firms does not necessarily mean that private firms are more efficient (Stiglitz 
2008a, pp. xii-xiv). 
 
This is because public and private firms differ in many respects, such as distributional 
objectives (Stiglitz 2008a) or constraints imposed on public firms relating to direct 
linkages between activities and the realisation of national economic and social 
development (Butler 1989). As King and Pitchford (1998, pp. 315-316) explain: 
 
[A] profit-maximising private firm may not result in a higher sum of private 
and social surplus than an equivalent government-owned firm. [Hence,] if 
public sector managers are provided with different incentives and objectives to 
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their private sector counterparts, then measuring public sector performance by 
private sector benchmarks will provide little useful information.   
 
Furthermore, the simplistic neoliberal linkage between ownership structure and 
efficiency undermines their own argument (King & Pitchford 1998; Stiglitz 2008a). 
First, they do not take into account the potential impact of market failures and market 
distortions on market efficiency. Second, very few mainstream economists have 
detailed the channels through which the effects (if any) of private ownership on 
efficiency improvement actually flow. The question of how differences in ownership 
can influence performance has only rarely been effectively addressed (see Brouthers et 
al. 2007). Third, because there is often a lack of such analysis, neoliberals find it 
difficult to verify the impact of such changes (Cuervo & Villalonga 2000). As a result, 
the theoretical foundations of privatisation are merely normative presumptions or 
beliefs which are, in fact, influenced by political factors and not just economic 
considerations (Hodge 2002).  
 
It is also worth noting that the assumptions of property rights theory have not often 
been empirically supported (Whinston as cited in Williamson 2002, p. 189). Agency 
problems are present in various settings, including both the private and public sectors 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983b). In practice, the introduction of 
remuneration packages, including share-options that link individual managers’ 
remuneration to firm performance (Jensen & Meckling 1976), only fortifies a 
shareholder-values orientation of the business strategy rather than ensuring a 
commitment to the long-term productive efficiency of privatised firms. On the other 
hand, it would be naïve to suppose that the private sector is exempt from 
bureaucratisation and corruption (Chang & Singh as cited in Bayliss & Fine 1998). So, 
instead of fearing the politicisation of self-interested SOE managers, as public choice 
theory would have it, it may be better to guard the privatisation process from being 
‘corrupted by the same factors’ (Wright 1993, p. 6).      
 
Criticism of privatisation is particularly trenchant among self-styled heterodox 
economists, who arguably bring their own prejudices to bear. Some authors targeted 
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specific reports by the WB or its underpinning philosophies. Bayliss and Fine (1998, p. 
845), for instance, criticised the Bureaucrats in business report as  
 
…an ideologically favourable stance towards the market, thereby overlooking 
or reinterpreting evidence that favours state economic intervention … [T]he use 
of evidence is selective, biased and tied to much stronger conclusions than are 
warranted … [and there is] a very narrow view of what constitutes industrial 
policy.  
 
Similarly, Kiely (1998) documented the inconsistency in the WB’s neoliberal 
propositions about market-friendly intervention and good governance in explaining the 
‘Asian miracle’. He cites Kwon’s castigation of the WB: ‘having been so quick to 
blame government for economic failures in the past, …[they] are now reluctant to 
admit a positive role for government in a successful economy’ (p. 72).  Kiely goes on 
to argue that: 
 
[i]n focusing on governance, the Bank has reduced the politics of development 
to a purely technocratic issue. Wider social and political interests are largely 
ignored, and so the need for better governance linked to a “free enterprise” 
economy is reduced to rhetoric (Kiely 1998, p. 74). 
 
Jomo (2008) points out that there are still public sectors running efficiently in many 
countries, with high levels of accountability and transparency. Meanwhile, as 
‘privatisation would give priority to profit maximisation at the expense of social 
welfare and public interests, except on the rare occasions when the two coincide’, 
poorer consumers will be adversely affected by privatisation (pp. 203-204). 
Essentially, Jomo (2008, p. 208) argues: 
 
[P]rivatisation is certainly not a universal panacea for the [admittedly] myriad 
problems of the public sector, as is often touted. Privatisation may be no more 
of a solution to the problems of public enterprises than public enterprises have 
been a solution to the problems they were ostensibly set up to overcome.      
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Other political economists, such as Rowthorn and Chang (1992), refute all the 
theoretical foundations of privatisation. For example, they point out that in practice the 
financial market does not effectively monitor and impose competitive pressures on 
firms as it is said to. This is not only because ‘individual investors in large joint stock 
companies do not have incentives to devote time and resources to monitoring the 
managers’ (p. 3), but also because size, rather than efficiency or profitability, governs 
‘selection for survival in the stock market’ (p. 4). Furthermore, as Singh argued, firms 
seek to avoid being taken over by merging with ‘smaller but more profitable firms’, 
thus leading to greater monopoly power and reduced efficiency, rather than vice versa 
(as cited in Rowthorn & Chang 1992, p. 4).  According to these authors, state decision-
making on the extent of its public sector is basically a ‘portfolio choice’, similar to a 
private company’s choice of ‘what it can most effectively manage’, which also sets the 
boundary between the public and private sector (p. 9). If this is so, then privatisation is 
pragmatic (Rowthorn & Chang, pp. 13-14).       
 
1.9.3 Political Agendas in Privatisation 
The inadequacy of neoliberal arguments on privatisation has invited political 
economists to question the neutrality of neoliberals (Bienen & Waterbury 1989; Butler 
1989; Marangos 2002; Cahill & Beder 2005; Medeiros 2009). According to Butler 
(1989, pp. 16-17):  
 
There may actually be a ‘hidden agenda’ among many of the proponents of 
privatisation. That is that privatisation reduces the mechanisms available to the 
state for the pursuit of several “social” objectives. These include the 
redistribution of income between classes or at least between parts of the 
community.  
 
In fact, the political purpose of privatisation in the UK was clearly stated as being to 
achieve a ‘popular capitalism’ (Kay & Thompson 1986) via the ‘institution of private 
property and freedom of exchange based on widely disseminated market information 
and a multiplicity of small buyers and sellers’ (Butler 1989, p. 10). This is what the 
CEE and former CIS transitional economies claimed they were striving for when they 
embarked on privatisation through voucher distribution, which they referred to as 
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‘people’s capitalism’ (Marangos 2002, p. 581). Similarly, Bienen and Waterbury 
(1989, p. 621) described privatisation as part of a process in which 
…a political leadership sets out to fundamentally reorganise social and 
political, as well as, economic agreements. The aim is to change a pattern of 
political and social power in a country directly. 
 
From another perspective, Cahill and Beder (2005, p. 7) locate privatisation within the 
context of ‘a mobilisation by particular fractions of capital in an attempt to shape state 
policy making in their own interests’. Against the backdrop of electricity privatisation 
in Australia, Cahill and Beder (2005, pp. 13-14) argue that privatisation is by nature ‘a 
class-based project through and through – driven by business interests and state elites’ 
to serve private opportunism by ‘transforming publicly owned monopolies into private 
oligopolies’. This is in line with observations in other contexts. Marangos (2002, p. 
581) agrees that, in transition economies, ‘the gains [of privatisation] have been 
captured by the managerial class, who have successfully won the rents from the state’, 
while Medeiros (2009) argues that privatisation in Latin America was often used by 
newly elected administrations to consolidate their political alliances.  
 
All in all, the point on which most political economists might agree is that the essential 
role of the state in the economy should not be thrown out with the privatisation of 
SOEs. In other words, privatisation should not be allowed to ‘hollow out’ the state 
(Hodge 2002). As Butler (1989, p. 18) puts it, ‘[t]he fundamental reason for the state’s 
not conceding control is that it is expected to be the organiser of capitalism’. Indeed, 
the ubiquitous and essential role the state accounts for is not being thrown out in 
practice, as opposed to being redirected: there is a considerable discrepancy between 
what neoliberals claim to adhere to and what they actually practise (Cahill 2014). 
Apart from anything else, the political economist insists that any examination of the 
privatisation of SOEs should be aware of and take into account the historical and 
political economic context of the country concerned. 
 
1.10 Summary and Conclusions 
There are different ways of defining privatisation – from the broadest (reducing the 
role of the state in the economy and society) to the narrowest (transfer of part or all 
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ownership of the state at SOEs to the private sector). Based on pace, breadth of 
coverage and methods, privatisation can be accomplished (configured) in different 
ways. Vietnam has practised privatisation in a narrow sense. In Vietnam, it is referred 
to as ‘equitisation’, part of what is known in the West as corporatisation; this leads to 
privatisation in the narrow sense of sales of shares of ownership to the private sector. 
In Vietnam, besides equitisation, other forms of privatisation are also undertaken in the 
name of ‘socialisation’, but these operate within a quite different policy framework to 
that of equitisation.      
 
Proponents of privatisation should consider why SOEs were created in the first place. 
The ideology of state interventionism mandated the formation of SOEs as strategic 
tools to coordinate investment and stimulate growth in a variety of economies in both 
the East and West and in both developed and developing countries. Undeniably, these 
SOEs contributed to the rapid economic reconstruction of the world in the period after 
WWII.  
 
Privatisation first became popular in Thatcher’s Britain, where it was pursued on the 
poorly established grounds that SOEs were generally inefficient in and of themselves 
(sui generis). The practice of privatisation spread to other countries in Europe and to 
the Anglophone world; it did not deliver well on its promises and had to be 
accompanied by state regulation; it was commonly partial and incorporated golden 
shares. Overall, privatisation has been of limited success – success with many 
reservations. In Australia, privatisation is ongoing and controversial. The population 
continues to be concerned about how privatisation will influence service accessibility 
and prices, technical improvement, environmental protection and the creation of 
private monopolies.   
 
Privatisation was introduced into developing countries by the WB and IMF on a one-
size-fits-all basis, despite the lack of clear evidence of success in Europe, and despite 
the much larger initial presence of SOEs in developing countries. Essentially, 
privatisation was part of the WB-initiated neoliberal reform known as the Washington 
Consensus. In this push, the reasons for the existence of SOEs in the first place were 
ignored, and the merits of privatisation came to be taken for granted. 
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Why was the WB so committed? The ideology of neoliberalism saw the WB repudiate 
the achievements of developmental state policies in favour of the position that 
liberalisation and private enterprises were responsible for the growth of Japan and 
other East Asian countries.  
 
The philosophies that underpinned the views of the proponents of privatisation were 
firmly aligned with neoclassical economics, and these have been equally firmly 
criticised. The critics of privatisation came to include even Joseph Stiglitz (an earlier 
proponent of privatisation), who warned of the need for an accompanying formal 
institutional structure and pointed out that the efficiency claim for privatisation was 
poorly founded. Other critics, such as Bob Rowthorn, Ha-Joon Chang and K.S. Jomo, 
are well regarded in East Asia. These critics have shown how much the case for 
privatisation has reflected political contests. Political economists have warned that the 
essential roles of the state should not be sacrificed by greed for access to apparent 
opportunities for private profits on the part of organised private interests working 
behind misleading claims.  
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Chapter 2 
Practical Experiences of Privatisation in Transition 
Economies and Developmental States 
 
The theoretical foundations of privatisation policy are not indisputable, nor has its 
practical implementation been straightforward. According to North (as cited in Rodrik 
2005, p. 1007), ‘economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have 
very different performance characteristics than the first economy because of different 
informal norms and enforcement’. When the neoliberal philosophies underpinning 
privatisation were diffused worldwide, these exogenous forces would have interacted 
with indigenous factors in each country to shape the particular implementation process 
(Lavi-Faur 2005). This explains how and why privatisation has taken such contrasting 
forms in economies on different development levels and in different socio-political 
contexts. In order to complement the theoretical debate with practical experiences of 
privatisation, I selected three general privatisation settings for detailed analysis: 
transition economies, developmental states, and a mix of both that is similar to what is 
found in the Vietnamese economy.  
 
Transition economies (or economies in transition) include the former socialist 
countries whose central command economies were transformed into market economies 
after the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991. In this thesis, however, the term 
‘transition economies’ is used to refer only to those economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) and the former Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – that is, 
Russia and those surrounding nations which had formed part of the USSR (Soviet 
Union); this usage follows Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar (2008). China and 
Vietnam are not included here although they are also in transition. This is because, 
unlike the aforementioned countries, the reforms took place only in the economic 
domain and not in the political sphere as well. These two countries also differ from 
other transition economies in that they have been influenced by the developmental 
state model that came to be recognised in the 1990s. Simply defined, the 
developmental state or entrepreneurial state refers to an essentially capitalist economy 
in which the state’s actively interventionist role has been one of the main contributors 
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to successful economic growth. Recent examples include the East Asian states of 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore during the period between the end of 
WWII and the Asian financial crunch of 1997. Although both China and Vietnam had 
the same structural conditions as those in transition economies in Eastern Europe, their 
policy makers tended to adopt neighbouring developmental states as models of best 
practice, rather than looking to learn from the CEE and former CIS, where the 
transition process – which has been described as disorganised, if not a ‘nightmare’ 
(Major 1993, p. 1) – provided a less attractive scenario. The process of privatisation – 
one of the key aspects of transition – appears to have emulated East Asian policy. 
 
This chapter begins by examining the wholesale privatisations in transition economies 
that were influenced by ideological bias and political construction. This is followed by 
an account of the privatisation experiences, lauded as the ‘Asian road’ (Medeiros 2009, 
p. 117), which characterised the gradual and partial approach adopted by the 
developmental states. 
 
2.1 Ideology-led Privatisation in Transition Economies 
Privatisation erases ‘the fundamental dividing line between a socialist and a capitalist 
society. No obvious precedent exists for such a profound transformation’ (Aslund 
2007, p. 143). As such, for many governments in the CEE and former CIS, it was part 
of an (over)ambitious political agenda during the 1990s. In these transition economies, 
it took the form of mass privatisations that have been characterised as shock therapy 
(Meideros 2009, p. 117). In fact, in each case, privatisation involved a complex 
process with its own evolutionary dynamic between intentions and practice, one that 
reflected different ideological impulses, political calculations, conflicts of interest and 
historical political economies. Up to the present day, the results of privatisation have 
been assessed as successful or not according to the assessor’s ideological position.  
 
2.1.1 SOEs, Soft-budget Constraints and Nomenklatura Ownership 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs), with their monopolist status in national markets and 
national production systems, represented one of the fundamental and iconic aspects of 
economic governance under state socialism. In the former central-command 
economies, the formal business sector consisted only of SOEs, collective farms and 
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cooperatives. Among these, the SOEs completely dominated economic activity in 
terms of both national asset ownership and contribution to GDP. The picture presented 
by inconsistently collected data (for which transition economies have traditionally 
been well-known) is that the relative size of the SOE sector to output/GDP was around 
96-97% in the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia (1985-1986); the 
smallest ratios were found in Hungary and Poland (65.2% and 81.2%, respectively) 
(Lipton & Sachs 1990b, p. 300). By contrast, the formally unrecognised private 
business sector was ‘nearly non-existent’ (Aslund 2007, p. 143), ranging from 5-10% 
in most of these economies in 1990 (Estrin et al. 2009, p. 2). In scope and scale, the 
SOEs not only commanded key industries in the CEE and former CIS economies, but 
were also represented among retail shops and kiosks. Their number varied from 2,500 
in a medium-sized country like Hungary to over 8,400 in Poland, and 45,000 in the 
former CIS (Major 1993, p. 24; Rondinelli & Yurkiewicz 1996, p. 145).  
 
By and large, SOEs in the CEE and former CIS were blamed for inefficiency, 
especially in the triumphalist days of neoliberalism. According to Aslund (2007, pp. 
143-144), for example, ‘state factories were badly managed, obsolete, and overstaffed; 
[...] In the East, popular disillusion with public enterprises was extraordinary’. 
Although various authors emphasise different features of the SOE system in their 
discussions of privatising SOEs, two key themes consistently emerge: the institutional, 
especially budgetary constraints in SOE governance, and the property rights structure 
of these enterprises. 
 
In his pioneering scholarly analysis, Janos Kornai identified one of the profound 
weaknesses in SOE governance as the so-called ‘soft budget constraint’. According to 
Kornai (1986, pp. 4-5): 
 
The “softening” of the budget constraint appears when the strict relationship 
between expenditure and earnings has been relaxed, because excess 
expenditure over earnings will be paid by some other institution, typically by 
the State […] The higher the subjective probability that excess expenditure will 
be covered by external assistance, the softer the budget constraint. 
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Softness in the budget constraint arises in four main areas: subsidisation, taxation, 
credit and administrative pricing. Problems occur when these relationships are 
routinely ‘negotiable, subject to bargaining, [and] lobbying’; gradually the violation of 
financial discipline becomes tolerable (Kornai 1986, pp. 5-6). Although Kornai 
acknowledges the existence of ‘soft budget constraint’ in various types of economies 
(socialist and mixed economies) and firms (SOEs, private banks, and non-profit 
organisations), it was assumed to explain inherent inefficiency in the SOEs in former 
socialist countries but to be less prevalent ‘for the majority of private firms’ (Kornai 
1986, p. 22). The ‘soft budget constraint’ is said to allow SOE managers to avoid 
market discipline in seeking funding. It cannot, however, be claimed that market 
discipline would have been more effective, since market institutions were 
underdeveloped due to the underdevelopment of the former central-planning 
economies. Nonetheless, neoliberalists proclaimed that ‘soft budget constraint’ was not 
only the antithesis of the free market’s price signals but also rendered those signals 
impotent, thus removing the one incentive they recognised as being capable of forcing 
SOE managers to improve the efficiency of the firm and, eventually, of the allocation 
of resources.  
 
This perceived failure of SOEs was described as ‘government failure’ and the political 
undermining of markets. This characterisation is in keeping with the traditional 
assumptions of property rights theory, agency theory and public choice theory. It was 
widely proclaimed that accountability in the ownership structure of SOEs was vaguely 
defined, and that this was the main source of inefficiency. According to Lipton and 
Sachs (1990b, p. 298): 
 
[W]hile the state enterprises are presumably owned by the state, the various 
components of ownership […] are in fact jointly held, in a shifting and 
imprecise way, among managers, workers, and the state.  
 
Major (1993, p. 11) argued that the de facto property rights over SOEs were 
determined by ‘the distribution of power and bargaining position of different power 
groups rather than a transparent legal framework’. There were, in fact, conspicuous 
gaps in the framework of accountabilities in SOE governance in the CEE and former 
62 
 
CIS countries.  Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995, p. 21) contend that ‘poorly defined 
property rights are endemic when politicians control economic activity’. According to 
these authors, the ideal situation is one in which the ownership of cash flow rights 
(who is subject to economic benefits/harms) should converge with control rights (who 
has influence on the firm’s performance) to avoid divergence between objectives and 
incentives (see also Roland 2008). This position leads to the familiar accusation among 
proponents of privatisation that SOEs are intrinsically inefficient because politicians 
and politically-driven purposes can defeat the interest of individual citizens as 
shareholders in maximising profitability (Aslund 2007).  
 
In attempts to turn the SOEs around before the wave of privatisation, some 
governments in the CEE and former CIS undertook a series of reforms to decentralise 
state control over various aspects of SOE management, including production, 
investment, pricing and wage setting. These reforms were largely unsuccessful, 
however, ‘mainly because they failed to lead to the creation of real markets with real 
competition’ (Lipton & Sachs 1990a, pp. 106-109). Furthermore, while the expected 
outcome of hardening budget constraints was unachievable, the greater autonomy 
granted to SOE managers led to another challenge: spontaneous privatisation. In 
Poland, for example, once SOE managers had been given the ability to set wages 
freely, they were pressured by powerful workers’ councils to raise wages, resulting in 
‘an enormous real wage explosion and a wage-price spiral’ (Lipton & Sachs 1990b, p. 
306). Meanwhile, Russian managers were able to engage in a ‘massive theft of public 
assets’ by signing discounted transactions, redirecting the assets and profits of their 
SOEs to private firms they themselves had established (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 
1995, p. 60) or to foreign joint-ventures (Lipton & Sachs 1990b, p. 306).  
 
The concepts of politically-driven SOE decisions and of the state as the beneficiary 
owner of SOEs need to be unpacked. According to Major (1993), state ownership is 
generally a ‘peculiar form of “collective ownership”, known as ‘nomenklatura 
ownership’, which is a  
 
complex system of interrelated interests of influential political and economic 
agents. Members of the nomenklatura did not belong to that group as persons 
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[...], but as representatives of powerful interests. They did not even need to be 
members of the communist party, though they had to be accepted [and 
tolerated] by the party leadership [...] as far as those goals could be reconciled 
with the endeavours of the party leadership (Major 1993, pp. 14-15).   
 
More tellingly, in response to such a ‘bruising fights over property rights’ (Lipton & 
Sachs 1990b, p. 298) of the SOEs at the beginning of 1990s, the efficient model of 
‘public-spirited bureaucrats’ serving as SOEs’ owners in Northeast Asian 
developmental states was recognised by the reform advisors; nonetheless, they stated 
that such a model was ‘rare’ throughout the world and impossible to apply in Russia at 
that time (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1995, p. 57). So, how were the privatisation 
agendas driven and planned by reformers in the CEE and former CIS in the transition 
period? 
 
2.1.2 Political Agendas in Planning for Privatisation 
The underperformance of SOEs had been a fact in the CEE and former CIS, yet 
privatisation – notionally vindicated as a means of improving the efficiency of SOEs – 
was represented as having a much wider remit. Although privatisation had been a 
prohibited topic before the transition wave that began in 1989, it was now viewed as a 
pervasive disruption of the former political economy system (Major 1993; Aslund 
2007). As a result, in addition to those rationales that had motivated privatisation in the 
West, reformers in transition economies added a host of other rationales to their 
arguments for transformation. 
 
First, the overwhelming aim of privatisation, as presented by the reformers, had to do 
with laying the foundation for ‘a well-functioning market economy’ (Aslund 2007, p. 
146). According to Major (1993, p. ix), privatisation emerged as ‘an immediate 
necessity in countries that aimed for an economic transformation from the command 
economy into a Western-type market economy with dominant private ownership’. 
Indeed, along with ‘macroeconomic stabilisation, [and] liberalisation of economic 
activity’, privatisation was at the forefront of the reform agenda (Lipton & Sachs 
1990b, p. 293). The role of privatisation was even more significant in view of the 
perception that the former socialist economy was an ‘irrational’ mode of economic 
64 
 
governance (Aslund 2007). In this view, any reform that could disentangle the old 
system would contribute to the creation of its antithesis – the market economy – 
which, it was presumed, could only be invigorated by the private sector. Such belief in 
the superiority of market forces and private ownership was preeminent during the early 
phase of transition. Consequently, according to the Czech Minister of Privatisation, 
Tomas Jezek (cited in Aslund 2007, p. 146), the main task of privatisation was ‘not to 
increase the efficiency of particular companies, but to create market structures to 
encourage private business’. It is noteworthy that the reformers expected that 
privatisation would help facilitate the creation of ‘the basic institutions of a market 
financial system’ (Lipton & Sachs 1990b, p. 294) rather than vice versa. This is in 
contrast to the conclusion reached by Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005), that the existence 
of effective financial markets enhances the effects of privatisation.     
 
Second, the economic agenda seemed to be outweighed by a political trajectory that 
could be discerned behind the advocacy. Inspired by Hayek’s liberal ideal, 
privatisation was geared towards the broader goal of ‘mak[ing] private ownership the 
foundation of freedom and democracy’ (Aslund 2007, p. 145). Through the ‘the 
reallocation of property rights’ (Major 1993, p. 2) via privatisation, another ‘liberal 
political objective was to build a new middle class of educated and property-owning 
people’ (Aslund 2007, p. 146). As was true of the political agenda of ‘popular 
capitalism’ pursued in Western Europe, privatisation was also seen as crucial for future 
‘capitalism with small entrepreneurs’ or ‘people’s capitalism’ in the CEE and former 
CIS (Major 1993, p. 56; Schutte 2000, p. 60). Reformers, however, ignored an 
important difference. While the former countries had been developed with fully-
fledged capital markets and institutions to protect property rights, these institutional 
prerequisites were yet to be created in the latter ones. If corruption and violation of 
minority investors’ rights became pervasive, the illegitimate wealth creation would 
only encourage asset stripping activities which, of course, diminish any society 
(Stiglitz 2008a, p. xvi). 
 
Third, there was the efficiency rationale, but this was overwhelmed by politics and 
ideology. Whereas the development of clearly specified channels for the change of 
ownership could have led to a corresponding improvement in productive efficiency – 
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for example, by hardening budget constraints or establishing better corporate 
governance under new management – there were merely expressions of faith in 
relation to depoliticising SOEs. From the cookbook of public choice theory, Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1995, p. 9) embraced the ideal of ‘economic man’ (homo 
economicus): 
 
Russia did not need a third way of organising its economic activity […] 
Russians would rationally respond to economic incentives pointed to markets 
as the best way to organise economic activity in Russia, just as they are 
elsewhere in the world.  
 
Further: 
[P]olitical influence over economic life was the fundamental cause of economic 
inefficiency, and […] the principal objective of reform was, therefore, to 
depoliticise economic life […] Privatisation fosters depoliticisation because it 
robs politicians of control over firms (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1995, pp. 10-
11). 
 
Privatisation was thus the means of constraining ‘hegemonic state power’ (Aslund 
2007, p. 145). This was commonly represented as an intermediate way of improving 
performance of the activities of (privatised) SOEs (Lipton & Sachs 1990b). The 
problem, however, was that, from being a secondary policy instrument, privatisation 
became a ‘primary objective’ of the reform in its own right – it was assumed that the 
more completely and swiftly the ownership of SOEs was transferred from the state to 
the private sector, the greater the efficiency would be. Other ‘less important’ aspects of 
reform were easily traded off (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1995, p. 11). As discussed 
in Chapter 1, it had been acknowledged in the West that competition and regulation 
were two complementary elements that were necessary for privatisation to improve 
efficiency and not adversely affect public interest (Vickers & Yarrow 1988).         
 
Fourth, ‘justice’ was a unique imperative advanced for privatisation in the CEE and 
former CIS transition economies. This represented a response to calls for restitution to 
the previous owners of assets that had been confiscated by the communist states, and 
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for the equitable distribution of state assets to the wider population or to workers in the 
respective enterprises, collective farms, and cooperatives (Lipton & Sachs 1990b; 
Major 1993; Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1995; Aslund 2007). Although this kind of 
rationale was more applicable to real estate, housing and agricultural land than to 
SOEs, the ideology influenced the adoption of the distinctive voucher approach to 
privatisation in these countries. From the critique of a system of vaguely defined 
property rights, the reformers argued that the assets of SOEs should belong to the 
entire population. In practice, this reflected their need not only for rapid and easily-
implemented privatisation programs, but also for a means of securing popular support 
for the legislation associated with the reforms. To achieve the latter aim, vouchers 
were distributed as a ‘government gift to the public’ (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1995, 
p. 86). These political imperatives behind privatisation in the CEE and former CIS 
deflected and undermined reformers’ plans for ‘rapid, equitable, and fiscally sound’ 
privatisation (Lipton & Sachs 1990b, p. 293).  
 
2.1.3 Rapid Privatisation, but neither Equitable nor Fiscally Sound?  
Even though the contours of privatisation in the CEE and former CIS economies have 
often been described as massive or wholesale privatisation with a ‘shock-therapy, big-
bang or radical’ approach (Wolf 1999), not every supporter of privatisation endorsed 
the strategy. Some reformers argued for a gradual approach. According to one 
prominent advocate of gradualism, Kornai, ‘[t]he point now is not to hand out the 
property, but rather to place it in the hands of a really better owner’ (Lipton & Sachs 
1990b, p. 297). Interestingly, the Western investment banks consulted by the 
indigenous privatisers also ‘advocated case-by-case privatisation through cash sales’ 
(Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1995, p. 70). While it can be inferred that these financial 
institutions would have gained more benefit by providing consulting services on each 
of many separate transactions, their endorsement of a gradual approach was clearly 
grounded in their own orthodoxy that ‘in the absence of [both markets and market-
supporting] institutions […], the neoclassical prescription is held to be inappropriate’. 
In particular  
 
the imposition of hard budget constraints on enterprises in the absence of 
functioning credit may force even sound firms into insolvency. Liberalisation 
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in the absence of supporting institutions can, in consequence, deepen the 
“transformational recession” unnecessarily (Wolf 1999, p. 4).  
 
Stronger non-economic influences, however, caused the privatisers to ignore these and 
other warnings. It was suggested, for instance, that vouchers might become 
concentrated in the hands of a few investors while direct sales or public offerings 
should be preferred on the grounds of transparency, careful valuation and, most 
importantly, the need to ‘allocate companies to the most efficient owners’ (Boycko, 
Shleifer & Vishny 1995, p. 70). However, the exaggerated significance attached to the 
role of privatisation in the overall economic transition strategy of the CEE and former 
CIS countries induced the reformers to prioritise the speed and scope of the process 
(Major 1993). Accordingly, the reformers insisted that  
 
[t]he potential costs of overly rapid privatisation must be traded off with the 
high cost of maintaining the present system […]. It would be preferable, in our 
view, for all enterprises regardless of their financial position to be corporatised 
and quickly put into private hands (Lipton & Sachs 1990b, pp. 297,327). 
 
Voucher distribution thus suited the aim of privatisers not only in terms of pace but 
also in terms of cost minimisation. In fact, if privatisation was to be pursued ‘as fast 
and as much as possible’, the most feasible option was free distribution of vouchers to 
the population at large. Other economically superior schemes required the 
establishment of financial markets, including stock exchanges, intermediary 
institutions and, much more importantly, the disposable savings of the population. 
Voucher distribution was also preferred to prevent assets being taken up by foreigners. 
Yet, while other schemes would have taken longer (Lipton & Sachs 1990b), they 
would certainly not have taken as long as the reformers’ overstated claims suggested 
(Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1995). 
 
The main factor behind mass privatisation was the recognition by both policy makers 
and economists of a ‘window of opportunity’ (Aslund 2007, p. 153) within which to 
implement irreversible changes to property rights before the transition process became 
unpopular. In fact, the political instability of many countries in the CEE and former 
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CIS forced the pro-reformers to employ ‘the re-allocation of property rights in order to 
strengthen their own power base’ (Major 1993, p. 73). This is evident in Balcerowicz’s 
proposition (cited in Wolf 1999, p. 4): 
 
[Radical economic reform] rapidly introduces a number of economic and 
political institutional changes that act as policy constraints on any new 
government taking over, whatever their basic ideology or value system.  
 
One source of legitimacy that reformers tried to claim for their privatisation agenda 
was the argument that it would forestall popular resentment of the ‘managerial theft’ 
that accompanied spontaneous privatisation. By the early 1990s, this had become so 
widespread that it generated the common saying, “what is not privatised will be stolen” 
(Aslund 2007, p. 152). Undoubtedly, in such a politically-charged environment, the 
option of voucher privatisation was a potential source of political capital. As Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1995, p. 72) observe, ‘[t]he way to make the public an ally in 
privatisation is [instead] to distribute free shares to all citizens’. In sum, while the 
general rationale behind privatisation was depoliticisation of the SOEs, the 
privatisation process in the CEE and former CIS was politicised by the very same 
proponents of reform, deliberately or otherwise.     
 
Although the experiences of the various countries differed greatly, the outcomes of 
privatisation in the CEE and former CIS were, by and large, neither as equitable nor as 
fiscally sound as expected. All major methods of privatisation - direct sales, vouchers 
and management-employee buyouts (MBOs) - were pursued by most of the countries, 
but to a different extent in each (Marangos 2002, p. 578). It is possible to group 
countries according to the privatisation methods they adopted as most workable. These 
methods often imply the pace and extent of their radicalism in privatisation, yet they 
are not necessarily associated with the overall manner of reform. As noted earlier, 
workability deserves attention because there was a great range of political interests 
involved, causing actual deviations from privatisation plans due to political-economic 
conditions and competing groups of stakeholders.  
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Distribution of vouchers to the wider population was the principal method of 
privatisation pursued in the Czech Republic, Russia, and half of the other countries in 
the former CIS (Marangos 2002). It was initially considered to be the best strategy on 
the grounds of equity, lower costs, and lack of impact on savings available for further 
investment. The dispersed ownership of privatised companies that resulted, however, 
often led to poor corporate governance, and voucher privatisation came to be regarded 
as a failure in terms of economic efficiency at firm level. Designed to be transferable, 
‘the voucher became the first liquid security in modern Russia’ (Boycko, Shleifer & 
Vishny 1995, p. 100). Vouchers were owned and traded by inexperienced Russians on 
a fledging financial market. Indeed, of 144 million vouchers issued, nearly one third 
were used by people to acquire equity in their companies or others. Most of the 
vouchers were quickly sold to speculators at prices fluctuating between US$4 and 
US$20, or were eventually accumulated in the 600 newly established voucher 
investment funds (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1995). Significantly, voucher auctions 
were highly decentralised in Russia, which created opportunities for managers and 
local politicians to change the auction rules to limit the competitive and transparent 
participation of outsider investors. As a result, several of the largest industrial firms in 
the country were bought cheaply. For example, Lada - the largest car producer and 
exporter, accounting for half a million workers and 7% of GDP - was sold for US$45 
million, despite being valued at US$2 billion, and the winning bid for the gas 
monopoly was under US$228 million (Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1995, pp. 108-109).  
 
Voucher privatisation was also implemented in the Czech Republic as a vehicle for 
speedy transition. Here, however, the governance of privatisation was much more 
centralised and carefully designed than in Russia. Privatisation schemes were proposed 
on a competitive basis by any group of stakeholders (the winners were mainly SOE 
managers and those ministries that had founded the SOEs) to upper levels of the 
government (Ministry of Privatisation) and were approved by the government. These 
plans were then put forward by the National Property Fund (NPF) as an intermediary 
state holding company (Schutte 2000, pp. 68-69). Another favourable factor in Czech 
privatisation was the country’s healthy macroeconomic situation, including respectable 
economic growth, full employment (Zijlstra 1997), and negligible level of public debt 
(Schutte 2000). Nevertheless, Czech voucher privatisation was hindered by the fact 
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that shares eventually accumulated in investment privatisation funds (IPFs). Many of 
these funds were controlled by several dominant state-owned banks, thus leaving the 
corporate governance of privatised firms effectively unchanged and contributing little 
to remedying the institutional weaknesses of the stock market in terms of transparency 
and protection of shareholder rights (Zijlstra 1997).  
 
Although Poland was one of the leading countries in the transformation to a market 
economy, its privatisation implementation in the early 1990s lagged ‘seriously behind 
other economic changes’ (Rondinelli & Yurkiewicz 1996, p. 145). In practice, the 
Polish government’s initial commitment to the shock-therapy approach to privatisation 
was blocked by the resistance of ‘powerful entrenched interests dedicated to the status 
quo within state-owned enterprises’ (Zijlstra 1997, p. 10) such as the trade unions. 
Traditionally, Polish trade unions had considerable bargaining power with the state and 
firm managers. Due to fear that privatisation would lead to unemployment, reforms 
were usually delayed after the corporatisation of large SOEs. The privatisation 
program was only reactivated in the second half of the 1990s. In the event, employees 
of a SOE were granted 15% of the shares ‘for free’; another 25% were retained by the 
state, and the remaining shares were jointly bought by 15 National Investment Funds 
(NIFs). These funds enjoyed greater autonomy than their Czech counterparts and were 
run by professional managers (Zijlstra 1997). Privatisation in Poland was a mix of 
direct sales and management-employee buyouts (MBOs). Thanks to strict rules applied 
to the stock market (Zijlstra 1997) and the effectiveness of policies designed to 
develop small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), Poland outperformed its 
neighbours in the creation of a vibrant private sector (Rondinelli & Yurkiewicz 1996).  
  
Interestingly, although neoliberalists view Hungary as a successful country in the 
forefront of economic transformation, it pursued gradualism in privatisation and 
ignored the voucher option (Zijlstra 1997). To deal with spontaneous privatisation, the 
State Property Agency (SPA) was established as early as 1990 and, in little over a 
year, most of the SOEs were corporatised. Direct sales through auctions with extensive 
foreign participation were the first option adopted by the SPA which, however, 
retained its control over key industries (Zijlstra 1997). Direct sales were also widely 
applied in Bulgaria, East Germany, the Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and two 
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countries in the former CIS. Despite their many advantages in respect of transparency, 
valuation, equitability and relative resistance to corruption, initial public offerings 
(IPOs) were little used in the CEE and former CIS (Aslund 2007). This was due not 
only to the reformers’ rush to privatise in the face of the exaggerated need for quick 
reform, but also to the absence of the conditions necessary for such open sales, 
including legal rules, state administrative institutions and, especially, effective 
financial markets.   
 
2.1.4 Outcomes: Private Sector Development or New Nomenklatura Ownership?  
Assessments of privatisation in transition economies have varied depending on the 
philosophical orientation of the assessor. Neoliberals insist that the changes that 
privatisation engendered in ‘the whole economy and society’ should be more deeply 
appreciated, rather than focussing on the restructuring effects it imposed on the SOE 
sector. An extraordinary increase in the share of the private sector in the economy, 
credited as the most important achievement of privatisation, was said to be reflected in 
positive correlations with democracy, liberalisation and transparency (Aslund 2007, 
pp. 168-169). Rapid development of the private sector became the finishing line that 
transition economies competed with each other to cross, regardless of the fact that 
there was no clear evidence that the ‘prize’ – in the form of improved economic 
performance – was a realistic expectation. The proportion of the private sector’s 
contribution to an economy was used as a benchmark against which to judge whether 
or not the transformation in general, and privatisation in particular, were successful. 
Schutte (2000, p. 64), for example, compared the private sector share of GDP to 
conclude that Czech privatisation outperformed its counterpart processes in Poland and 
Hungary because the country’s private sector share rose from 3% in 1986 to 75% in 
1996. Similarly, Wolf (1999) used the liberalisation index 1989-1995 to categorise the 
economies of the CEE and former CIS as radical, gradual or lagging reformers. This 
criterion placed Russia in the third group, despite the fact that Russian reformers were 
the most radical during this period. Since the liberalisation index did not include 
privatisation policies, it could imply that the reforms in these lagging economies were 
not radical enough. In practice, the facilitation of privatisation alone does not 
necessarily lead to private sector development (Cook, Kirkpatrick & Nixson 1998). As 
Rondinelli and Yurkiewicz (1996, p. 156) observed, ‘[t]he transformation of Poland's 
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economy thus far owes much more to the development of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises than to the privatisation of large state enterprises’. In their review of 
empirical accounts, Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar (2008) also report mixed results 
for the impact of privatisation on a series of firm performance indicators. According to 
these authors, ‘privatisation of state-owned firms to domestic owners in CEE and the 
CIS […] did not have the strongly positive effect on economic performance that was 
expected’ (Hanousek, Kocenda & Svejnar 2008, p. 96). 
 
Even though the impact of privatisation on broad economic and social development 
criteria can only be assessed if it is isolated from other variables, the fact that the CEE 
and former CIS countries experienced economic recession and a rise in inequality 
during the 1990s implies a hollowing-out of state capacity to which poorly-governed 
privatisation clearly contributed. By 1998, the average level of GDP in the region was 
equal to only 72% of what it had been before the transition (Wolf 1999, p. 1). 
However, the picture varied among these countries. While the CEE economies 
recovered to their pre-transition level in 1998, the former CIS economies were reduced 
to 63% of their previous level. While the GDP of Poland – where privatisation was 
delayed – rose 40% during the 1990s, that of Russia – where voucher privatisation was 
eagerly implemented – declined by 40%. Moreover, the poverty rate in the region 
experienced a five-fold increase in just a decade. According to the World Bank at the 
time, ‘[i]nequality... has increased so much in the CIS countries such as Armenia, the 
Kyrgyz, and Russia that they have come to rival the most unequal countries in the 
world’ (World Bank 2002, p. xiii). The Bank had to admit that part of the cause of the 
economic and social deterioration was the ‘diminished state capacity to provide public 
goods needed for the market economy as a result of corruption, [and] weak public 
sector management’ (World Bank 2002, p. xiii).  
 
Most economists criticised the way in which privatisation was handled in the CEE and 
former CIS economies. According to Marangos (2002, p. 573), privatisation entailed ‘a 
large reduction in output, high unemployment and inflation and a breakdown of 
institutional norms resulting in corruption and illegal activities’. Russia – where mass 
privatisation saw the loosely-regulated selling-off of huge state assets ‘to enrich a few’ 
– is often seen as the worst example. 
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In a few years, Russia became a country marked by great inequality, with a 
Gini coefficient as bad as many in Latin America. By some estimates, $1.5 
trillion in assets were stolen (Stiglitz 2008a, p. ix-x).  
 
In fact, privatisation failed to accomplish the restructuring of SOEs in transition 
economies. According to Major (1993), the shock-therapy approach did not allow 
sufficient time for the creation of the legal rules and institutions that were necessary 
for privatisation to succeed.  
 
Obsessed by the grand mission of an overall transformation of the transition economy, 
reformers hurried to overload privatisation with multiple objectives, despite the 
absence of enabling market institutions. Ideological commitment to the superiority of 
private ownership led to privatisation being presented as a panacea for a variety of 
economic problems. When the economic rationale was overwhelmed by political 
agendas, privatisation was carelessly implemented. The use of voucher privatisation or 
MBOs meant that, post-privatisation, the old management at SOEs remained nearly 
intact. This rendered unattainable the most important objective to which privatisation 
should have been directed – reform of the corporate governance of the SOEs. At the 
same time, the mantra of mainstream economics – ‘let the market decide’ – was 
inappropriate since ‘there was not yet a market and where, in fact, the explicit motive 
for the sales was to create a market’ (Stark as cited in Marangos 2002, p. 579).  
 
Since the population could not afford to buy the assets of large SOEs, ‘[t]he only 
people who could purchase firms were those who had benefited under the previous 
regimes through the black-market and illegal activities’ (Marangos, pp. 578-579). As a 
result, the exaggerated expectations of a ‘people’s privatisation’ or ‘people’s 
capitalism’ through voucher privatisation did not materialise. Rather, capital came to 
be concentrated either directly into the hands of a few oligarchs, or indirectly in 
foreign firms (Marangos 2002, p. 581). In other words, the enterprises’ assets were 
transferred to a new nomenklatura ownership (Major 1993, p. 53).  
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In summary, the privatisation process in transition economies was largely conditioned 
by ideological imperatives, political calculations and power struggles among all 
stakeholders. Consequently, the outcomes of the privatisation policies often deviated 
substantially from those predicted by neo-liberal proponents. 
 
2.2 Rule-based Privatisation in the East Asian Developmental States 
While the results of transition economies’ attempt to apply the Western capitalist 
economic model have been uneven and remain controversial, there has been 
widespread praise for those developmental states in East Asia that have achieved 
success by rejecting belief in ‘the invisible hand... [and] all received principles of 
capitalist rationality’ (Ronald Dore as cited in Johnson 1999, pp. 32-33). Over four 
decades, from the 1950s to the 1990s, first Japan, then South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore, made amazing leaps in economic development – a phenomenon that 
challenged the academic establishment to provide an explanation. This came in the 
form of a school of developmental statist thought led by Chalmers Johnson in his book 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982) and followed in by his supporters’ 
contributions to Meredith Woo-Cumings’ edited book The Developmental State 
(1999). The following discussion analyses the developmental state concepts and shows 
how economic ideals influenced the way privatisation was implemented in Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore8.  
 
2.2.1 The East Asian Developmental States 
Various authors have represented the developmental state (also known as the 
entrepreneurial state)9 as: 
 
a Weberian ideal type of an interventionist state that was neither socialist […] 
nor free-market […] but something different: the plan-rational capitalist 
                                                          
8 The privatisation experiences of other Southeast Asia nations are of less interest in the present 
context. Economies such as those of Malaysia and Indonesia emulated the developmental state less 
successfully (Woo-Cumings 1999, p. 19). It is also more difficult to analyse the privatisation process in 
these Southeast Asia countries where the public business sector is often leveraged as ‘a 
counterweight’ to the economic power of the ethnic Chinese population (Yuen & Woon, 1992, p. 50). 
9 It is worth noting that developmental state is not exclusive for the economies in Northeast Asia only, 
but the ‘state-led corporatist industrialisation’ and ‘entrepreneurial states’ have also been observed in 
Northern European countries (Vartiainen 1999; Tiberghien 2007) and the UK and US (Chang 2003). In 
fact, it can be said that the state universally has been the mid-wife of industrial take-off. 
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developmental state, conjoining private ownership with state guidance (Woo-
Cumings 1999, pp. 1-2).  
 
Despite certain distinctions (Pempel 1999), the three Northeast Asian countries (Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan) clearly shared a broad spectrum of policies.  
 
First, according to Johnson (1999, p. 38), the most prominent feature of the 
developmental state model was the central role of a ‘small, inexpensive, but elite state 
bureaucracy’ which effectively functioned to ‘choose the industries to be developed’, 
select the best means to implement that strategy, and ensure the competitiveness of the 
strategic sector. Industrial policy was directed by a powerful ministerial agency, such 
as the then Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan. Clearly, the 
developmental state must be centralised and strong. Although market-conforming 
methods were still utilised, the approach was mainly top-down and interventionist. The 
developmental state is more effective than the neo-liberal state in relation to four 
functions: (i) centrally coordinating for change; (ii) providing vision at the national 
level and reflecting national interests; (iii) building necessary institutions to realise the 
vision in practice; and (iv) managing social and economic conflict (Chang 1999, pp. 
192-198). In effect, the establishment of the developmental state has posed a 
significant challenge to the orthodox economics that the West has proclaimed since the 
1990s as the only worthy model. While public choice theory insists that the market 
mechanism should be kept independent of political influence, the experiences of 
developmental states suggest quite the opposite – that the political and business 
spheres can harmoniously interact to boost national economic capacity.  
 
Second, the role of the state in the economy and the way in which the state handled its 
relationship with the business sector were quite distinctive in the developmental states. 
Business entities, regardless of ownership, have been seen as instruments for the 
successful implementation of industrial policy, under the coordination of the state 
bureaucracy. It is evident that deference to market principles was much less important 
than the goal of ‘improving the international competitiveness of their domestic 
economies’ (Pempel 1999, p. 139). Such a paternalistic approach – which fitted 
comfortably with the regional culture – does not, however, mean that the market was 
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set aside. On the contrary, state intervention was all ‘market-conforming’ (Johnson 
1999, p. 39). The state deliberately engaged in ‘alter[ing] market incentives, reducing 
risks, offering entrepreneurial visions and managing conflicts’ to create a conducive 
environment within which the business sector could operate effectively (Johnson 1999, 
p. 48). Meanwhile, firms were not expected merely to respond to these ‘catalytic’ 
incentives and disincentives created by the state, but actively to participate in the 
policy-making process through multiple cooperative channels – a scenario described 
by Weiss (1995) as ‘governed interdependence’. Indeed, it was a ‘mutually beneficial 
relationship to achieve developmental goals and business viability’ (Johnson 1999, p. 
60), in which ‘[n]either could exist without the other’ (Robert Reich as cited in 
Johnson 1999, p. 48).  
 
Third, the popular understanding of ‘social mobilisation and economic nationalism’ in 
developmental states has worked well in a number of important respects (Johnson as 
cited in Woo-Cumings 1999, p. 3, 8). These invisible linkages have allowed the 
Korean chaebol (business conglomerate) to serve as a ‘private agency of public 
purpose’ and its postwar Japanese counterpart, the keiretsu, to ‘work much more for 
the [country’s] market share rather than solely for their own profit’ (Woo-Cumings 
1999, pp. 17-18). Indeed, there is no definite boundary between the public and the 
private in developmental states (Rodan 1989; Woo-Cumings 1999). More specifically, 
these large conglomerates, which traditionally played a pivotal role in developmental 
state economies, have been both ‘immense private domains’ and ‘quasi-state 
organisations’ (Woo-Cumings 1999, p. 17). This may explain the pragmatic way in 
which the developmental state viewed the issue of ownership in businesses – it was 
simply not a big deal. The problem highlighted in theories of agency and public choice 
is unlikely to be an issue in the developmental state. When the bureaucrats were 
trusted (even in doing business), the task of privatising the SOEs was not perceived as 
urgently as it was in the CEE and former CIS transition economies.  
 
2.2.2 The Role of SOEs in the Initial Phase of the Developmental State 
The role of SOEs (often known in these countries as public enterprises, PEs) differed 
among the developmental state economies. In Japan, since the economy was largely 
based on the private sector, PEs only accounted for 5% of both GDP and employment. 
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Three PEs were established in the post-war period: Japan Tobacco and Salt Public 
Corporation (JTSPC), Japanese National Railways (JNR), and Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Public Corporation (NTTPC). In addition, five government departments 
that acted like businesses were maintained as the monopolies they had been before 
WWII; these were the post office, forestry, printing, the mint, and alcohol production. 
There were also three PEs in the financial sector (Toyama 1998, p. 388). Despite the 
limited scope of the PE sector as a whole, all these companies were large-scale and 
played various important roles in the economy, such as in technological development, 
crowding in private investment, providing favourable credits, holding key industries 
and monopolies, or - at least – offering job opportunities for retired officials (as was 
traditional in many private firms). 
 
In Korea and Taiwan, PEs played a greater role, especially in the initial phase of 
development, when they compensated for the ‘absence of well-developed markets and 
the lack of indigenous private entrepreneurship’ (Pao, Wu & Pan 2008, p. 324). 
Whether they ‘have been used as the chosen instrument for a big push’ (Wade 1990, p. 
110) or for ‘controlling and rationing investment and credit’ (OECD 1998), PEs were 
effectively linked with the growth of the private sector thereafter:  
 
In both Korea and Taiwan, public enterprises played an important role in 
enhancing the profitability of private investment by ensuring that key inputs 
were available for private producers. Public enterprises accounted for a large 
share of manufacturing output and investment in both economies (UNDP 2003, 
p. 39). 
 
Korean PEs originated from the nationalisation of Japanese colonial industries. The 
number of PEs grew quickly, from seven in the 1950s to 35 in the 1960s, in the key 
areas of transportation and aviation, energy, mining, heavy and chemical industries, 
construction, money and banking (Kim, Kim & Boyer 1994, pp. 158-159). More 
tellingly, these PEs ‘ha[d] a reputation of profitability and fiscal soundness’ (OECD 
1999, p. 74). In fact, although one usually associates large conglomerates in Korea 
with the chaebols, public enterprises outnumbered private in the list of the biggest 
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firms, and the state-owned iron and steel maker (POSCO) was one of the cornerstones 
of the country’s industrial expansion (Amsden 1989).  
 
Taiwanese PEs followed the pattern of their Korean counterparts in dominating 
strategic sectors and venturing into new industries. According to Pao, Wu and Pan 
(2008, p. 326), the share of Taiwan’s PE sector gradually increased, peaking at 9.4-
12.1% of GDP in the 1970s, while individually they were among the largest firms in 
size, accounting for seven out of the ten largest and 19 out of the 50 largest (Wade 
1990, p. 178). As in Korea, PEs in Taiwan also pioneered industries where private 
investment was discouraged due to entry costs, such as heavy machinery, heavy 
electrical machinery, trucks, petroleum and petrochemicals, steel and other basic 
metals, shipbuilding, and nuclear power. Furthermore, the control of PEs in upstream 
sectors, which gave the government ‘indirect influence over the downstream sectors’, 
enabled it to protect indigenous private business from adverse external impacts by 
‘suppressing the prices charged by public corporations in basic industries’ (Wade 
1990, p. 179).  
 
Singapore is another example of a successful developmental state in which the market 
mechanism has also been ‘tamed’ and ‘harnessed’ by the government for 
‘developmental purposes’ (Wade as cited in Asher 1989, p. 59). According to Rodan 
(1989, p. xiv), 
 
the Singapore state’s role in the industrialisation process is indeed depicted as a 
pervasive one. In the economic sphere the state has not only engaged in 
selective but [also] significant direct investment […]   
 
In Singapore, the PEs comprised 39 statutory boards directly involved in commercial 
operations and four holding equity funds (Yuen & Woon 1992, p. 52). These statutory 
funds held majority shares in nearly 500 companies, hierarchically arranged in a six-
tier pyramid (Thynne 1989, p. 30). The public sector accounted for a considerable 
portion of the Singaporean economy, given that the share of wholly foreign-owned 
firms was more than half of gross output, value added, employment, and 
manufacturing exports in 1985 (Asher 1989, p. 72). Under a strong state interventionist 
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philosophy, statutory boards were present not only in ‘such traditional areas as public 
utilities, ports, broadcasting, and mass transit, but also cover[ed] international trade, 
tourism development, housing, and financial services’; the seven statutory boards 
alone had revenue equal to 17.7% of GDP in 1986 (Asher, 1989, p. 61). The public 
enterprises formed a distinctive, inter-locking network of cross ownership and cross 
management – officials can serve on various boards – under the ‘coordination and 
control’ of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, within a perfect web of talented and 
effective civil servants who have business skills and profit-oriented minds (Thynne 
1989, p. 31). 
 
2.2.3 Gradual and Partial Privatisation without Discrimination against State 
Ownership 
As discussed in Chapter 1, privatisation was introduced into developmental states 
contemporaneously with the other early emulators of the policy. Whereas Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1995, p. 9) did not adopt ‘the third way’ as an appropriate 
strategy in Russian privatisation, the developmental states effectively maintained their 
‘third way’ ideal as it had worked to generate economic growth. Neither policy-makers 
nor the public were antagonistic to state ownership. Privatisation, accordingly, was not 
prioritised in developmental states, even when some PEs underperformed. Despite the 
PEs’ role in economic growth, however, the familiar neoliberal rationale for 
privatisation – inefficiency due to lack of market discipline, excessive political 
interference, and profits relying on privilege – could be heard in the developmental 
state economies (Kim, Kim & Boyer 1994, pp. 157-158; Toyama 1998, pp. 389-390). 
  
Japanese National Railways (JNR) had indeed underperformed and faced huge 
challenges by the end of 1986 – considerable financial debt (US$286 billion), low 
productivity and a large number of redundant workers (JNR had more than 400,000 
employees), and a drastic reduction of market share due to private competitive 
operators and alternative transport means (Fukui 1992, p. xi). The Japanese 
government, however, did not rush to sell off the company to the private sector. It had 
spent six years restructuring the PE before deciding on privatisation; only when these 
efforts were deemed to have failed to achieve a turnaround was the privatisation plan 
implemented in 1987.  
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The Japanese non-discriminatory attitude towards state ownership seems to have 
produced a gradual approach to privatisation, which in turn led to a flexible, partial 
approach. The main initiatives implemented by government were corporatisation 
(NTTPC and JTSPC in 1985, JNR in 1987) and the introduction of market-based 
competition (such as market deregulation to allow new private entries, and trade 
liberalisation to allow for imported tobacco). Ownership transfer to the private sector 
appears to have lagged behind schedule, although it is not clear whether this was 
intentional or not. For example, the state only divested itself of a third of NTTPC and 
JTSPC, while tobacco and salt production continued to be controlled by state 
monopolies (Toyama 1998). Similarly, amidst the economic slowdown, the 
government was willing to postpone listing companies of JNR on the bourse; thus, a 
majority of shares in JNR’s passenger carriers were still owned by the state. In fact, the 
mix of public-private ownership did not adversely affect these companies’ 
performance, as the three urban carriers achieved a profit of around 10% of total 
revenue throughout the 1990s (Kasai 2003, pp. 160-161).      
 
Similarly, the Korean government undertook a series of restructuring policies to 
improve PEs and the markets in which they did business, including corporatisation, 
changing the balance between sources of credit (with the assistance of the state-owned 
banks and the participation of private chaebols), financial liberalisation (greater 
autonomy for the banks to adjust interest rates), and market deregulation for 
development of SMEs. Privatisation was seen as the next in a sequence of restructuring 
programs (Kim, Kim & Boyer 1994). The approach to privatisation, however, was 
gradual and partial: 
  
In most cases, the government has sold less than half the assets of public 
enterprises to private investors, thus assuring government majority ownership 
and control – albeit less regulation – of public enterprises (Kim, Kim & Boyer 
1994, p. 161). 
 
According to the government’s plan in 1988, PEs of particular importance to the 
economy were only divested gradually and partially; these included the National 
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Citizens Bank, Small and Medium Industry Bank, Korea Electric Company, Korea 
Telecommunication Company, and Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO). Even 
more important PEs that provided key utilities, products and services merely 
underwent ‘functional readjustment’; these included the Industrial Sites and Water 
Resources Development Corporation, Korean Development Bank, Korea Housing 
Bank, and Korea General Chemical Industry Corporation (Kim, Kim & Boyer 1994, p. 
163). Indeed, privatisation in Korea was only facilitated after the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1998 (for which the chaebols, rather than these PEs, were blamed), and then 
under pressure from international financial institutions. By 1998, the proportions of 
state ownership in key PEs were as follows: Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation 
(42.5%), Korea Telecom Corporation (71.2%), Korea Electrical Power Corporation 
(62.4%), Daehan Oil Pipeline Corporation (51.7%), Korea Gas Corporation (85.7%), 
POSCO (26.7%), and Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Company Ltd (84.3%) 
(OECD 1999, p. 75).       
 
In Taiwan, privatisation policy was contemplated by ‘social elites’ from 1984. Despite 
two bankruptcies of PEs, privatisation only began – on the grounds of adapting to the 
‘global trend’ – in 1989. Although Taiwan was an emerging developed economy, ‘the 
policy generally was carried out by trial and error because of inexperience in execution 
and immature institutional settings’ (Pao, Wu & Pan 2008, p. 325). Around 40 PEs 
were privatised in Taiwan, although majority state ownership was maintained in 21 of 
these. By 2005, these 21 PEs continued to be as profitable as they had been prior to 
privatisation (Pao, Wu & Pan 2008), indicating that the ownership transfer had not had 
a significantly adverse impact on their performance (Wu & Parker 2007).  
 
The rationale for privatisation took a distinctive form in Singapore – public enterprises 
had been ‘too profitable’. The state budget was in such good shape that, unlike in all 
other countries, the reason for privatisation in Singapore was neither concern about 
inefficiency nor state fiscal considerations. The three main official drivers of 
privatisation, as stated by the Divestment Committee (as cited in Asher 1989, p. 68), 
were:  
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(1) To withdraw from commercial activities which no longer needed to be 
undertaken by the public sector; in other words, when the government’s 
establishment role had been accomplished. In the words of Lee Kuan Yew, “we 
hand them over once they became routine business” (as cited in Asher 1989, p. 
71);  
(2) To add breadth and depth to the Singaporean stock market by floating 
Government-Linked Companies (GLCs); and  
(3) To avoid or reduce competition with the private sector.  
 
Unlike the practices in other economies, privatisation in Singapore was not aimed at 
introducing competition into the public sector but to mitigate the crowding-out effects 
the PEs were said to impose on the private sector. Instead of facing the competitive 
pressures within domestic markets, the privatised businesses then had to look 
internationally for new investment opportunities.  
 
Singapore’s commitment to the developmental state might have been a factor in 
keeping the scope of divestment of PEs at a modest level (Thynne 1989, p. 51). 
According to Thynne (1989, p. 30) and Asher (1989, p. 63), the Divestment 
Committee targeted only seven of 39 statutory boards and 99 GLCs, including all 91 
first-tier companies, but only eight of over 200 second-tier companies. In most cases, 
shares in the companies were sold gradually, in stages; many were acquired by other 
public companies and funds, and were even subsequently repurchased (Asher 1989, 
pp. 62-63, 70-71). Essentially, the reduction of public ownership was matched by 
corresponding enhancement of regulation (Asher 1989). In the privatisation of 
important firms, such as Singapore Airlines, ‘golden’ shares were effectively utilised 
to retain the state’s capacity to influence the company’s managerial appointments and 
its ‘veto powers over the amendment of key provisions in the company’s memorandum 
and articles of association’ (Thynne 1989, p. 37). 
 
2.2.4 Rule-based Privatisation  
This section discusses the key elements of rule-based privatisation in the 
developmental states: stakeholder approach, management focus, introduction of 
competition, and institutional building for business viability. 
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Stakeholder approach 
Developmental states traditionally appreciate the stakeholders involved in 
privatisation. Such an approach played a central role in the successful privatisation of 
JNR, which has been hailed worldwide as an exemplar of successful privatisation 
(Fukui 1992). According to Fukui (1992), favourable political and economic 
conditions are ‘imperative’. The process must gain public support and be placed on the 
political agenda of the government, and the privatisation strategy must be carefully 
planned. Since it is difficult to address all issues at the same time, short- and long-term 
problems should be targeted separately in different phases. For example, to facilitate 
the break-up of JNR, considerable effort went into difficult negotiations and 
discussions (Kasai, 2003). Mr. Kasai – the former CEO and President of one of the 
privatised JR companies – noted that the privatisation decision was inevitably 
permeated by politics, and that a national consensus was formed based on 
compromises among different stakeholders and political forces. That is to say, the 
success of privatisation was not simply a question of introducing market discipline to 
the sector. In fact, the government had cleared a huge debt (US$233.3 billion) for the 
JNR by arranging for 
 
all related parties, such as the tax-payers, railway passengers and JNR workers, 
[…] to share the burden; [which] was possible only because there was an 
understanding that public services […] could not be left entirely to market 
forces (Kasai 2003, p. 162).  
 
As a result of this stakeholder approach, the private sector responded favourably to the 
government’s call to voluntarily employ most of JNR’s redundant workers by 1990 
(Fukui 1992).  
 
Management focus 
In the process of privatising JNR, the soundness of the management team responsible 
for privatising and restructuring public enterprises proved to be of crucial importance. 
It was argued that restructuring and privatisation should aim to attack ‘problems and 
institutions, not people’ (Fukui 1992, pp. 126-129). To achieve a ‘solid managerial 
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basis’ in the new companies, their management was staffed by a mix of old JNR 
managers and the new faces of business leaders in the local communities (Fukui 1992, 
pp. xiii-xiv). The public-private approach to managerial renewal seemed to work in 
other developmental states as well. In Taiwan, even when state ownership was reduced 
to minority status in 19 privatised companies, ‘the state-controlled seats on boards of 
directors remain[ed] at approximately 60% on average’ (Pao, Wu & Pan 2008, p. 333). 
Further, the choice of private sales and public offers for privatisation meant that both 
the procedures and the managerial changes were transparently and effectively handled.     
 
Introduction of Market-based Competition and Institutional Building for Business 
Viability 
The introduction of market-based competition was viewed as even more important 
than privatisation in improving efficiency, as discussed in Chapter 1. In many cases, 
privatisation was pursued to dethrone state monopolists and create competitive 
markets. However, institutions must be developed to regulate new business entities and 
ensure these businesses become commercially viable. Both of these objectives were 
achieved by Japanese and Singaporean privatisers.  
 
First, the unwieldy JNR was divided into six JR passenger companies operating in 
separate regions and one for freight transportation. It was important that the size of 
each market segment be carefully measured to secure a certain level of profitability, 
allowing the respective carrier to focus on improving customer satisfaction. The 
former JNR was reincorporated as JNR Settlement Corporation to operate as a 
financial holding company. This initially held the shares in the seven passenger and 
freight carrier companies. Large parts of JNR’s old debt were assumed by the 
profitable urban-area companies and the corporation running the new bullet train, 
Shinkansen. A Management Stabilising Fund was established to compensate for the 
unprofitability of the rural-area companies. This meant that JR firms which were 
underperforming because of unfavourable demand conditions did not have to raise 
fares or reduce services to remain in the market. Since developmental states accepted a 
balance between profit-maximisation and public interest, the privatisers were not 
opposed to cross-subsidisation policies. In fact, the three island-based JR companies 
(with smaller customer bases because of their remote location) still rely on the 
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Management Stabilisation Fund to remain financially viable and attractive to investors, 
who would likely withdraw from those unprofitable segments if the firms had to 
respond to market discipline (Kaisai 2003, p. 164). On the other hand, thanks to the 
centralisation of privatisation governance, such an approach did not seem to penalise 
and, thus disincentivise, the profitable JR carriers in urban areas.  
 
After five years, the first stage of restructuring JNR prior to privatisation recorded 
important achievements. Since that stage, most of the JR companies have become 
profitable and paid a total of US$1.2 billion in corporate tax; the workforce was 
reduced to 191,000, while the passengers and cargo increased by 5% and 10% per 
annum, respectively. Significantly, the population also benefited in that passenger 
service was improved ‘without fare increases’ (Fukui 1992, p. xv). By 2003, except for 
the freight company, all passenger JRs have improved on their previous performance 
(Kasai 2003, p. 160).   
 
In Singapore, the Mass Rapid Transit Corporation (MRTC), a statutory board under 
the umbrella of the Ministry of Communications and Information, constructed the 
metro system then leased all of its infrastructure and equipment and granted the 
operating licence to Singapore Mass Rapid Transit Ltd (SMRT). The MRTC held a 
golden share in SMRT which gave it veto rights over changes to the company’s charter 
and the right to appoint two of six directors, even though 100% of SMRT’s shares 
were owned by the Temasek Holdings fund. This government-owned hedging fund 
planned to privatise SMRT after it ‘established a track record’ of profitability (Asher 
1989, p. 50). In terms of regulation, the Ministry was still responsible for safety 
standards, while the fares were determined by the Public Transport Council, which was 
comprised of representatives from the transport industry and consumer groups 
(Thynne, 1989, p. 33). In this way, Singaporean industrialists and privatisers have 
developed a network of formal institutions that effectively perform their respective 
functions while integrating stakeholder interests.  
 
In summary, privatisation was implemented in developmental states on the basis of 
pragmatic considerations. Because the privatisers were not biased against the public or 
private sectors, privatisation plans were pursued flexibly and directed towards 
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developmental goals and public interests. The government always acted as an 
‘entrepreneurial state’ or a ‘venture capital corporation’. As Lee Hsien Loong observed 
in 1987: 
 
“privatisation does not mean that the Government will stay out of business 
altogether”, for “where the private sector does not have the means to take up 
opportunities… the Government will not hesitate to do so”; nor will it “rule out 
investing its reserves in good, local companies through minority shareholdings” 
(as cited in Thynne 1989, pp. 42-43). 
 
A wholesale approach to privatisation certainly never figured in the developmental 
state philosophies of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. The question then arises, 
what would have happened if the transition economies had taken the same gradual 
approach? Though the situations are not really comparable, some kind of answer might 
emerge from analysis of Chinese privatisation.    
 
2.3 State-backed Privatisation in China10 
Even before the economic transition in the Socialist bloc of the CEE and former CIS, 
China had introduced economic reform policies, including policies about SOEs, as 
early as 1978 (Geng, Yang & Janus 2009). Unlike the command economies in Europe, 
however, China consistently took a ‘gradual approach’ (Gan 2009, p. 582) in its 
transformation towards a market economy, and was greatly influenced by the 
developmental state model being pursued by its prosperous neighbours (Heilmann & 
Shih 2013). The reform of SOEs – which were considered to be the major organic 
‘affiliates’ or ‘fundamental production units’ in the previous centrally planned 
economy – into ‘independent commercial entities’ (Zhang & Freestone 2013, pp. 78-
79) apparently played a significant role in the policy agenda. Nevertheless, just as the 
overall reform strategy was usually described as ‘cautious’, so too was the 
privatisation process, which was mainly limited to small- and medium- scale SOEs at 
the local level (provincial SOEs, and Township and Village Enterprises or TVEs), 
while large-scale SOEs were only involved in restructuring rather than ownership 
transfer (Mohan 2004, p. 4904). As a result, the state is still a major owner, exerting 
                                                          
10 The title of this section is drawn from the book by Zeng (2013). 
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considerable influence over various facets of the country’s industrial capacity. It is 
worth noting that, until recently, China had achieved a level of economic growth that is 
envied throughout the world.  
 
2.3.1 SOE Restructuring and Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs)  
Prior to the reform, the SOE system in China was seen to be operating unprofitably 
and inefficiently. This was despite a range of favourable conditions and preferential 
treatment by the state, such as soft budget constraints, subsidies, cheap credits and 
land, monopoly status, and protection from competition, all of which created 
substantial debt and market distortion (Mohan 2004; Gan 2009). Despite the size of the 
task, the SOE reform measures were carefully designed by Chinese policy makers to 
achieve the dual objectives of improving economic efficiency and ensuring the 
country’s political and social stability. The ‘incremental’ approach and ‘trial-and-error’ 
strategy were operationalised in two main stages of reform spanning over three 
decades (Zhang & Freestone 2013, pp. 78-80).  
 
The first phase (1978-1993) mainly involved administrative reform, initially to 
enhance managerial autonomy by delegating commercial decision-making and day-to-
day operations to the SOEs’ managers (Mohan 2004; Geng, Yang & Janus 2009; Gen 
2009). One of the main forms of ‘experimentation’ was so-called ‘dual-track’ pricing, 
which permitted SOE mangers to sell surplus (i.e. beyond plan) outputs to the market 
so that they became acquainted with the working of markets (Malesky & London 
2014, p. 408). At the same time, the control of most SOEs was also decentralised to 
different local levels. This was accompanied by administrative streamlining efforts to 
separate the social and business functions of the SOEs by transferring most of the 
social responsibilities, such as housing, education and healthcare for workers, to local 
authorities (Mohan 2004).  
 
The evolution of township and village enterprises (TVEs) was one of the distinctive 
features of Chinese economic growth during this period. TVEs originated from the 1.4 
million commune and brigade enterprises that had been established under China’s 
program of collectivisation. If individual and household enterprises are included, 
China had a total of 6.1 million TVEs by 1984. With the complete decentralisation of 
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their governance, these semi-private, local level ‘joint stock’ companies could be 
reorganised into an effective institutional and incentive structure. First, like the SMEs, 
they still benefited from the state’s favourable policies in relation to loans, tax 
reduction, and technical assistance. Second, TVEs represented themselves as 
opportunities for rural communities to ‘realise value from locally controlled 
resources’. This helped TVEs to attract capital that the population had built up during 
the early phase of economic reform. Third, TVEs continued to engage local 
authorities, while their governance was not captured by specific residents or 
employees. Local officials had to celebrate TVEs since their careers depended on the 
performance of these enterprises. Meanwhile, TVE managers were constrained by 
harder budget constraints and merit-based promotion (Harvie 1999, pp. 2-4). The 
development of TVEs as a ‘middle way’ for privatisation appears to have been a wise 
strategy. Unlike the situation in most other transition economies, the size of the 
Chinese product market was not an impediment to TVEs enjoying economies of scale; 
on the contrary, TVEs could exploit their dynamism as SMEs and forge links with 
urban industrial firms or foreign investors. As a result, by the mid-1990s, TVEs were 
‘the single largest source of employment for industrial workers … [and contributed] 
over 30% of the GDP’ (Harvie 1999, p. 2).     
 
2.3.2 Retain the Large, Release the Small 
Officially, the term ‘privatisation’ did not appear in China until the second phase of 
privatisation, from 1993 to the present. At first, SOEs were urged to transform 
themselves into ‘modern corporations’ (Gan 2009; Geng, Yang & Janus 2009). A 
milestone development in the mid-1990s was the advice by Chinese leaders that ‘the 
state sector did not need to be involved in every sector of the economy’ (Zhang & 
Freestone 2013 p. 82). Leaders also acknowledged the need to widen financial 
investment opportunities, which required the ‘new institutional arrangement of a joint-
stock system’ (Chen 2005, p. 39). In 1995, the central government produced two 
policy slogans: ‘Retain the large, release the small [SOEs]’ (Geng, Yang & Janus 
2009; Gan 2009); and ‘Advancing (in some areas) while retreating (in other areas)’ 
(Zhang & Freestone 2013, p. 82). In the meantime, the non-state sector was 
encouraged to expand, and financial markets were encouraged to develop with the 
participation of foreign investors. Even in this period, however, privatisation played 
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only a modest part in overall SOE reform of large-scale SOEs. Clearly, at this level, 
the state pursued privatisation reluctantly. As Zhang and Freestone (2013, p. 81) 
observed, ‘China’s SOE reforms have been a mixed experiment of quasi-privatisation, 
corporate governance reform, and greater exposure to competition’. Consequently, 
until today the scope and scale of privatisation have remained partial. 
 
The Chinese government’s privatisation strategy was, in fact, deliberately crafted in 
accordance with its philosophy of economic growth in which the state plays a back-up 
role for business in various ways but eventually retains overwhelming control over 
economic activities. This growth model has been described as ‘state-led development’ 
(Malesky & London 2014) and the accompanying privatisation strategy, ipso facto, as 
‘state-led privatisation’ (Zeng 2013). As in neighbouring developmental states, 
privatisers in China selectively targeted SOEs to secure state capacity for the 
implementation of industrial policy. Specifically, according to Geng, Yang and Janus 
(2009), only SOEs that were unprofitable in competitive markets were likely to be 
privatised, while those that were profitable but which were located in strategic markets 
and state monopolies were to remain under state control.  
 
The least regulated aspect of privatisation in China involved those underperforming 
SOEs at the provincial level (i.e. between large-scale SOEs and TVEs). Reportedly, 
this process was associated with as many ‘workers’ protests [due to retrenchment] and 
managerial corruption’ as had occurred in the CEE and former CIS transition 
economies, and also caused large-scale social disparity in China. Just as in these other 
economies, to secure support for privatisation and avoid unrest, the Chinese 
government had to offer concessions by selling these SOEs at discounted prices and 
with (other) generous incentives to the managers and workers. This is exactly what is 
meant by spontaneous privatisation. Where the Chinese privatisers outperformed those 
in the CEE and former CIS economies was in the effective use of propaganda and 
resources to appease the affected parties during privatisation. Indeed, in addition to its 
cash compensations, the government created a large number of re-establishment 
centres to help laid-off employees re-train so they could find new jobs in the private 
sector (which had been very active) (Zeng 2013, pp. 70-97 passim). 
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According to Gan (2009), share-issue-privatisation (SIP) - which leads to explicit 
(public) changes in ownership - only accounted for 1%; this was an appropriate 
amount given the limited extent to which the government committed to financial 
market liberalisation. This was in contrast to other privatisation schemes without 
ownership transfer to outsiders. Management buy-outs (insider privatisation), for 
instance, was the most popular (47%) due to the ongoing privatisation among 
provincial-level SOEs and TVEs. For the TVEs, the subsequent privatisation was not 
of concern since these enterprises were traditionally based on collectivised ownership. 
Selling to outsiders (domestic and foreign firms and individuals), in which the process 
was not disclosed, accounted for 22%; other schemes, including joint ventures, leasing 
and issuing shares to employees, accounted for 2%, 8% and 10%, respectively.  
 
As previously observed, in practice most of the privatisation took place with small and 
medium SOEs at provincial and county level while large SOEs often underwent 
restructuring. This was either by way of corporatisation, which involved setting up 
boards of directors and internal supervisory structures to ensure that management 
would pursue profit and be accountable for business decisions (Zhang & Freestone 
2013), or via reinvigoration through technical renovation, interest payment 
exemptions, debt restructuring, and redundancy payouts for workers (Mohan 2004). In 
an effort to modernise their corporate governance, many large SOEs have been 
publicly listed on Chinese mainland and overseas stock markets. Yet, financial markets 
have been liberalised only slowly in relation to SOEs’ assets, which largely remain 
under state control. For those listed SOEs, ownership could be diversified in theory. In 
practice, however, the company’s shares were classified into five types, most of which 
are either not tradable or are exclusively for Chinese individuals and institutions 
(Mohan 2004). As a result, only a small fraction of shares have been accessed by and 
transferred to the private sector, and control of the 500-1000 largest firms remains in 
state hands (Mohan 2004, p. 4905). In 2008, SOEs accounted for just 3% of the total 
number of enterprises in China, but they held 30% of total assets in non-agricultural 
sectors. On the stock market, private companies outnumber SOEs, but the market 
capitalisation is dominated by the latter (Wildau 2014). 
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It is fair to say that privatisation was utilised as a sectoral restructuring strategy within 
an industrial policy rather than as an ownership transfer strategy. As SOEs were 
withdrawn from ‘labour-intensive industries such as textiles and footwear’, they were 
concentrated in ‘strategic and pillar’ capital-intensive sectors such as natural resources, 
materials, energy, utilities and infrastructure. According to Zhang and Freestone (2013, 
pp. 8-10), ‘in 2010, on average, a SOE had five times more workers, produced nearly 
eight times more output value, and used 15 times more assets than a firm in the non-
state sector’. Clearly, the state is neither retreating nor consolidating, but is willing to 
invest in promising ventures, such as ICT, environment-friendly technologies, new 
energy and biology.  
 
2.3.3 State-backed Business 
Aside from the ‘modern state controlled companies’ – which are few in number but 
enormous in scope and scale, often holding monopoly positions in utilities and banking 
– various arrangements have been created through which the state can back enterprises 
of any type of ownership. These include: (i) joint-ventures, often involving foreign 
partners in an exchange of technology and market access; (ii) private companies with 
state influence in terms of favourable policies and protection from foreign competition; 
and (iii) companies backed by publicly owned investment funds, for both foreign 
venture-capital funds and enterprises of local authorities. Each of these arrangements 
has produced successful, internationally competitive firms such as China National 
Petroleum Corp, Shanghai Volkswagen, Goldwind, Huawei, and China WLCSP (The 
Economist, 2011). The active inter-penetration between the state and private sectors in 
China has created a web of indirect, ‘subtle’ business relationships which prove, just as 
do the models of keiretsu and chaebol, that ownership does not matter so much. None 
of these companies is ‘truly private’: the developmental state is ‘never far away’ (The 
Economist 2011).  
 
In fact, there can be too much or too little government holding: too much interference 
or too little political support. There may be an ‘optimal relationship between 
government ownership and performance’ (Mohan 2004, p. 4906). Using Chinese 
privatisation as a model for India, Mohan (2004, p. 4907) argued that ‘industrial 
reforms in China met with considerable success in terms of inducing behavioural 
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changes at the firm level…[and] enterprise restructuring can improve enterprise 
performance even without formal privatisation’. Indeed, the SOEs’ return on equity 
did increase significantly from ‘below 2% in 1998 to above 15% in 2007’ (Zhang & 
Freestone 2013, p. 10). The development of Chinese businesses is widely recognised. 
From small SOEs producing light industrial products in Shunde, Midea and Galanz are 
now among ‘the world’s largest application manufacturers’ (The Economist 2011). 
Twenty years ago, the revenue of a leading company in the US could be greater than 
that of China’s top 500 SOEs combined; in 2012, 54 Chinese SOEs were represented 
in the Fortune 500, with the largest in 5th place (Zhang & Freestone 2013, p. 9). Thus, 
while neo-liberal supporters are still sceptical that a full-scale privatisation might have 
brought even better results, political economists, like Mohan (2004), believe that the 
reform of SOEs and their improved performance have contributed significantly to 
China’s remarkable annual GDP growth rate of nearly 10% on average over the past 
three decades. Moreover, the ‘cautious’ pace of privatisation adopted by China’s 
policy makers was justifiable given its underdeveloped financial market and threatened 
reduction in tax revenues and increased unemployment at the time (Mohan 2004; 
Zhang & Freestone 2013). As a result, privatisation in China not only avoided the 
disruption of social and economic institutions and welfare that occurred in the CEE 
and former CIS countries, particularly Russia, but also helped to achieve broad 
national economic and social developmental objectives.  
 
2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The implementation of privatisation policy varied between transition economies in the 
CEE and former CIS on one hand and developmental states in East Asia on the other. 
The approach and outcomes of privatisation not only reflected the contexts of the 
political economies of the countries concerned but also the ideologies of the 
privatisers.  
 
SOEs once played a dominant role in the economies of the CEE and former CIS 
countries. During the transition period from central planning to a market economy, 
however, the SOEs were accused of inefficiency and poor performance, which 
neoliberal reformers ascribed to soft budget constraints and vaguely defined property 
rights. These claims turned out to be exaggerated because the production capacity of 
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these economies was substantially reduced following privatisation and took a decade 
to return to the previous level. In other words, privatisation might not have been the 
efficiency improvement device the reformers promised it would be.  
 
During the transition period, the reformers encountered a cluster of complex political 
and economic challenges. In such a context, privatisation policy was overloaded with 
multiple objectives: laying the foundation of a ‘well-functioning market economy’; 
reallocating of property rights to foster ‘capitalism with small entrepreneurs’ or 
‘people’s capitalism’; realising the assumed efficiency of politics-free markets; and 
distributing public assets equitably to the whole population. As politics overwhelmed 
careful planning, the implementation of privatisation was rushed by a wholesale 
approach that made the transformation irreversible. Voucher privatisation, which was 
pursued in Russia and many countries of the former CIS with careless disregard for the 
fledgling nature of the institutions, resulted in negative outcomes for the economy and 
society – corruption, appropriation of huge assets at cheap prices by oligarchs, 
unchanged corporate governance, a production slump, and greater inequality. In other 
countries, different approaches to privatisation were less harmful. On the other hand, 
though voucher distribution was discarded in Poland, privatisation there was delayed 
and captured by powerful workers’ councils, which led to spontaneous privatisation 
without performance improvement. Nonetheless, the Polish economy outperformed 
others thanks to its favourable policies for developing SMEs, which disproved the 
presumed association between privatisation and private sector development. 
   
When privatisation was introduced in developmental states in East Asia, it also 
reflected neoliberal beliefs. The developmental state, however, ‘underscores the ways 
in which political power, if wielded astutely, can contribute positively and effectively 
to a nation’s economic wellbeing’ (Pempel 1999, p. 140). The philosophy helping 
these economies achieve spectacular economic growth has induced the governments of 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore to implement privatisation policy using a gradual 
and partial approach. Thanks to their non-discriminatory attitude towards private 
versus state ownership, they were able to retain state capacities and, more importantly, 
to ensure through careful planning that stakeholder interests were included, 
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management was renovated, and institutions were developed to guarantee both 
business viability and effective regulation. 
 
China was an example of how a transition economy successfully emulated the 
developmental state. Privatisation was implemented in China gradually and 
selectively. In the initial phase, SOEs were merely restructured, while the governance 
of numerous township and village enterprises (TVEs) was decentralised to local 
authorities. Unlike the devolution of privatisation in Russia – where the auction system 
was replaced by a process that granted the responsibility for sales to local officers and 
managers, who took the opportunity to plunder the SOEs’ assets - the governance of 
TVEs was decentralised within a business-conducive institutional framework that 
managed and incentivised various stakeholders to create businesses and earn income 
using local resources. This is an effective transition towards privatisation. For large-
scale SOEs, the progress of privatisation has been limited because the state has 
persisted in backing businesses, regardless of ownership status, to implement their 
industrial policy.    
 
Essentially, the differences between transition economies and developmental states in 
the implementation of privatisation reflected their political economic philosophies. The 
reformers of transition economies were overwhelmed by the politics of conflicting 
private interests while retaining a belief in the superiority of private ownership; hence 
economic and social objectives were secondary to ownership transfer which, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, is not unconditionally associated with efficiency. When the 
appropriate enabling institutions were not developed, a careless approach to 
privatisation had adverse effects. In contrast, developmental states identified broad 
national economic and social development as their principal objective, with industrial 
policy as a fundamental means. Hence businesses of all types were equal under the 
coordination of the state, and privatisation was viewed as part of an aggregate of 
policies judiciously designed by the state to achieve sectoral restructuring and support 
businesses.   
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Chapter 3 
Privatisation (Equitisation) in Vietnam 
 
The privatisation experiences of both transition economies and developmental states 
have been reflected in Vietnam’s privatisation process. In 1986, the Doi moi economic 
renovation was launched by the 6th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP). It was designed to accomplish a profound transformation from a centrally-
planned economy to a socialist-oriented market economy. As discussed in previous 
chapters, this move took place at a time when the socialist bloc in the CEE and the 
former CIS were also undertaking reform and the world was observing a rising tide of 
neoliberalism, in which privatisation was an exemplar.  Privatisation, known in 
Vietnam as ‘equitisation’ (hereafter used interchangeably with privatisation) has since 
played a key role in the Vietnamese economic policy discourse. This explains why, in 
so far as economic transition concerns the nature and extent of state intervention in the 
economy, research on Vietnamese economic development in this period cannot ignore 
the policy of privatisation. Conversely, any enquiry into privatisation cannot fail to 
contextualise it within the broad picture of economic transformation of the political 
economy as a whole.   
 
The transition process apparently adopted classical liberal economic tenets: opening 
markets and trade liberalisation, establishing market-conforming and supporting 
institutions, and promoting private enterprise. In such a context, repositioning the 
SOEs – which had been the predominant business sector in the command economy – 
became a challenging task for the indigenous governing elites in the new economy. 
Reform of the SOEs ostensibly had two objectives: reorganisation to improve their 
performance within a market economy; and reducing and consolidating the SOEs in 
key industries while privatising those SOEs in less important areas as part of the 
development of non-state businesses in these markets. Accordingly, the equitisation 
process took place in three phases, only becoming intensive after 2003. Yet, while 
privatisation in Vietnam was also influenced by the philosophy of the developmental 
state, as articulated officially in the party-state’s documents, the extent of state 
capacity that was retained for coordination of industrialisation was far less than what 
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the rhetoric suggested. I will argue that the gap in implementation of the 
developmental state institutions derived from the vacillation of the party-state between 
the developmental state model, exemplified in East Asia, and the neoliberalism 
advocated by international donors, as well as deviations resulting from strategic 
groups’ attempts to realise the rents created in the equitisation process. Acknowledging 
these political economic realities is of significance in order to improve future 
equitisation planning.   
     
This chapter begins by outlining Vietnam’s economic reform agenda. It then describes 
and assesses the privatisation project over the last two decades as an integral 
component of the economic growth strategy. Next, the philosophical underpinnings of 
the project are analysed, including the distinctive institutional features of the country’s 
political economy that are embedded within it, the rules applied in the equitisation 
process, the contests among strategic groups, and their social implications.  
 
3.1 The Doi moi Economic Renovation 
A number of excellent reviews of the ‘Doi moi’ economic renovation have outlined the 
country’s post-war reconstruction period prior to the reform, including the immense 
difficulties that led to a series of ‘fence-breaking’ endeavours and generated the 
seminal policy-making process behind the transition agenda (see Evans & Bui 2005; 
Fforde 2007; Gainsborough 2010; Thayer 2010; Malesky & London 2014). 
Accordingly, this section only examines those aspects of the economic renovation that 
are key to understanding the significant changes that occurred in the SOEs, 
equitisation policy and related contextual features, especially those that have taken 
place since the 9th VCP Congress in 2001. Essentially, the reform was characterised by 
three main transformations in the Vietnamese party-state’s ideological orthodoxy: (i) 
from a closed to an open economy; (ii) the establishment of market-conforming 
institutions; and (iii) the development of non-state business sectors.  
 
3.1.1 From a Closed to an Open Economy 
Though rarely mentioned by foreign scholars, the opening up of the Vietnamese 
economy and its integration into the world economy had a significant impact on the 
country.  After achieving its independence in 1945, Vietnam experienced three 
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devastating wars in the period up to 1986. Due to the diversion of resources to various 
war efforts, its economy – despite state attempts to emulate Soviet-type 
industrialisation – was in fact largely agrarian and dependent on the socialist bloc for 
most of its aid (Thayer 2010). The isolation imposed by the US embargo (which was 
only lifted in 1994) also contributed to the country’s ranking as the poorest in the 
world (Evans & Bui 2005). Threats of a looming economic crisis, with goods 
shortages, inflation and famine in some provinces, forced the party-state’s governing 
elites – who had witnessed the promising outcomes from experimental policies, such 
as the limited-scope ‘fence-breaking’11 initiatives in agriculture – to initiate reform in 
1986. Thereafter, the achievement of impressive rice and crude oil exports (the result 
of an oil exploration joint venture with Russia) amidst the collapse of the socialist bloc 
in Eastern Europe intensified the reform agenda at the 7th VCP Congress in 1991.  
 
During the 1990s, a series of breakthroughs in foreign affairs and regional and world 
trade integration made the country more open than ever. In this context, ‘openness’ 
and ‘integration’ need to be considered as a two-way street. On one hand, external 
players (such as international and bilateral donors, foreign investors and traders) 
became an important source of influence on Vietnam’s political economy discourse 
from the early 1990s. On the other hand, Vietnamese leaders and people themselves 
were enthusiastic about globalisation for the sake of ‘industrialisation and 
modernisation’. It is worth noting that the internet is much more accessible in Vietnam 
than in China and, in terms of foreign trade/GDP ratio, Vietnam currently ranks among 
the most open economies in the world12. Last but not least, the openness to the world 
also explains the penetration of neoliberal economics into Vietnam via young 
bureaucrats who were often sent to study in Western educational institutions during 
this period. In summary, economic openness and trade liberalisation entailed a two-
way interaction between external and indigenous political economic forces, which 
                                                          
11 ‘Fence-breaking’ refers to explorative policies implemented at below-provincial level which were 
illegal because they exceeded the official regulations of the state. Before the Doi Moi, only collectives 
were officially recognised in agricultural production. To increase incentives for farmers, an 
experimental system of contracting outputs to each household was introduced in Vinh Phu province in 
1966-1969. Even though production improved, the leader of the ‘fence-breaking’ initiative was lightly 
disciplined.  
12 During three decades of Doi moi, Vietnam’s foreign trade/GDP increased from 23% to 179% (the 
world average is 57.9%), according to the World Bank. (Source: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS; accessed on August 12, 2016.)  
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would not only shape the overall policy framework of economic reform in general but 
also the contemporaneous equitisation process in particular.  
 
3.1.2 Establishment of Market-conforming Institutions 
The second most important aspect of the transition was the exposure of economic 
activities to market forces and competition, a process that began with the establishment 
of market-conforming institutions. The term ‘mixed economy’, which was widely used 
in the initial phase of Doi moi, meant that the state had to share its power and 
legitimacy with market mechanisms in determining the allocation of resources; in 
other words, allocation was no longer solely an outcome of central-planning. This 
helps to explain the meaning of the popular slogan ‘socialist market economy under 
state guidance’, which was coined by governing elites at the 7th VCP Congress in 
199113. There had been a long-running debate within the party-state before the 
decision was made to adopt economic renovation, which was prompted in part by the 
afore-mentioned ‘fence-breaking’ endeavours in agricultural production (Vo & Le 
2014, pp. 9-10). What is important to note here is the way the success of this event 
would shape the subsequent mindset of the governing elites. Since most of the party-
state leaders had risen to prominence from revolutionary backgrounds, practical 
experience was more highly valued than dogmatism. Hence, to the extent that the 
renovation process proved successful, it is traditionally attributed to similar 
breakthroughs achieved by the ‘fence-breaking’ policies which, local leaders theorised, 
would ‘unleash the relations of production for matching with the growth of forces of 
production’14 (9th VCP Congress 2001). As a result, the governing elites strengthened 
their belief in the ‘intermediate’ role of the market mechanism between feudalism and 
socialism (Nguyen-Thanh 2016). Thus, the more leaders favoured the market 
mechanism, the more they were perceived to be pro-reform and progressive, and vice 
versa. This approach, which came to be institutionalised throughout Doi moi, was seen 
elsewhere, for instance in the CEE and former CIS. Of more concern is the fact that, in 
Vietnam when economic difficulties are encountered, the policy discourse has 
                                                          
13 See List of Party-state’s Documents. 
14 The fundamental criteria for assessing the efficiency with which the socialist-oriented relations of 
production are being constructed are unleashing the production forces, improving living standards and 
achieving social equality (9th VCP Congress 2001). 
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consistently favoured furthering market-based reforms rather than reviewing their 
effectiveness.  
 
Indeed, Vietnamese market institutions have undergone a long development period. 
One of the priorities identified by the 7th VCP Congress in 1991 was the need to 
establish markets for all production factors, including land, capital, labour, and 
services. To achieve that goal, a priority task was to build market-conforming 
institutions. It is worth noting that the SOEs in Vietnam had previously operated in a 
mostly monopolistic and bureaucratic environment. This differs from the situation in 
institutionalised market economies, where the SOEs are at least familiar with such 
rudimentary business values as customer service. In a sense, then, the SOE reform 
should be characterised as a process of familiarisation with market-rules, i.e. 
‘marketisation’ (Painter 2003).  
 
The two decades after Doi moi witnessed a regulatory boom in Vietnam, including the 
promulgation of important laws and the establishment of administrative agencies for 
different areas of the economy15. The supremacy of the SOEs could only be curtailed, 
however, if trading and market-entry barriers in many industries were removed and 
exporting rights were no longer reserved solely for the SOEs. As private property 
rights were recognised and non-state business sectors were encouraged, there were 
calls for the removal of burdensome administrative requirements and red-tape in order 
to improve the business environment, especially under pressure from international 
financial institutions and donors, foreign investors and the local business community. 
These processes are not inconsistent with the logic of the party-state’s new ideology of 
‘unleashing the forces of production’.  
 
Yet the path dependence of deregulation might also render the Vietnamese policy 
discourse less effective than that of developmental states in East Asia. While the policy 
agenda of the latter was dominated by the question of how bureaucrats could play a 
                                                          
15 For example: the Law on Foreign Direct Investment (1987, 1996, 2000); Company Law (1990); Law 
on State-owned Enterprises (1995, 2003); Enterprise Law (1999), which abolished the requirement for 
minimal capital in business start-ups; Enterprise Law and Investment Law (2005, 2014), which created 
equal legal treatment for all businesses. Laws on commerce, competition, tax, accounting, finance and 
banking were also made during this period. The State Securities Committee was formed in 1996, and 
the Stock market has operated since 2000.   
100 
 
coordinating role in the implementation of industrial policy, state involvement in the 
former has often been viewed rather as harassment and corruption. In fact, although 
the economic role of the state was usually celebrated in official documents, there was 
little discussion of how it could be carried out and improved within the policy 
discourse. The absence of an industrial policy that involved more than rhetoric led to 
what Masina (2012, p. 204) has described as ‘liberalisation without neoliberalism, 
development without developmental state’.  
 
3.1.3 Development of Non-state Business Sectors 
Development of non-state business sectors, the third pillar of the reform, also arose 
from the desire to mobilise productive resources for development (7th VCP Congress 
1991). If the market was seen as an instrument for generating incentives and 
efficiency, it was hoped that the private and foreign-investment sectors would become 
sources of financial capital, technology, technical and managerial skills, and 
entrepreneurship, all of which had been limited in the SOE sector. It should be 
remembered that, before Doi moi, only the state and collective ownership – which 
were formed through the processes of nationalisation and collectivisation – were 
officially recognised, while most private businesses were illegal. Historically, the 
SOEs in the North were established to ‘support the war effort, to build infrastructure or 
to produce goods for the local economy’, while those in the South were nationalised 
from the previously domestic or foreign facilities ‘with few structural changes’ 
(Cheshier & Penrose 2007, p. 8). As a result of the war, the trade embargo and rigid 
management of the command economy, however, most SOEs were neither innovative 
nor productive (Fforde 2007; Beresford 2008).  
 
Structural transformation has always been an important topic in the policy discourse 
and remains a key concern of state governance in the context of reform. Every five 
years, in tandem with the VCP Congress, the party-state launches a Socio-Economic 
Development Plan (SEDP) for national multifaceted development over the period 
which integrates the VCP’s vision and broad instructions with the results of 
consultations with international organisations (such as the UN and UNDP) and 
financial donors (WB, IMF, ADB).  Based on the SEDP, the National Assembly holds 
hearings and approves the government’s annual plan, which sets specific goals for the 
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performance of each economic and social group in the following year. In this kind of 
state-led development, with its vision of ‘industrialisation and modernisation’, the 
governing elites have sought to answer questions about the appropriate proportion of 
GDP that should be contributed by the various sectors (industry, service, agriculture), 
how much large SOEs, private enterprise and foreign direct investment (FDI) should 
contribute to GDP, and how all this is to be achieved16. Just as agriculture’s dominant 
contribution to GDP and employment was negatively assessed at the launch of the 
reform, so too were the SOEs viewed as symbolic remnants of the former economy. 
This partly explains the biased attitude among both the governing elites and the 
population towards the SOEs, especially when they underperform.  
 
Overall, despite the effort to retain some sort of balance in the policy discourse, the 
further reform proceeded the more it has been inspired by neoliberalism, since the 
rhetoric of the developmental state has not been realised in practice. Very early in the 
reform process, in 1989, the policy on development of non-state sectors was 
established by the 6th Plenum of the 6th VCP Congress. It has since been maintained as 
a strategic direction, along with other decisions about international integration and 
‘marketisation’. By 1991, the party-state seemed to realise its vision for economic 
reform when the slogan ‘socialist market economy under state guidance’ was 
introduced (Nguyen-Thanh 2016). By 2001 (at the 9th VCP Congress), the new theme 
‘socialist-oriented market economy’, without its ever being clarified, has since been 
interpreted as meaning the state would intervene more indirectly in the economy – an 
idea that may seem to resonate with the Post-Washington consensus agenda. At the 
same time, however, it was counterbalanced by the conferring on SOEs of the title of 
‘mainstay’ of the economy. Yet it posed a challenge for economic governance. On one 
hand, the SOEs could only fulfil the new mandate if they were assisted by an effective 
industrial policy, which clearly requires a prominent role for state intervention. On the 
other hand, this seemed to conflict with the extent to which neoliberalism was already 
                                                          
16 The state-led ‘sectoral transformation’ has often been used in VCP Congress documents. For 
example, the 9th VCP Congress assessed the previous sectoral transformation as successful when 
‘agriculture reduced from 38.7-24.3%, industry increased from 22.7-36.6%, service increased from 
38.8-39.1% of GDP’, and set the structural targets for the next period as ‘agriculture reduces to 16-
17%, industry increases to 40-41%, service to 42-43%, and employment in agriculture reduces to 50%’. 
The VCP Congress does not set any clear targets for the SOEs, but a similar rationale of sectoral 
transformation is widely deployed in government’s annual plans, as shown in Hoang-Thi (2012), who 
also suggests a more even balance between the contributions of the state and private sectors.  
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present in Vietnam on the threshold of the new century, when the country had just 
signed its bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with the US and was preparing to join the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). Lifting barriers to imports and foreign investment 
was then of less concern than fears about the perceived crowding-out effects that SOEs 
might have on the local private sector. This is somewhat understandable, since the 
benefits (though limited) from foreign trade and investment have been greater than 
those expected from the SOEs, given the large gap between policy and 
implementation. These issues of political economy will be analysed in the following 
sections. 
 
3.2 The Party-state’s Policies on SOEs and Privatisation 
Against the backdrop of the overall process of economic reforms described above, the 
design and implementation of important policies to renovate the SOEs, especially 
through privatisation, can be divided into three main phases. Each of these is examined 
in detail below.  
   
3.2.1 Phase 1 (1991 – 2000): Reshaping the SOEs through ‘Administrative’ 
Commercialisation  
Throughout Doi moi, the SOEs have consistently been affirmed as the cornerstone of 
the economy. The 7th VCP Congress (1991) explained that the state economy was to be 
consolidated and developed in key areas that contained important businesses, and 
would take over those activities that other sectors were not able or willing to manage. 
The state sector would be reorganised, with improved technology and management, to 
operate efficiently, link to and assist other sectors, and play the leading role as an 
instrument for macro fine-tuning of the state. 
 
In the 1990s, reform of SOEs was confined to restructuring by administrative 
measures. Only a small number of SOEs were equitised on a pilot basis. While the 
state was to retain 100% ownership of most SOEs, autonomy was enhanced, financial 
independence was encouraged, and the state funded only selected projects, thus 
narrowing the scope of subsidisation. Pilot projects were conducted in small SOEs in 
unimportant industries to diversify their ownership structure, which involved allowing 
local private investment or the formation of joint ventures (JVs) with foreign firms. 
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Administrative decisions were frequently used to reshape the SOEs17, mainly by 
merging unprofitable enterprises with profitable ones. As a result of merging 3,100 
SOEs and dissolving 3,350 others, the number of SOEs was halved from 12,231 to 
5,571 (Pham-Minh & Vuong 2009, p. 157)18. A substantial number of SOEs were 
merged to form 17 large SOEs known as ‘General Corporation (GC) 91’ and over 70 
SOEs known as ‘GC 90’ (the numbers refer to the decree that created the particular 
type of large SOE)19. Their purpose was to control important areas of the economy and 
to compete internationally. Although autonomy was enhanced in relation to business 
decisions such as pricing, marketing and production, various aspects of SOE 
management were still regulated by the respective ministries. SOE employees, for 
example, were still viewed as civil servants.  
 
The first wave of SOE equitisation began in 1992 with Decision 202/CT of the Prime 
Minister to pilot the transfer of SOEs into joint stock companies with options to sell to 
the employees, domestic institutions, or individuals. Five medium-sized SOEs with 
good financial prospects that did not operate in areas requiring 100% state ownership 
were ‘equitised’. When only minimal progress was achieved, Decree 28-CP was issued 
in 1996. This provided more regulatory details, offered more favourable employment 
prospects for the equitised SOEs and allowed ministerial and local authorities to 
approve the equitisation of smaller SOEs with capital of under 3 billion dong. Some 30 
SOEs joined the plan. The aims of equitisation for the country’s economic 
development were clearly outlined in Decree 44/1998/ND-CP, namely: to attract 
capital from the whole society; renovate technology and management; create more 
jobs; enhance competitiveness; and allow employees to become owners with 
incentives for improved efficiency. 
 
                                                          
17 Under Decree 388-HDBT (1991) on the establishment and dissolution of SOEs and the Law on State 
Owned Enterprises (1995). 
18 Due to the dispersal of governance, data on the SOEs are often based on their reports to the 
Government or National Assembly. Not all of the SOEs fully comply with these reporting requirements, 
and there have been numerous changes in SOE policy; as a result, there are significant inconsistencies 
in different sources (Pham-Minh & Vuong 2009, p. 158).   
19 Decrees 90-TTg and 91-TTg (1994) regulated the creation of two types of large corporations: GC 90 
had at least 5 strategic business units (SBUs) and over 500 billion dong of capital, and were governed 
by ministries or large provinces; GC 91 had more than 7 SBUs, 1,000 billion dong of capital, and were 
governed by the Prime Minister.  
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This decree, promulgated in 1998, allowed foreign investors to buy shares in equitised 
SOEs. Previously, they had engaged in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) targeting 
some private firms (such as the famous Da Lan brand), or indirectly acquired shares in 
JVs with SOEs (such as the JV arrangement with CocaCola). The decree also 
classified SOEs according to whether or not the state needed to retain control by 
limiting the number of shares that could be purchased by institutions and individuals 
(10-20% and 5-10%, respectively). After paying the organisational cost of equitisation 
to line ministries, local authorities or general corporations, most of the revenue would 
be retained for the firm’s employment remuneration fund or capital consolidation. 
From 1998-1999, 340 SOEs were equitised under this scheme (Do 2008). 
 
Ostensibly, these policies reflected an accommodation with pressures to create a 
neoclassical market economy. During this period, however, the party-state continued 
to express scepticism about private ownership which, despite encouragement for 
investment in ‘socially beneficial areas’ and ‘without limits of scope’, was viewed far 
less favourably than were the SOEs. It seems that the party-state’s ambivalence 
towards the private sector was responsible for the key differences between successive 
SOE reforms, rather than its attitude towards the SOEs themselves. Private ownership 
obviously posed a political challenge to the ideological orthodoxy during this whole 
period of cautious experimentation with reform. It explains why equitisation was 
viewed differently from joint-venture activities, which were allowed very early in Doi 
moi.  
 
In summary, the 1990s are often assessed as a decade in which SOE reform was 
achieved mainly by administrative solutions with limited SOE equitisation (Sakata 
2013). Besides reflecting the ideological orthodoxy of the time, the apparent 
preference for non-market arrangements might also have reflected the desire to avoid 
lay-offs and preserve the perks of SOE managers. Other factors, however, might also 
help to explain the failure to prioritise privatisation during this phase. These included: 
the inexperience of state bureaucrats, SOE managers and local investors in dealing 
with the complex procedures of corporate acquisition; the absence of necessary tools 
and conditions such as asset evaluation, property rights and a stock market; the 
cautiousness of foreign investors in a newly emerging market; and the limited financial 
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capacity of the local population to take up any divestitures. In fact, despite the 
disappointment commonly expressed by neoliberals, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
gradual approach taken during the 1990s was an appropriate strategy and significantly 
paved the way for privatisation in the following decade.  
 
3.2.2 Phase 2 (2001 – 2010): Ambitious Business Groups and Rapid Privatisation 
By 2001, Vietnam was seeking to regain momentum in annual GDP growth after it had 
plunged from 9.34% to 4.77% (1996-1999) under the impact of the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997 (see Appendix 1). It had signed a bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with 
the US in the previous year and was negotiating to join the WTO. The Enterprise Law 
1999 established a modern framework of corporate governance and initiated a vibrant 
business environment, while the stock market was newly established. If equitisation in 
the previous phase of the fledgeling market economy merely involved ‘corporatisation’ 
of the SOEs, it much more closely resembled privatisation during this period. 
 
As the governing elites at the helm of the reform became more experienced, their 
policies had greater substance and contained more detail. The SOEs continued to be 
perceived as the ‘pillar’ of the economy and as the instrument through which the state 
could intervene, but were given a new mandate of holding the economy together, 
leading technological application to productivity and quality, enhancing socio-
economic efficiency and ensuring compliance with the law. According to the 9th VCP 
Congress (2001), the existing SOEs in these important areas were to be consolidated, 
reorganised and improved, while new ones might be created or invested with 
controlling shares in important areas. Strong business groups (BGs) were to be 
developed from the GCs, with the participation of other sectors. The equitisation of 
those SOEs where 100% state ownership was not necessary would be facilitated, small 
SOEs would be contracted, sold or leased, and inefficient SOEs would be merged or 
dissolved.  
 
The important industries were clarified, and a five-year time frame for accomplishment 
of these SOE reforms was set. The party-state’s determination to facilitate equitisation 
was particularly evident in its use of the 3rd Plenum of the 9th VCP Congress (2001) to 
realise the SOE equitisation agenda, which can be summarised as follows:  
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• The return on equity (ROI) was to be used as the main assessment criterion for 
commercial SOEs, while social policy outcomes would serve this purpose for 
public utility-provision SOEs;  
 
• State governance was to be reformed to give the SOEs greater autonomy, self-
responsibility, and the ability to cooperate and compete equally with businesses 
in other sectors according to law. Conditional protection would be provided in 
key industries, and state monopoly would be maintained in crucial areas. The 
state would cease funding but would maintain investment and appropriate 
support for prioritised industries. State regulatory functions were to be 
separated from the corporate management and the governance of the state 
ownership at the SOEs would be improved.  
 
• Two new strategies were pursued: (i) consolidating the GCs and establishing 
strong BGs with diversification around the core business, capital intensity, 
domestic and international competitiveness, advanced technology, management 
and linkage between R&D and production; and (ii) facilitating equitisation 
which, it was emphasised, was not the equivalent of privatisation.20  
 
From 2005-2010, 12 BGs were established by upgrading or merging major GCs; these 
held a monopolist or oligopolistic position (Beeson & Pham 2012) in coal and 
minerals, telecommunications, rubber, shipping, petroleum, textiles, electricity, 
insurance, chemicals, housing and construction (Hoang-Thi 2012, p. 12). The creation 
of these large conglomerates to compete internationally, like the keiretsu and chaebol, 
however, seemed to be in contradiction with another policy of the party-state – to 
displace monopoly market structures. This was because the introduction of 
competition was not easily achieved in practice, given the opposition from SOE 
managers and bureaucrats who preferred the status quo. On the other hand, these 
companies’ overwhelming market powers reflected the wide differences in financial 
capital, technical capacity and experience between the public and private sectors. The 
                                                          
20 Within the state apparatuses, the party-state’s assessment of the reform has been officially used as 
the single mode of assessment.    
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best solution might have been a combination of regulatory reform for competition and 
enhancement of linkages between the monopolist SOEs and private suppliers. Yet, 
neither of these strategies was pursued to any great extent.  
 
Although the ambitious attempt to emulate the large conglomerates in Japan and Korea 
might have been a good strategy for consolidating and enhancing the competitiveness 
of SOEs as a leading sector, more attention should have been paid to improving 
governance, by, for instance, hardening budget constraints. In fact, the attraction of a 
speculative stock market combined with the loose regulations on business 
diversification enabled the SOE managers to engage in rent-seeking from fashionable 
industries, such as real estate or finance and banking, which led to uncontrolled 
expansion of BGs regardless of efficiency. Newly established strategic business units 
(SBUs) within some BGs, for instance, rapidly numbered in the hundreds; these 
included PVN and Vinashin (Pham-Thanh 2013; Malesky & London 2014). The same 
principle was applied to the GCs which were transformed into holding companies 
while their SBUs multiplied into a complex system of secondary and tertiary layers 
with ‘interlocking directorships, and finance companies’ (Ishida 2013, p. 25). Some of 
these SBUs were created solely to use the funds of a trade union for investment21; 
others came about through the establishment of a new JV with private investors, who 
might have been cronies of the SOE managers and whose investment in the JV could 
take various forms such as cash, lending the SOE brand name, or business deals. 
Because some BGs or GCs carried a well-known brand name, which promised 
favourable access to credit, land, licenses and connections, their stock prices soared 
during the property boom of 2007.  
 
Such an environment, which was highly conducive to financial leverage and 
speculation (Ishida 2013), nonetheless spurred the reorganisation of 4,757 SOEs 
(through mergers, splits, liquidation and closures), of which 3,388 involved 
equitisation. Using the criterion of more than 50% state-ownership, the number of 
SOEs declined to 1,309, including 452 SOEs in security, defence and public utilities, 
and 857 commercial SOEs (Tran-Minh 2013, p. 7). The strategy of consolidation into 
                                                          
21 E.g. PetroVietnam Financial Investment (PVFI), Petrolimex Union Investment JSC, and Union 
Investment companies of BIDV and Vietinbank.  
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large SOEs was reflected in the fact that up to 85% of the assets and 90.4% of equity 
capital of the SOE sector were under the control of the BGs and GCs (Nguyen-Duc 
2015, p. 74).  
 
Despite the consolidation efforts, SOEs were often seen as inefficient over the period, 
for three main reasons: they absorbed a larger share of production inputs than their 
contribution to output warranted22; they were outperformed by (local) private and FDI 
sectors in terms of financial efficacy23; and they incurred high levels of loss and bad 
debt24. The Vinashin and Vinalines scandals were two influential milestones in the 
SOE reform process.  
 
When regional industrial reallocation seemed to favour moving ship-building 
technology and production from Korea to Vietnam (which offered advantages in the 
form of sea ports, steel production, and cheap labour), Vinashin was upgraded from a 
GC to a BG with the expectation that it would become the flagship of the ship-building 
industry. However, it invested in more than 445 subsidiaries, ranging from 
manufacturing JVs with foreign and domestic partners to training schools, magazines 
and non-core businesses (Malesky & London 2014, p. 413). Initially, the Vietnamese 
                                                          
22 The SOEs accounted for 70% of total investment, 50% of public investment, 60% of banking credit, 
and 70% of ODA, but only contributed 28-35% to GDP (because this is an aggregated figure for the 
whole state sector including health care, education, and the military, for the SOEs alone it should be 
reduced by 28%), 39.5% of industrial outputs, 50% of exports, and 28.5% of tax revenues (Pham-Thanh 
2013, p.37-38; Tran-Minh 2013, p. 7; Nguyen-Minh 2015). (It should be noted that these figures were 
not credible but were frequently used in the press). 
23 The SOEs took over 44.7% of the investment but produced 27.8% of GDP, while the corresponding 
private sector figures were 27.5% and 46.1% respectively during the second half of the period (Vu 
2013, p. 3). Although the labour productivity of the SOEs (78.01 million dong/labour/year) was higher 
than that of the private sector (10.1 million dong/labour/ year in 2005 because of the labour-intensive 
nature of the private sector), the productivity growth rate was slower in the former than in the latter 
(3.98% - 4.6% in 2001-2005) (Tran-Minh 2013, p. 7-8). To generate 1 dong in revenue, the SOEs needed 
2.8 dong of capital, compared to the private sector figures of 1.2 and FDI 1.3 dong, which helped the 
ICOR (investment efficiency) of Vietnam rise above that of the regional economies in the same period. 
Compared to foreign competitors, the SOEs lagged even further behind. Vinacomin, for example, had 
140,000 employees, more than those of BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto combined, but only achieved 
revenue equal to 3% (USD4/123 billion) of the revenue of these companies (Pham-Thanh 2013, p. 39). 
24 By 2012, the BGs and GCs had accumulated a loss of 26,110 billion dong - on average, 12 times more 
than a firm in other sectors. The debt of 12 BGs was 218,738 billion dong, equal to 8.76% of the debts 
of the entire banking system, and 52.66% of the SOEs’ credit; 30 of the 85 BGs and GCs had a 
debt/equity capital ratio of 3 times and for some CGs, 10 times in infrastructure (Hoang-Thi 2012, p. 
13; Tran-Minh 2013, p. 9). According to Hoang-Thi (2012, p. 14), 80% of the profit of BGs and GCs in 
fact came from 4 BGs in petroleum, military, telecommunications and rubber, which benefited from 
their natural monopolies. The SOEs were also blamed for half of the USD61 billion of the country’s 
external debt (Pham-Thanh 2013, p. 38). 
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government seemed to be doing well with its favourable issue of bonds to the 
international market that raised USD 750 million for Vinashin. It subsequently 
sponsored a further 3 trillion dong of commercial bonds that were sold domestically 
(Ishida 2013, pp. 44-48). When the global financial crisis (GFC) hit in 2008, most of 
Vinashin’s orders were cancelled and the ships and technologies that had been the 
objects of many its deals were simply scrapped. By 2010, four years after its 
establishment, its CEO had been arrested and the company defaulted on USD 4 billion 
of loans, four times greater than the stimulus package of the country in 2009 (Hoang 
Lan 2010). Vinashin was restructured by transferring parts of its asset portfolio 
(including debts) to PVN and Vinalines; much of its debt was converted into bonds, 
and it reverted to being a GC in 2013.  
 
The damage from Vinashin spread to other parts of the economy. Habubank, a private 
bank, went into bankruptcy in 2012. This was followed by the scandal of Vinalines, a 
GC90 with nearly 30 SBUs in ship forwarding and port services. In 2012, its bosses 
were charged with receiving USD 442,000 from the purchase of an old, unusable 
floating dock for USD 22 million25. By 2014, Vinalines was heading the list of 
unprofitable BGs and GCs with a negative bottom line of over 19 trillion dong 
(equivalent to USD 860 million)26. These examples of mismanagement and corruption 
– the largest ever - ineluctably undermined society’s confidence in the SOEs’ ability to 
act as the economic mainstay at the forefront of efficiency and legal compliance as set 
out in the policy agenda.  
 
As well as discrediting the sector in policy discourse, the poor performance of the 
SOEs – especially that of the sprawling and unwieldy BGs and GCs – also contributed 
to the rapid increases in external debt that seriously impacted on the country’s 
macroeconomic stability and prospective growth27. According to An Ngoc (2016), the 
                                                          
25 The company proposed to resell the dock at USD 1.71 million (see: Vietnam Investment Review 2016 
‘Vinalines sells its incriminating floating dock at a knock-down price’, 6 June, viewed 29 August 2016, 
http://www.vir.com.vn). 
26 Not just Vinalines, other unprofitable SOEs included GCs in food exporting, engineering, construction 
and trade. (See: Nguyen Le 2014 ‘Vinalines nhat bang lo cua tong cong ty nha nuoc [Vinanlines leads 
the unprofitable SOEs], 29 November, viewed 29 August 2016, http://www.vneconomy.vn).     
27 See: Chi Hieu 2014, ‘1,5 trieu ty dong no nan cua cac tap doan, tong cong ty nha nuoc [An 
indebtedness of 1,500 trillion dong of the state-owned BGs and GCs]’, 1 December, viewed 29 August 
2016, www.vnexpress.net; Tu Hoang 2015, ‘Dang lo ngai tinh trang no nan cua cac doanh nghiep nha 
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accumulated public debt of Vietnam reached US$117 billion in 2015 (equal to 62.2% 
of GDP), more than double the level in 2010. The external debt accounted for 43% of 
the total public debt, of which 80.8% was borrowed by the Government (mostly 
through ODA), 17.8% by government–sponsored projects and 1.4% by local 
authorities. Notably, most of the loans were to fund projects carried out by SOEs. 
Thus, alongside the fiscal and monetary malpractice and wasteful public investment of 
the government, SOEs were often to blame for the problems in the first place. 
Although the Vietnamese economy recovered well after the East Asian financial crisis, 
and achieved an impressive annual growth rate of 8.46% in 2007 (see Appendix 1), the 
impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 was more extensive. Yet even 
before the GFC, the economy was confronting the problem of high inflation, which 
reached 19.4%/year-on-year in 2008 and was associated with a range of fiscal and 
monetary instabilities (Pincus & Vu 2008). Combined with the impact of the GFC, the 
asset bubble – fuelled by the investment-based growth model28 and cheap credits 
channelled into real estate and financial speculation – quickly affected the growth of 
the economy in 2008 and 2009, with growth rates plummeting to 6.31% and 5.32% 
respectively, and depressed per capita growth virtually to the point of stagnation. A 
demand-stimulating package was released in 2009, with the result that growth 
temporarily increased to 6.78% in 2010 but was accompanied by the return of inflation 
to 18.6%/yoy in 2011. Consequently, when the government had to tighten monetary 
policy, the growth rate declined again to 5.89%-5.03% in 2011-2012 (see Appendix 1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
nuoc [SOEs’ indebtedness should be worried]’ 24 November, viewed 29 August 2016, 
www.thesaigontimes.vn; Luong Bang 2016, ‘Nang ganh tap doan nha nuoc, Chinh phu no 21 ty USD 
[Due to the debt of BGs, the Government owes USD21 billion]’, 4 July, viewed 29 August 2016, 
www.vietnamnet.vn; Chi Hieu 2015, ‘Tap doan, tong cong ty nha nuoc no nuoc ngoai hon 380.000 ty 
dong [BGs and GCs have external debt equal to 380,000 billion dong], 23 November, viewed 29 August 
2016, www.vnexpress.net ; An Ngoc 2016, ‘No cong tang gap doi sau 5 nam len 2,6 trieu ty dong 
[Public debt doubled after 5 years to 2,600 trillion dong]’ , 12 July, viewed 29 August 2016, 
www.cafef.vn ; Ngoc Tuyen 2016, ‘Tap doan, tong cong ty nha nuoc dau tu nghin ty, thu bac cac [BGs, 
GCs invest thousands of billion, to gain cents], 28 August, viewed 29 August 2016, www.vnexpress.vn.     
28 Traditionally, the total investment rate has always been at a high level in Vietnam, rising from 
39%/GDP in 2001-2005 to 42.9%/GDP in the next five years and only declining by 32% in the most 
recent period (An Ngoc 2016).  
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3.2.3 Phase 3 (2011 – present): Withdrawal, Restructuring Agenda and New 
Debate 
The policy discourse in this period was largely concerned with the macroeconomic 
instabilities that occurred in 2008-2013. Since 2008, the terms ‘economic 
sustainability’, ‘group interests’, ‘rent-seeking’, ‘limits of resource-based 
development’, and ‘looking for the new growth engine’ have been widely used in local 
policy discourse29. By the 11th VCP Congress, the governing elites seem to have 
agreed on two main themes: first, restructuring the economy by focusing on three 
prioritised areas (withdrawing inefficient business units owned by the SOEs, 
eliminating the squandering of public investment, and handling the bad debts of 
commercial banks and financial institutions)30; second, transforming the growth model 
from factor-based to productivity-based. Restructuring the SOEs accounted for one-
third of the overall economic restructuring project. Accordingly, the 6th Plenum of the 
11th VCP Congress (2012) mapped out a new agenda for SOE reform. 
   
This identified the SOEs as the cornerstone of the state economy and the instrument 
that supported the state’s ability to intervene in the economy.  The tasks ahead 
involved: restructuring the SOEs; applying new technologies; strengthening the 
socialist-orientation of the economy; focusing on the key segments of security, 
defence, natural monopolies, provision of essential public goods and services, and 
some foundational industries that used modern technologies and had large spill-over 
effects. A short-term goal was to stop diffusive investment into non-core businesses 
                                                          
29 The Harvard Vietnam Program (2008) Choosing success report became well-known after it issued the 
first warning about the growth stagnancy that the Vietnamese economy might face if it followed the 
path of Southeast Asian countries rather than the best practice of Northeast Asian ones. In 2010, the 
Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM), Ministry of Planning and Investment submitted to 
the Government two proposals: (i) Continuing the reform, facilitating the economic sectoral-
transformation towards improving the economy’s productivity, efficiency and competitiveness; and (ii) 
Policy solutions for enhancing the growth quality, efficiency and competitiveness of the economy. These 
were subsequently combined to form the Overall Project of Economic restructuring with growth-model 
transformation towards improving the efficiency, productivity and competitiveness during 2013-2020’, 
which was formalised by the Prime Minister’s Decision 339/QD-TTg in 2013 (CIEM 2010a; 2010b).  
30 There have been frequent complaints about wasteful and low-quality public investment and public 
concern has been expressed that large-scale projects (such as the national freeway) have played a 
major role in cost-push inflation. At the same time, due to macro instabilities, the banking and financial 
system (in which the ‘big four’ are state-owned) has been burdened by a large amount of bad debt 
since the property bubble burst. This was reflected in the government’s establishment in 2013 of a 
new Vietnam Asset Management Company owned by the State Bank, as well as the Debt and Asset 
Trading Corporation (DATC – 2003) of the Ministry of Finance. 
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and to complete the disinvestment of state capital in SOEs with less than 50% state 
ownership. It was also recommended that the establishment of a united agency in 
charge of ownership representation in the SOEs should be investigated.  
 
‘Continuity and change’ (Gainsborough 2010) were clearly evident here: on one hand, 
the party-state reaffirmed the centrality of the SOEs as a symbol of the country’s 
socialist orientation; on the other hand, it was toning down its appraisal of the 
reliability of the sector. According to CIEM (2014), if the focus of SOE reform had 
previously been on quantity, the ongoing agenda would seek an improvement in the 
quality of the sector. The overhaul has been implemented via a ‘top-down’ hierarchical 
approach: (i) the framework plan described in the Prime Minister’s Decision 929/QD-
TTg (2012) specified goals and solutions at the national level; (ii) sectoral plans for 
SOEs in each industry or locality were prepared by ministries and provincial 
authorities and  submitted to the Prime Minister for approval; (iii) based on these 
plans, each of the SOEs, BGs and GCs developed its own specific plan, which was 
submitted to line management (CIEM 2014, p. 2). The overarching mandate in these 
plans was for SOEs to withdraw or disinvest from all but core businesses that are 
important for the state’s presence in the economy and where the SOEs have a 
competitive edge. 
  
By August 2013, all sectoral plans were approved by the Prime Minister (CIEM 2014, 
p. 2). By October 2014, 90 of a total of 108 BGs and GCs had their plans approved (20 
by the PM, 70 at ministerial and provincial levels); 18 had not yet been approved 
(Nguyen-Duc 2015, p. 73). By 2016, the BGs and CGs had achieved disinvestment 
from non-core businesses of the BGs and GCs to a total value of 4,956.3 billion dong. 
According to the Department of Enterprise Reform, Office of Government (2016), this 
was broken down as follows: real estate (3,177.3); insurance (21.1); securities (22.5); 
finance (1,675.2); banking (60.2); and divestiture of BGs’ SBUs (10,048). This amount 
was still less than what the BGs and GCs had invested31 (Nguyen-Duc 2015, p. 75). 
Progress in the equitisation process was also stalling; from a planned total of 514 deals 
                                                          
31 According to the Ministry of Finance, the amount that BGs and GCs invested in non-core businesses 
by 2014 was about 22,000 billion dong (see: Cafef 2014 ‘Tien do thoai von ngoai nganh van cham 
[Progress of disinvestment from non-core businesses is slow]’, 22 July, viewed 5 September 2016, 
http://www.cafef.vn).    
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over the five–year period 2011-2015, only 16 were concluded in 2011, 13 in 2012, 66 
in 2013, 143 in 2014, and 222 expected in 2015 (Department of Enterprise Reform 
2016)32. However much the current policy agenda endorses equitisation as a strategic 
tool for reform of the SOEs, in practice the process of financial retreat and divestment 
by the state was inevitably conditioned by the stock market, which had been on a 
downward trend. The VN-Index reached a record 1,000+ points in early 2007, then 
plunged to 244 (February 2009), before recovering slowly to around 400 (by February 
2012), and to 600 since March 201433.   
 
As well as withdrawal of non-core business investment, changes in the classification of 
SOEs according to the proportion of state ownership have reflected the state’s attitude 
towards SOEs and, in practice, will provide benchmarking rules and guidance for the 
new phase of equitisation. 
 
Until 2014, the SOEs had been defined as firms with more than 50% of state 
ownership and were classified into two groups: (i) 100% state ownership in sensitive 
industries of security and defence, airlines and maritime-pilotage services, power grid, 
large-scale seaports and airports, railways, broadcasting and television, tobacco, and 
lotteries; (ii) more than 50% state ownership in enterprises providing public goods and 
services, those in remote areas; and those in industries vital to macro stability, such as 
key infrastructure and transportation, oil, and mineral resources. During this phase, the 
party-state policies of maintaining majority ownership in strategic industries and 
utilities were clearly consistent with the gradual and partial approach to equitisation – 
a characteristic of developmental states. 
 
Since 2016, the neoliberalism-inspired equitisation has advanced further with new 
rules narrowing the range of firms recognised as SOEs. Under the Enterprise Law of 
2014, only firms with 100% state ownership are recognised as SOEs34; therefore, BGs 
                                                          
32 Equitisation here means that shares in the SOEs were sold for the first time to insiders and/or 
outsiders, regardless of the ratio of state ownership. 
33 The stock market has been an important channel for initial public offerings (IPOs) of the SOEs. In 
2015, the IPOs of 112 SOEs generated 5,455 billion dong (Department of Enterprise Reform 2016). 
34 The Deputy Prime Minister, Head of the Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and 
Development, stated that ‘it needs to facilitate the downsizing of the SOEs and there should be as few 
SOEs with 100% state ownership as possible’ (See: Website of the Government 2016 ‘Tiep tuc thu hep 
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and GCs would not be considered as SOEs after their equitisation. Among these many 
utilities providers were classified as not needing to be wholly owned by the state. The 
aim of the Enterprise Law was to create more opportunities and greater scope and scale 
for equitisation. According to Decision 58/2016/QD-TTg, which involved 240 
enterprises, the state would hold 100% ownership in 103 SOEs (key infrastructure and 
financial security, including 63 lottery companies); 65% ownership in four equitised 
SOEs (coal and minerals mining, agriculture and rural banking, oil exploration); 50-
65% ownership in 27 equitised SOEs (telecommunications, food export, tobacco, 
regional electricity distribution); and less than 50% ownership in 103 equitised SOEs 
(53 water supply-sewage, urban utilities, and 14 industrial manufacturing). Thus, the 
proportion of state-ownership of most of the industrial BGs and GCs, including oil 
exploration and electricity, could be reduced by disinvestment to 50-65%. This change 
arguably implies a wholesale approach in that the decision makers wish to expose 
more majority-ownership SOEs to market forces in order to ‘free them from the social 
tasks or political influences’ (Son Nguyen 2014).  
 
In summary, though the SOEs have been officially designated as the ‘mainstay’ of the 
economy, there has been a fundamental change in the party-state’s views about how 
much of a role the sector could play. On one hand, the party-state has to underscore the 
role of the SOEs to conform with its socialist political ideology; on the other hand, 
private firms are coming to be relied on as an ‘important engine’ of economic growth. 
In fact, many policies have been designed to support growth in this sector, including 
encouragement for start-ups, extensive simplification of administrative processes35, 
and assistance for small and medium enterprises (SMEs)36. Nevertheless, even if the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
doanh nghiep nha nuoc [Keep downsizing the SOEs]’, 3 March, viewed 6 September 2016, 
http://www.chinhphu.vn).  
35 The small size of the private sector has often been blamed for the ‘crowding-out’ effects created by 
the SOEs, and the unfavourable business environment in which private firms operate; for example, 
only 1% of the SMEs have ambitions to become large corporations (see: Khanh An 2016, ‘Vi sao doanh 
nghiep khong muon lon? [Why don’t the firms want to develop?], 9 January, viewed 14 September 
2016, http://www.baodautu.vn). Hence, the party-state’s policies towards the private sector have 
focused on administrative simplification and deregulation of business licenses, usually enshrined in 
different versions of Enterprise Law (1999, 2005), especially Investment Law 2014. (See: Lao dong 2015 
‘Bai bo 3,299 dieu kien kinh doanh: con hon ca ‘coi troi’ [3,299 business conditions are removed: more 
than…‘unleashing’], 1 July, viewed 14 September 2016, http://www.laodong.com.vn).    
36 According to General Statistics Office (GSO 2008), by employment size, most of the private firms are 
SMEs (5-10 employees: 36.6%; 10-50: 32.3%); the FDI firms are normally larger (10-50: 29.1%; 50-200: 
31.0%); and the SOEs are the largest (50-200: 23.2%; 200-500: 36.5%). Among the largest corporations, 
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role of SOEs is played down by the party-state, they remain the largest firms in scale 
and as corporate tax payers37. Hence the way in which the SOEs are reformed and how 
equitisation is governed will have a significant impact on the future economic growth 
of the country. 
 
3.3 Vietnam’s State-led Development: Vacillation between 
Neoliberalism and the Developmental State  
Analysis of Vietnam’s uneven experience of equitisation over recent decades reveals 
the extent to which it is embedded within a complex of economic and political 
constructs. In order to unravel the reasons for the uneven governance of policy and 
implementation outcomes, it is necessary to look beyond official accounts and examine 
the dynamics of the ‘backstage’ political economy. This section analyses the 
characteristics of state-led development in Vietnam, which reflect the philosophical 
contest between neoliberalism and the developmental state.   
 
3.3.1 Political Legitimacy Based on Economic Performance  
The Vietnamese political system has been well described by Thayer (2010), who 
emphasises the role of the one-party leadership over the whole state apparatus as it 
seeks to respond to a variety of political challenges. Once wartime mobilisation 
ceased, patriotism and nationalism have gradually given way to concern about the low 
level of national wealth and the post-war economic difficulties. This has prompted the 
party-state to seek a new basis for its political legitimacy in the country’s economic 
performance (Bui 2015). Since the launch of Doi moi, ‘successful economic 
development and modernisation’ has become an important source of the political 
                                                                                                                                                                        
the private sector still dominates those firms of 500-1,000 employees: 42.7% (SOEs: 27.5%; FDI: 
29.7%). In firms of 1000-5000 employees, the private sector, SOEs and FDI account for 33.6%, 30.8%, 
35.6%, but for firms employing over 5000 people, the private sector is outnumbered by the SOEs and 
FDI sectors (17.3%, 39.5%, 43.1% respectively). In terms of assets, the distribution is similar: 100-500 
billion dong (private: 57%, SOEs: 20%, FDI: 23%); 500-1000 billion dong (37%, 33%, 30%); 1,000-5,000 
billion dong (32%, 42%, 27%); over 5,000 billion dong (31%, 42%, 27%). However, the private sector is 
still the main employer accounting for 56% of the labour force working in businesses, more than the 
two other sectors (FDI: 23%, SOEs: 21%). That is to say the private sector is smaller but labour intensive 
while the SOEs are typically larger and capital intensive.             
37 For example, in the list of largest corporate tax payers (V-1000), there were 229 SOEs contributing 
82,344 billion dong, equal to 45% of listed revenue (or over 10% of the whole budget revenue); FDI had 
460 firms (37%), and the private sector had 311 firms (18%). (See: Vietnam Report 2015, ‘Bang xep 
hang V1000 2015: ton vinh doanh nghiep nop thue [V1000 ranking 2015: congratulating largest tax 
payer corporations’, 27 November, viewed 14 September 2016, http://www.vietnamnet.vn].    
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regime’s legitimacy (Thayer 2010, p. 425). To date, Vietnam has attracted 
international recognition for some of its achievements (Masina 2012; Schwenkel & 
Leshkowich 2012; Bui 2015), such as a rapid average annual growth rate of 7.42% in 
the 20 years from 1991-2010 (GSO 1991-2010); poverty reduction, from 58% of the 
population in 1993 to 23% in 2004 (Beresford 2008, p. 236)38; and a reasonable level 
of income equality, ‘with a Gini coefficient of 0.37 compared with 0.47 for China’ 
(Malesky & London 2014, p. 397). The development path, however, has not been 
smooth, particularly in relation to reform of the SOEs, as previously discussed39. 
 
Both consistency and inconsistency between economic and political constructs are 
evident in the course of Vietnamese development under the leadership of a state in 
need of economic performance. The state has advanced its political agenda by 
proclaiming the necessity of political stability for economic growth, and vice-versa. 
This explains the willingness of the governing elites to adopt Doi moi, which 
‘resonated with neoliberalism to rework the socialist form of governance’ (Bui 2015, 
p. 83), and why market-based economic reform has always been preferred to a political 
reform that is likely to be viewed as a threat to the party’s sole leadership (Thayer 
2010). Nevertheless, the pace and scope of both kinds of reform have always been 
debatable. Although the party-state is composed of reformers as well as conservatives, 
these circles are still generally viewed as ‘hard-line’ by the population, who are likely 
to favour any reforms that make their lives easier as signs of ‘progress and prosperity’ 
(Hayton 2010, p. xiii). With over 3 million members (since nearly every large family 
has at least one Party’s member), the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is large 
enough to ensure that official policy discourse within the governing elites is not 
isolated from popular discourse. Accordingly, as the population has embraced 
elements of Westernisation that are identified with modernisation, so too has the party-
state. This appears to be consistent with the state’s claim for political legitimacy based 
on economic performance.  
                                                          
38 In 2010 the poverty rate had further declined to 14.2% (according to the official Vietnamese poverty 
line) or 20.7% (adjusted according to the international poverty line). (See: The World Bank 2013, 
‘Poverty reduction in Vietnam: remarkable progress, emerging challenges’, 24 January, viewed 23 
September 2016, http://www.worldbank.org). 
39 The annual growth rate is also tending to slow down: from 7.8%/year on average (1990-2007), to 
6.7% (2007-2012), to 5.8% (2012-present). Source: Tu Hoang 2016, ‘CIEM: phai duc tran cai cach neu 
muon phat trien [CIEM: it needs to break the limit of reform for development]’, 3 August, viewed 26 
September 2016, http://www.thesaigontimes.vn).     
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Nevertheless, given the state’s paternalistic control over ideology, the term 
‘neoliberalism’ is unknown and reference to ‘capitalism’ is taboo in these discourses, 
despite the conspicuous presence of capitalism in the daily life of the society (Hayton 
2010). As a result, discussion has been limited to the pace and extent of the reforms, 
and the greater the number of reforms, the more ‘progressive’ they are held to be. As 
long as the economic reform bears fruit, confidence in the drive for reforms that are 
actually inspired by neoliberalism increases. Interestingly, when an economic stumble 
occurs (typically a scandal involving SOEs or public investment), critics accuse the 
state of not reforming enough rather than needing to review or step back from previous 
policies. A forward-looking mindset is also due in part to the desire to avoid looking 
back to the mismanagement of the central planning economy (Hayton 2010). 
 
In some postsocialist societies such as Vietnam and China, even though 
neoliberal policy is never openly acknowledged in the official state ideology, 
the adoption of neoliberal-informed strategies and practices is palpable in 
restructuring the economy, modes of governing, selfhood, and everyday life 
(Zhang 2012, p. 659). 
 
While the official mantra still stresses that Vietnam is a “market economy with 
socialist orientation,” in practice Vietnam’s integration into the global economy 
through the membership in the World Trade Organisation (in 2007) has 
accelerated the development of a national economy driven by market forces. 
Vietnam’s party-state has made progress in reforming and privatising the state-
owned enterprises… and there has been an explosion in the growth of the 
private sector (Thayer 2010, p. 439). 
 
Thus, it may seem that the reforms, despite some initial fumbling, have been good 
enough to improve economic performance and secure enough legitimacy to enable the 
state leadership to remain in place. In fact, however, the ‘cacophony’ of official and 
unofficial voices conceals an ‘amorphous double movement’ of Vietnam between a 
developmental state and neoliberalism (Bui 2015). It may be that the party-state uses a 
pragmatic approach of oscillating policies - ‘sometimes favouring growth, sometimes 
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stability’ - to address the difficult task of creating ‘one million jobs a year’ (Hayton 
2010, p. 3). Because of this strategy, scholars hail the country as a successful exemplar 
of an unprecedented ‘hybrid’ (Masina 2012) or ‘co-existence’ (Bui 2015) between 
elements of socialism and neoliberalism; or they praise the ‘state-crafted’ mediation of 
external globalisation pressures and domestic interests (Evans & Bui 2005) to secure a 
harmonious process of ‘continuity and change’ (Gainsborough 2010). In order to shed 
light on the policy discourse around equitisation, it is essential to explore the complex 
accommodation between Vietnamese socialism and neoliberal philosophy that has 
characterised the state’s approach to tackling the intertwined political and economic 
challenges.  
 
3.3.2 Vacillation between Neoliberalism and the Developmental State  
Although I am in partial agreement with these academic arguments, I propose another 
understanding of the Vietnamese developmental trajectory as a vacillation between the 
developmental state and neoliberalism in which neither agenda has been pursued 
successfully nor completely. On one hand, thanks to the pragmatic treatment of 
philosophical contestation as secondary to the primary goal of improving the 
population’s living standards, the Vietnamese economy has achieved a relative stable 
growth. This is in stark contrast to the stumbling growth of transition economies in the 
CEE and former CIS, where ideological transformation was prioritised as an 
overwhelming agenda – most clearly evidenced in their programs of mass 
privatisation. On the other hand, Vietnam achieved much less than the developmental 
states of East Asia, in terms of both economic growth and privatisation. According to 
Collins and Bosworth (1996, p. 136), most developmental states achieved an average 
annual growth in GDP of around 8.5% in the decades immediately before the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997 (from 1960 to 1994, the rates were: Korea, 8.5%; Singapore, 
8.3%; Taiwan, 8.7%). Even some economies in South East Asia outperformed 
Vietnam when they were at a similar level of economic development (Thailand, 7.7%; 
Malaysia, 7.0% from 1960-1994). Vietnam’s average annual growth rates have indeed 
been declining over these decades: 7.7% (1992-2001); 7.2% (2002-2011); 5.7% (2012-
2016) (GSO 1992-2016). Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 2, the management and 
privatisation of SOEs in the developmental states have been implemented more 
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consistently and effectively than have the governance reforms of the BGs and GCs and 
equitisation in Vietnam.  
 
Essentially, the economic transition in Vietnam can be characterised as an adaptation 
of neoliberal economics. In the party-state’s policy discourse, it is easy to identify calls 
for the efficacy and rationality of market mechanisms to be recognised as ‘axiomatic 
truths’ or ‘objective rules’ that need to be accommodated (Schwenkel & Leshkowich 
2012; Nguyen-Thanh 2016). As outlined earlier in this chapter, almost all of the 
Washington-consensus formulae were applied to create ‘the efficient market’ and 
burgeoning private sector. Two features, however, make the Doi moi distinct, at least 
from the processes that characterised the opening up of the CEE and the former CIS.  
 
First, contrary to the idea of the minimal state – one of the cruxes of neoliberalism – 
the Vietnamese government has been at the helm throughout the course of economic 
development (Masina 2012). Its influential role in directing and overseeing the 
economy (Adams & Anh-Le 2010; Beeson & Pham 2012) has ensured that the 
dominance of neoliberalism has been neither complete nor ‘powerful’ (Gainsborough 
2010). Hence, although Vietnam is often held up by international donors as a model of 
successful economic development for other third-world countries, it does not fit 
comfortably into the neoliberal mould (Hayton 2010; Masina 2012, p. 204).  
 
Second, the popular explanation for the ‘marriage of convenience’ between statist 
socialism and neoliberalism (Bui 2015, p. 84) as a compromise between the 
“conservative” and “reform minded” camps within the governing elites has proved to 
be insufficient: 
 
[I]n the cleavages over SOE reform […] the complexities of state, party and 
economic interests is such as to defy clear categorisation into such simple, 
broad-based blocs or tendency […] reflecting both the need for economic 
reform and the need to retain political control (Painter 2003, p. 21). 
  
Hence, the policy outcomes – such as a ‘less liberalising reform trajectory’ (Malesky 
& London 2014, p. 407) here and ‘sudden u-turns or moments of dramatic reform after 
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period of inaction’ (Painter 2003, p. 21) there – have all resulted from a complex 
assemblage of political economy configurations within multi-centred ‘elite politics’ 
rather than from the bold calculation of a consistent source of power. It is a state-led 
development, but it also comes under a leadership that is collective, factionally 
representative and legitimacy-sharing. This amorphous tradition blurs both the 
neoliberalism and developmental state characteristics of Vietnamese economic 
governance. While neoliberalism needs a solid political hegemon that is willing to 
suppress the state itself to realise the legitimacy of free-market forces (as, for instance, 
in Thatcher’s Britain), the developmental state needs a centralised power to harness 
market forces to realise the state’s coordinative capacity (as, for example, in Lee Kuan 
Yew’s Singapore).   
 
This is the reason why Vietnam has seemed to vacillate between neoliberalism and 
developmental state rather than definitively allying itself with one of them. 
Interestingly, although the contours of the reform have been pervaded by hegemonic 
neoliberalism (Masina 2012), the essential starting point was the developmental state 
(Bui 2015). Indeed, the stereotype of development inspired by successful economies in 
Northeast Asia seemed to be the most acceptable (or least harmful) mode of 
governance for the Vietnamese party-state in the early 1990s. Vietnam undertook 
reform in the light of ‘two largely alternative models for industrial development’ that 
were available for emulation (Masina 2012, p. 192). The stark rupture that marked the 
transition of the CEE and former CIS counterparts from statist socialism towards free-
market capitalism was seen to have resulted in chaos, loss of control and the dilution of 
party power. At the same time, Japan and the four NIEs were emerging as miraculous 
exemplars of late industrialisation. The story of South Korea’s transformation from 
one of the poorest countries in the world to an OECD member in three or four decades 
was certainly appealing to the Vietnamese governing elites. Further, although they 
were old enemies, the fact that these autocratic, single-dominant-party East Asian 
regimes had maintained political stability over a long period of economic development 
seemed likely to provide a valuable source of legitimacy for the party-state. When 
China – which bore considerable resemblance to Vietnam in terms of its socio-political 
modality (Perkins & Vu 2009) – presented another successful showcase of an economy 
transitioning from socialist orthodoxy but looking East rather than West, the suitability 
121 
 
of developmental state doctrine for the party-state’s agenda was clearly affirmed 
(Beresford 2008; Masina 2012; Malesky & London 2014). These contextual 
particularities help to explain the apparent paradox in Bui’s (2015) proposition that 
Vietnam has approached the developmental state as a convenient platform to 
accommodate neoliberalism: 
 
In Vietnam, the East Asian model of state-led developmentalism has great 
appeal to the party-state when embarking on the market-based reforms. The 
activist and interventionist role of the state in directing the course of 
development corresponds with the desire of the party-state to maintain control 
as the commander-in-chief. However, the Vietnamese party-state embraced this 
model when neoliberalism has already taken a strong hold… In this phase, the 
techniques of governance are seen in the co-existence and juxtaposition of both 
neoliberal and socialist forms of governmentality [more exactly, governance], 
which was once deemed unthinkable (Bui 2015, p. 81). 
 
Nevertheless, given the ‘exception and novelty’ that resulted from the uneven 
interaction between ‘neoliberal logics and practices’ and the ‘entrenched socialist 
political visions and […] cultural values’ of Vietnamese society (Schwenkel & 
Leshkowich 2012, p. 382), the implementation of developmental state principles was 
not straightforward either (Masina 2012). As explained in Chapter 2, the 
developmental state is premised on three core elements: the prominent role of an 
effective bureaucracy to plan and coordinate industrial policy; the unique cooperative 
alliance between the state and business sector through market-conforming incentives; 
and the philosophy of a project that harnessed individual interests in the collective 
pursuit of a national export-oriented strategy. Vietnamese governing elites appear to 
have been aware of these salient features of the developmental state, but have not yet 
successfully adapted to them. 
 
First, since ‘the historical context of development has changed’ (Evans & Bui 2005, p. 
2), Vietnam now encountered ‘the additional challenge of “late-late” development’ 
(Beeson 2004). It had to break into the global hierarchy of production dominated by 
earlier developers (Beeson 2004; Ohno 2009), but it lacked the unique form of 
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international geopolitics that formerly favoured the Northeast Asian developmental 
states. Moreover, the new agenda of globalisation has worked to reduce the legitimacy 
and legality of barriers to external flows of trade and investment (Pempel 1999), 
narrowing the space for policy endeavour40.  
 
Second, both the first and second features of the developmental state noted above are 
less evident in Vietnam, even when the governing elites strived to emulate them. In 
terms of economic governance, Vietnam does not possess a strong state, since its 
capacity is limited by ‘vested interest of major political and economic actors’ (Masina 
2012, p. 192). Despite attempts to install an equivalent to the MITI and hold periodic 
consultations with the business sector, the Vietnamese bureaucracy remains ‘sprawling 
and unwieldy’ (Painter 2003, p. 18) and far less effective41. After 30 years of 
modernisation and industrialisation, the fact that the ability of a minister to speak 
English fluently can become an online phenomenon creates doubt about the breadth of 
the technocracy and the merit-base of the bureaucracy42. This is not to mention the 
absence of a ‘coherent national industrial strategy’ – which, as Masina (2012, p. 202) 
emphasises, is a basic requirement of the development state. This is analysed further in 
the next chapter.   
 
                                                          
40 Noticeably, the investment climate in Vietnam was far less friendly than those of the NIEs when the 
development course was started due to the entrenched legacies of the non-market economy. This did 
not only affect the pace of growth of the former but has also established a routine of indefinite 
neoliberal trajectories in the minds of the country’s reformers, such as adopting the WB’s initiatives of 
improving the regulatory environment for foreign and domestic private-sector growth, which 
essentially involved interminable deregulation and market liberalisation programs.  
41 Given that administrative reforms are frequently emphasised in the Doi moi agenda, the 
internalisation, wastefulness and sluggishness of the bureaucracy at all levels appear in public media 
commentary almost daily. (See: Quyet Nguyen 2016, ‘Ca nha bi thu tinh uy Ha Giang lam quan [The 
whole family of the Secretary of Ha Giang are officials]’, 17 September, viewed 9 October 2016, 
http://www.nld.com.vn; Phuong Vy-Le Hoang 2016, ‘Du an dai hoc hon 400 ty thanh noi chan tha trau 
bo [The university construction valued 400 billion is vacated]’, 10 August, viewed 9 October 2016, 
http://www.vnexpress.net; Minh Quan 2016, ‘Khien trach giam doc so dai tiec trong gio hanh chinh 
[Department Director holding party in working hours is disciplined]’, 24 June, viewed 9 October 2016, 
http://www.laodong.com.vn).     
42 See: Vnexpress 2016, ‘Lan truyen clip bo truong Kim Tien phat bieu bang tieng Anh [Circulation of the 
clip of Minister Kim Tien speaking English]’, 5 May, viewed 9 October 2016, 
http://www.expressnet.net. It is estimated that 2.73 million people are employed in the whole state 
apparatus of Vietnam (at central and local levels, not including the army); 30% of these bureaucrats 
are perceived as ‘not delivering on tasks’. (See: Ngoc Tuyen 2016, ’17.000 ty dong tra luong cong chuc 
“khong lam duoc viec” [17 trillion dong of salary paid to “unqualified” bureaucrats], 13 October, 
viewed 14 October 2016, http://www.vnexpress.net).  
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Third, during Doi moi, there has existed a widespread form of ‘social mobilisation’, 
reminiscent of war-time nationalism; for example, football fans often encouraged the 
national team by carrying General Giap’s picture to the stadium, and the press referred 
to ministers as ‘commanders’43. At the same time, however, the country is geared up as 
‘a collective enterprise moving toward prosperity by competing with other nations in 
the global market’ (Nguyen-Thu 2016, p. 98). According to Johnson (1999), the 
legitimacy that would eventually result from such a ‘quasi-revolutionary’ commitment 
to ‘overarching social transformations’ would enable the bureaucracy to smoothly 
override individual group interests and social conflicts to accomplish grand-vision 
objectives (pp. 52-53). In Vietnam, debate over the post-war status of the nation – 
whether or not it is a small country – has also attracted public interest, and a sense of 
inferiority about being a poor country has permeated society, especially its young 
members (Nguyen-Thu 2016). It is difficult to know if these discourses were 
deliberately promoted: despite the fact that most of the public media in Vietnam are 
state-owned and under ‘soft-authoritarian’ supervision (Thayer 2010), these narratives 
might often be constructed by the very program directors and actors who are 
influenced by neoliberal logics. Social mobilisation in the developmental states and 
Vietnam differs in one important way. While the former was a kind of institutional 
collectivisation, the latter has taken the form of institutional individualisation. In peace 
time, Vietnamese social mobilisation has taken the form of a neoliberal ‘commercial 
nationalism’ in which ‘personal wealth’ is viewed as ‘national pride’. According to 
Nguyen-Thu (2016):  
 
[P]ersonal achievements were characterised as ethical contributions to the 
prosperity of the nation (p. 90) … [B]usiness success was consistently treated 
both as an individualist value and a nationalist responsibility (p. 93) … 
[M]oneymaking efforts [were seen] as not only a legitimate action but also an 
urgent task, an ethical responsibility of each individual member of the nation 
(p. 96).  
 
                                                          
43 In his public speeches, General Giap often called on more support for business people to enrich the 
country in the new task of economic development. 
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3.3.3 Implications of Vacillation 
As a result of these conflicting characteristics, the Vietnamese political economy has 
been realised as neither fully neoliberal nor a successful developmental state. The 
implications of this go beyond mere ideological contestation. Some might say that 
support for personal wealth creation in an underdeveloped institutional environment 
effectively legitimises greed and that this is a trademark of neoliberalism. At the very 
least, the responsibility for national enrichment seems to have been partly 
decentralised or contracted-out to individual citizens. Hence, numerous groups within 
the population have benefitted from the economic reform, legally or otherwise. These 
range from lucky families who have earned rents (either by starting up their own shops 
or leasing to others) when their houses happened to be situated on newly-built roads44 
and workers who are ‘exported’ to foreign countries to send remittances home45, to 
officials who are in a position to receive bribes46. When people were encouraged to 
pursue private interests, the ‘animal spirits of capitalism’ unleashed ‘massive amounts 
of new labour and capital’ which helped the Vietnamese economy to thrive (Malesky 
& London 2014, p. 401). The effects of improved incentives, however, seem to have 
been confined to the initial phase of Doi moi as the economy – then at a very low base 
– was in need of basic factors of production. In the next stage of development, when 
economic growth requires a much more sophisticated industry and locally-developed 
                                                          
44 The substantial impact of real estate development on the enrichment of Vietnamese households and 
the informal sector during Doi moi has, however, rarely been investigated by academics. This may 
reflect the complexity of the issue and the lack of reliable statistics. According to Hinh (2013, p.28), 
‘there were 1 million household businesses in semi-informal sector that were registered and paid taxes 
at the district levels and 3 million of household enterprises that were not registered in any way, 
compared with about 544,000 formal sector firms’. This highlights the significance of the informal 
economy in Vietnam, which comprises small shop owners, street-food sellers, sidewalk vendors, 
motorbike taxis, and vehicle keepers, among others. 
45 It was estimated that about 4.5 million overseas Vietnamese sent over US$12 billion in remittances 
to Vietnam in 2014, ranking the country in the top 10 of the largest remittance-recipient countries in 
the world (2013). This figure was equal to 7.1% of Vietnam’s GDP, one third of the foreign reserves 
(2013), greater than the disbursed FDI (US$10.5 billion), and disbursed ODA (US$4.1 billion, 2012). 
(See: Pham-Thanh 2015, ‘Hai mat cua kieu hoi [Two sides of remittance]’, 10 February, viewed 16 
October 2016, http://www.doanhnhansaigon.vn).   
46 According to Transparency International, Vietnam is still been within the group of corruption-prone 
countries in Southeast Asia (See: Lao dong 2016, ‘Minh bach quoc te: Vietnam xep thu 112/168 ve chi 
so tham nhung [Transparency International: Vietnam ranks 112/168 countries in terms of corruption], 
27 January, viewed 16 October 2016, http://www.laodong.com.vn). The survey on corruption, carried 
out by different organisations in Vietnam, found that the five most corrupted areas were traffic police, 
administration of land, construction, tax and customs (See: Minh Thu 2013, ‘Nganh nao tham nhung 
nhat? [Which areas are most corrupted?]’, 31 October, viewed 16 October 2016, http://www.cafef.vn).     
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technological innovations47 (Ohno 2009), these liberalised and self-interested 
‘moneymaking’ incentives become hindrances. At present, they are prone to populism 
and nepotism, which threatens to make Vietnam look like one of the less successful 
economies in Southeast Asia (Woo-Cumings 1999; Beresford 2008; Masina 2012). 
 
The social embeddedness of Vietnamese development is clearly evident in the fact that 
the authority of both the state and its people stands to gain from economic 
performance. The party-state earns political legitimacy by delivering economic growth 
on the basis of populist policies that allow citizens to maximise their individual 
chances of earning a living and accessing utilities. Yet populism is a two-sided coin, if 
not a two-edged sword. Civil protests and costly compensations have made land 
clearance for infrastructure projects highly expensive and disputable in Vietnam48. At 
the same time, the national industrial policy has been fragmented by cronyism, since 
every sector demands to be prioritised in the 5-year SEDP, and the devolution of the 
means to attract FDI to provinces has created a ‘race to the bottom’ as overly generous 
incentives are offered to investors49.  
 
It is possible to explain why the creation of a Vietnamese equivalent of the Japanese 
MITI has not been fully realised. In Japan, such a bureaucratic structure was created to 
                                                          
47 Local innovation applications only account for 10% of all patents licensed in Vietnam. Compared to 
neighbouring countries, Vietnam has one of the largest populations of doctorate-holders (24,000) but 
holds the fewest international patents and publications, equal to 1/5 of those in Thailand, 1/10 of 
those in Singapore. (See: Huynh Hai 2014, ‘Bang doc quyen sang che cua Viet Nam con qua it 
[Innovating patents of Vietnam are too few]’, 3 November, viewed 18 October 2016, 
http://www.dantri.com.vn; Chau An 2016, ‘Viet nam nhieu tien si, it thanh tuu: sao lai bat ngo? 
[Vietnam has many doctorates, but very few innovations: why be surprised?]’, 27 April, viewed 18 
October 2016, http://www.baodatviet.vn).   
48 Until now, the North-South traffic routes are still based on the downgraded colonial-era railway and 
national road. A national express-train project was initiated but was not pursued due to populist 
protest around fears of public debt. Only recently has a national freeway construction plan been 
discussed. In rural areas, land clearance often involves social unrest (either because firms gain 
extraordinary rents or are slow to implement, leaving the acquired lands unused), while 66%-90% of 
the costs of road construction in urban areas are paid for land clearance due to the genuinely 
increased values of these properties. (See: Hong Khanh, ‘Diem mat nhung con duong “dat nhat 
Vietnam” [Naming the “most expensive” roads in Vietnam]’, posted on 26 April 2016, viewed 18 
October 2016, http://www.vietnamnet.vn).    
49 Admittedly, there is no clear difference between firms that enjoy favourable treatment and those 
that do not; since only 5-6% of the technologies are advanced, the objective of attracting investment 
to modernise agriculture in remote areas has not been achieved. (See: Tu Hoang, ‘Uu dai FDI khoi dong 
cuoc dua xuong day [FDI incentives ignite a race to the bottom]’, posted on 27 June 2014, viewed 18 
October 2016, http://www.thesaigontimes.vn).  
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concentrate the private rents relating to industrial policy under unified state 
coordination. In Vietnam, that level of bureaucratic power was also perceived as a kind 
of rent-seeking opportunity, so the benefits of which were equally distributed among 
three ministries (finance, planning and investment, and industry and trade). Similarly, 
the power and rents associated with national industrial policy, instead of being 
leveraged to incentivise the business sector for industrialisation, have been diffused 
throughout the VCP’s Central Committee, whose members are often leaders at the 
ministerial and provincial level. In Japan, by contrast, cabinet appointments are 
completely at the discretion of the Prime Minister. Thus, it might not be inappropriate 
to depict the political economy of state-led development in Vietnam using the 
metaphor of a chessboard with multiple interest groups at ministerial, provincial and 
business levels50.  
 
In summary, Vietnamese economic governance takes the form of a state-led 
development that is executed in a decentralised manner – a vacillation between the 
developmental state and neoliberalism. Strictly speaking, it is a state-franchised 
development in which both self-automatised individualism – a key feature of 
neoliberalism – and equitable-benefit sharing51 – a traditional characteristic socialism – 
have been combined to satisfy all interest groups and social strata, though at different 
levels, in an attempt to achieve both political stability and economic growth. 
According to Painter (2003, pp. 18,21) and Gillespie (cited in Painter 2003, p. 18), 
however, the resulting system of ‘diffuse and shared authority’ and ‘polycentric power 
sharing’ led to the ‘unimplementability’ and ‘inoperability’ of state intervention in the 
economy when the need arises (Fforde cited in Painter 2003, pp. 18,19). Therefore, 
unlike the popular conceptualisation of Vietnam as a strong state that is in political 
control, state power is not equally strong in relation to socio-economic governance 
(Gainsborough 2010); this detracts from the state capacity for ‘structuring market 
                                                          
50 According to Vu Thanh Tu-Anh, the Vietnamese economy has been divided into various small realms 
shaped like a chessboard, which is vertically controlled by ministries, horizontally by provinces and 
obliquely by SOEs, creating numerous interest groups in between. (See: Le Nhung 2010, ‘Tai cau truc: 
don da ke, benh nhan co chiu uong thuoc? [Restructuring: prescribed, but is it is undertaken?]’, 30 June, 
viewed 20 October 2016, http://www.vietnamnet.vn).  
51 This is exemplified by the appointment of 8 deputies in a Department in Thanh Hoa that is only 
entitled to have three (for provinces) or four (for central-level cities) deputies. (See: Le Hoang 2016, 
‘Thanh Hoa “xe rao” bo nhiem 8 pho giam doc So Nong nghiep [Thanh Hoa “broke the fence” to have 8 
deputy heads of the Department of Agriculture]’, 8 August, viewed 20 October 2016, 
http://www.vnexpress.net).  
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incentives to achieve national developmental goals’ (Johnson 1999, p. 48). This overall 
structure of the political economy helps to explain the ineffectiveness of the policies 
and institutional underpinnings in SOE reform and equitisation, which are discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
3.4. Vietnamese Emulation of Developmental-State Policies and 
Institution Building in SOE Reform and Equitisation  
The combination of dispersed power, ineffective state guidance, cronyism, and group 
interests has obscured the ways in which Vietnam adapted developmental states’ 
successful policies and institutions in the reform of SOEs and equitisation. These 
include the Chinese strategy ‘retain the large, release the small’; corporate governance 
models of the Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol; introduction of competition, 
transparency and hard-budget constraints; public-listing requirements; hiring 
independent professional managers; dispersed governance of state-owned capital in 
SOEs and privatised SOEs; and, most importantly, the gradualist and partial approach.  
 
3.4.1 Retain the Large, Release the Small 
Vietnam’s SOE reform policies, especially that of equitisation during 2001-2010, 
emulated the Chinese policy ‘retain the large, release the small’ (Beeson & Pham 
2012). Accordingly, while thousands of small SOEs and firms at local or secondary 
level within GCs were divested, some general corporations (GCs) were actively 
expanded and upgraded to ‘business groups’ (BGs)52 and others only sold a minority 
of shares in exchange for capitalisation and managerial skills from the private and 
foreign-investment sectors. It should have been a sound policy: like the TVEs in 
China, the small and medium privatised SOEs could take advantage of the lack of 
economies of scale and dynamic context at the local level (small enterprises can be 
more efficient and dynamic)53, while the large SOEs had to utilise their economies of 
scale and adapt to the national industrial policy (with state incentives and support) to 
compete globally. As long as the budget constraints were not hardened, however, SOE 
reform and equitisation were seen as opportunities for rent-seeking (Vinashin and 
                                                          
52 It was fashionable not just for the GCs but even for large private firms to upgrade to ‘business 
groups’, which gives the brand more cachet with creditors and customers.     
53 In fact, the SMEs in Vietnam were less well-placed than TVEs in China with respect to the 
engagement of local authorities below the provincial level. 
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Vinalines were typical examples), and the policy slogan was effectively realised as a 
case of retaining the large ‘gains’, but not releasing the small ‘stakes’. Whether SOEs 
were large or small, their reform and equitisation could only proceed according to the 
interests of the capturing groups.  
 
As Gainsborough (2008) pointed out, the privatised firms were still kept at arm’s-
length from the ministries, local authorities, or holding corporations (GCs, BGs) 
insofar as these ‘virtual share holders’ (Fforde 2004) had various kinds of stakes in the 
businesses (which were vulnerable to spontaneous privatisation). Yet, if the ambiguity 
was sustained for the sake of ‘indirect rule’, the business environment could not be 
soundly competitive. This is to say nothing of the cases of SOEs purchased by 
‘privateers’ who only sought to exploit their undervalued assets (often real estate) by 
converting the privatised firms to non-manufacturing businesses (asset stripping). In 
the case of the large SOEs, regardless of the change in state ownership, reform could 
still be undertaken in principle by restructuring unrelated to ownership transfer; in 
practice, however, the latter was preferred because delaying privatisation was less 
harmful to insiders than restructuring. Such a preference is contrary to the international 
best practice of restructuring prior to privatisation. As a result, though Vietnam carried 
out SOE reforms throughout the 1990s, the old soft-budget constraints and managerial 
boards were almost unchanged.  
 
The scope, scale and prominence of large SOEs made it unlikely that clear cases of 
spontaneous privatisation could occur within them; for example, the directors could 
hardly devalue and buy shares in the primary-level companies. Yet de facto (or 
spontaneous) privatisation was often undertaken at secondary and tertiary levels in the 
SBUs (Fforde 2004), owing to inadequate information disclosure. This explains why, 
on the surface, the large SOEs seemed to be outperforming all the party-state’s 
objectives of reforming corporate governance by means of equitisation and business 
expansion, such as equitising a large number of member enterprises, establishing new 
JVs with private or foreign investors (these were implicit forms of privatisation since 
the SOEs’ assets, including financial obligations, were jointly owned by the private 
sector), signing new investment projects, and purchasing new equipment. Most of 
these activities, however, were implemented by member companies of the GCs and 
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BGs at the secondary and tertiary levels and related to the speculation bubble in stock 
and real estate rather than national industrial policy. Often, the inefficiency only came 
to light when the GCs and BGs themselves went bankrupt.  
 
3.4.2 Corporate Governance Models of Keiretsu and Chaebol 
Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol seemed to fit with the party-state’s ambition of 
building large conglomerates to advance national competitiveness globally. This was 
also in line with the strategy of consolidating the role of the SOE sector in the 
economy. At a business level, the keiretsu model was readily endorsed by the BGs and 
GCs since the existence of an internal central bank – the typical characteristic of a 
keiretsu – provides the network with greater autonomy in financial mediation among 
its members, while the chaebol model held out the promise of unlimited expansion of 
SOEs in non-core businesses. Ironically, Vietnam adopted these models despite the 
numerous problems associated with them during the East Asian financial crisis. The 
close and interlocking system of keiretsu combined with the overarching expansion of 
chaebol made the soft-budget constraints more harmful for large SOEs in Vietnam, 
which quickly amassed a huge amount of bad debt from unqualified loans from 
investment banks and financial companies within the BGs amid the fuss of 
diversification into non-core businesses.  
 
During this period, the lines between SOE reform, equitisation and corruption were 
easily blurred. SOE managers and privateers used private ownership as bait to exploit 
the SOEs’ assets, (brand, capital, functions, and opportunities) rather than adding any 
real value to increase the enterprises’ performance. SOE managers could avoid 
corruption charges by justifying these projects as realising the greater role of the SOE 
sector in accordance with party-state policy.  
 
As Le (2010, pp. 58-59) explains, the Vietnamese party-state ignored the fact that the 
concentration of wealth in both keiretsu and chaebol had occurred through market-
conforming measures, albeit under the state’s guidance, not by administrative merger 
decisions. In particular, the enhancement of their core competencies was achieved by 
taking advantage of the economies of scale and the internal development and 
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accumulation of technologies, capital and managerial capabilities or exogenous 
expansion through mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Moreover, there has long been ‘fierce competition among and within these 
conglomerates’ in both Japan and Korea. Such competition did not exist among the 
GCs and BGs in Vietnam (Le 2010, p. 55). Above all, the most important distinction is 
that the keiretsu and chaebol are private enterprises, so their owners pursue profit-
maximisation. Yet they do so within a framework of governed interdependence. This 
means that profits are maximised within the constraints of agreements over industrial 
policy (with incentives for performance); in this situation, budget constraints are quite 
evidently hardened. If the conglomerates overinvested outside of the policy, they had 
to bear the risks privately. By contrast, in business terms, the Vietnamese GCs and 
BGs were vehicles of the state: independent co-owners were few in number or held a 
minority of shares and thus must be supervised in some other way – and closely so – to 
guard against inefficiency and abuse of assets. If the state does not effectively control 
the SOEs and their equitisation process by imposing monitoring regulations and hard-
budget constraints, it is hard to expect these SOEs to pursue the strategy contained in 
state plans given that competition had rarely been introduced in practice, and financial 
markets were not fully developed. 
 
3.4.3 Introduction of Competition 
It is widely agreed that competition is meant to promote both ‘allocative efficiency 
[and] internal efficiency’ (Vickers & Yarrow 1988, p. 426). Hence gradual 
privatisation is partly necessary so that competition can be introduced in advance to 
prevent a public monopoly being turned into a private one, thus securing both 
economic and social welfare. While the lesson has been acknowledged54 in Vietnam 
and most of the markets have been opened for new entries (CIEM 2015) – notably 
within a neoliberalism-informed deregulation agenda – the presence of private 
                                                          
54 According to the Vice Minister of Information and Communications, four ‘unchanged principles’ 
should apply in administering telecommunications policy: (i) Establishing competitive markets; (i) 
Respecting the market economy by minimising intervention; (iii) Separating the provision of public 
utilities and commercial functions; and (iv) In spite of minimising state intervention, maintaining state 
regulation with enhanced effectiveness. (See: Le Van 2015, ‘Bon nguyen tac “bat bien” quan ly nganh 
vien thong [Four “unchanged” principles in administration of telecommunications]’, 31 July, viewed 26 
October 2016, http://www.vietnamnet.vn).  
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competitors in these markets has not been realised in practice55. Strictly speaking, the 
recognition of competition and effective state regulation of competition as 
indispensable components of privatisation is the key distinction between the post-
Washington consensus and neoliberalism. It has been suggested that international 
donors have familiarised Vietnamese governing elites with the revised version of 
neoliberal recommendations that had been promoted by developmental states (Cramer 
1999; Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005).  
  
It is evident that the introduction of competition has resulted in better performance by 
SOEs in Viet Nam. Over recent years, the list of Top 10 companies paying the largest 
amount of corporate income tax has consistently included the SOEs of oil and gas, 
telecommunications, dairy and banking56. Except for oil and gas, which allow firms to 
reap Ricardian rents from natural resources, the markets of the other sectors are all 
highly competitive. For example, the Vietnamese banking sector had 34 commercial 
banks operating in 2014; with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 0.07 and the 
Concentration Ratio of the three largest companies (CR3)57 of 0.38, they compare 
favourably with the average market concentration indexes of 20 developed countries 
(HHI of 0.11 and CR3 of 0.47, respectively). This should be seen as ‘one of the factors 
leading to efficiency improvement of the system’, according to Nguyen-The (2016, p. 
37), which is also evident in the success of Vietcombank as the ‘best bank in 
Vietnam’58. In telecommunications, despite the limited presence of the private sector 
owing to capital intensity, competition among the oligopolistic SOEs has been fruitful. 
                                                          
55 According to CIEM (2015, p. 18), even though most markets are currently accessible to businesses 
with different forms of ownership, competing equally in the same legal context,  many business 
conditions are still designed in such a way that only SOEs can meet the requirements; this is not to 
mention the fact that private firms rarely enter markets in which the SOEs already have monopoly 
power (85% of electricity and petroleum, 90% of telecommunications, 98% of domestic airlines, 56% of 
financial and banking services, 70% of rice exports, 80% of chemical fertilizer production). 
56 In 2016, the nine SOEs were PetroVietnam, PVGas, PVEP (oil and gas); Viettel, Mobilefone 
(telecommunications); Vinamilk (dairy), BIDV, Vietinbank, and Vietcombank (banking). While PVN, 
Viettel and Mobifone are still 100% state-owned, the others are all partially equitised (Vinamilk has the 
least state ownership at 45%). The only foreign firm in the list is Honda Vietnam; in 2014, a brewery 
SOE was listed instead of PVEP. (See: Vietnam Report 2016, ‘Cong bo V1000: 1000 doanh nghiep nop 
thue lon nhat Viet Nam 2016 [Publicising the V1000: 1,000 enterprises paying largest amount of tax in 
Vietnam in 2016]’, 13 October, viewed 27 October 2016, http://www.vietnamnet.vn).  
57 HHI is frequently used to assess the level of competition in an industry, ranging from 1/n (firms 
relatively have equal sizes) to 1 (monopoly); CR(n) takes into account the total market share of a group 
of leading companies in the industry (Nguyen-The 2016, p. 34).  
58 See: Thanh Thu 2016, ‘Vietcombank duoc bau chon ngan hang tot nhat [Vietcombank is selected as 
the best bank]’, 16 July, viewed 27 October 2016, http://www.vnexpress.net     
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Viettel, for instance, recorded a profit of over US$2 billion in 201559 and has been 
among the few local businesses that have successfully invested abroad.  
 
For a long time, Vietcombank was the only bank providing payment services for 
foreign trade activities, which enabled it to install ‘state of the art’ technologies. 
Similarly, Viettel had an advantage in being a military enterprise. The success of these 
two SOEs, however, resulted from both the excellence of their leadership and staff and 
the trade agreements secured by Vietnam which mainly focused on retaining 
protection of such sensitive sectors60. In other words, there needs to be a constellation 
of nurturing factors in addition to the market forces of competition to guarantee the 
effectiveness of equitisation; ownership transfer on its own is not sufficient. Vinamilk 
provides another showcase for the value of a combination of institutional elements – 
preferential commitments in trade agreements, introduction of competition, partial 
equitisation through the stock market, advanced corporate governance (with 
institutional partnership), good strategy and managerial talent of the CEO61. It is 
noteworthy that, since all of these firms are SOEs, they have had to abide by the state’s 
prohibition of cartels or similar forms of association. In fact, although Vietnam 
promulgated its Competition Law in 2005, it took 10 years for law-makers to 
criminalise the establishment of cartels under the Penal Code enacted in mid-2016.   
 
                                                          
59 See: Thuy Dieu 2015, ‘Loi nhuan cua Viettel vuot 2 ty USD [Viettel’s profits is over US$2 billion]’, 30 
December, viewed 27 October 2016, http://www.vneconomy.vn   
60 In banking services, the WTO commitments allowed the establishment of 100% foreign banks which 
were limited by taking deposits of Vietnamese in local currency and not opening the secondary branch 
within 5 years while the shareholding of foreign investors in local banks was just under 30% 
(Vietcombank still has 77% state ownership). In telecommunications, foreign investors could only 
provide services based on the local-owned infrastructure. Import tariffs of dairy materials and products 
are reduced by 2% to 18% within 2 years and by 5% to 25% within 5 years, respectively. (See: Hoang 
Ngan, ‘Ban tom tat co ban ve cam ket WTO cua Viet Nam [Basic summary of WTO’s commitments of 
Vietnam]’, posted on 3 July 2007, viewed 28 October 2016, http://www.agro.gov.vn).    
61 Vinamilk accounts for 45% of market share (53% of fresh milk and 25% of milk powder) in the local 
dairy industry. It was established in 1988 on the site of a Nestle milk factory. During the 1990s, it 
developed its cooperative network of farming (to 113,000 cows) to control inputs rather than 
depending on imports; it was able to succeed in the market despite intense competition from 
established foreign brands. It pays 3,000 billion dong/year on average in tax revenues and has invested 
into 31 regional and developed markets, with exports reaching US$200 million. It won an award as the 
company with the best governance in Vietnam, and ranks among the 100 best valued companies in 
ASEAN and the 50 best listed companies in Vietnam. Vinamilk was equitised in 2003, with 45% of the 
ownership held by SCIC. (See: Dan Tri 2015, ‘Ba Mai Kieu Lien chia se hanh trinh vuot kho cua Vinamilk 
[Md. Mai Kieu Lien shares the successful journey of Vinamilk]’, 9 December, viewed 29 October 2016, 
http://www.dantri.com.vn).  
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3.4.4 Enhancing Transparency, Hard-budget Constraints and Managerial 
Professionalism 
Just as the managers of SOEs might have sought to establish collusive relationships 
post-reform, so too have they often resisted governmental efforts to enforce more 
transparency, hard-budget constraints and management improvements in the context of 
equitisation. It should be emphasised that the regulations on transparency – such as 
information disclosure and the requirement for periodical reports to related agencies on 
the state capital investment and performance of SOEs – were only made obligatory in 
recent years, during the period of restructuring the economy and following the 
scandals involving SOEs. The SOEs themselves are required to restructure their 
‘corporate governance in accordance with the best practices of the market economy’ 
(Decision 704/QD-TTg in 2012), for which the OECD guidelines on SOE corporate 
governance (2005) provide the template. Although these were instructions rather than 
legal requirements, the reform of the framework of SOE corporate governance was 
expected to lead to enhanced autonomy, improved transparency, greater 
professionalism among Boards of Directors, hardening of budget constraints, and an 
effective monitoring mechanism (CIEM 2015). 
 
In fact, the transparency obligations were initially stated in Articles 11 & 12 of Decree 
No 59/2011/ND-CP alongside the requirements for public listing on the stock market 
and the employment of professional consulting services to evaluate the assets and 
divestiture plan during the equitisation process. Thus, transparency was implicitly 
linked with the supervisory mechanism of the financial markets. These stipulations, 
however, only applied to publicly listed SOEs after privatisation. In 2012, they were 
restated in the stock-market development strategy (Decision 252/QD-TTg) and the 
overall economic restructuring project (Decision 339/QD-TTg) in 2013. Transparency 
was further enforced by Decree 108/2013/ND-CP, which specified that shares must be 
listed on the secondary stock exchange one year after the IPO on the primary market, 
and by Decree 81/2015/ND-CP, which regulated the nine requirements for disclosure 
regardless of whether or not the privatised SOE was publicly listed on the stock 
exchange.  
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The slack enforcement of transparency has largely been attributed to the conflict of 
interest between managers and bureaucrats. Mobifone, which is number two in the 
telecommunications market, provides an example. The decision to equitise this 
corporation was made as long ago as 2005. The implementation process, however, 
slowed down many times due to: selection of expensive consultants (e.g. Credit 
Suisse), the global financial crisis, change in management boards, a plan for merging 
with Vinafone (eventually not approved), the splitting off of VNPT (Vietnam Postal 
and Telecommunications) and, at present, government inspection. Thanks to its 
substantial profitability, there was little enthusiasm for equitisation among both the 
Mobifone management and employees and their counterparts in VNPT (the holding 
business group of both Mobifone and Vinafone, and the second and third largest firms 
in the market) because their profits had been the main sources of finance for the whole 
organisation62. 
 
In developmental states, transparency rules and public listing were clearly targeted at 
the beginning of privatisation and were successfully achieved. In Vietnam, they were 
realised only slowly. As a result, the implementation of hard-budget constraints and 
management renovation has made no progress. One of the main objectives of 
ownership transfer in SOEs is, at least, to shake up the management, if not to appoint 
bright new Harvard Business School graduates to all managerial positions. Arguably, it 
could have involved a combination of old and new teams, as happened in Japan’s 
railway privatisation. Yet when five Vietnamese SOEs were designated to pilot the 
appointment of independent directors in 2004, only two of them actually did so – in 
one case, recruiting back the very manager who had just retired and, in the other, 
appointing the manager of a member company (effectively a promotion)63.  
 
                                                          
62 In the restructuring plan to make Mobifone independent, it has to carry 60 units with debts of 1,600 
billion dong; while the VNPT retains profitable ones, including Vinafone. (See: Dong Phong 2014, ‘Co 
phan hoa Mobifone – cau chuyen dai chua ro hoi ket [Equitisation of Mobifone – long story without an 
end], 7 April, viewed 30 October 2016, http://www.vnreview.vn ). Currently, Mobifone is under review 
by the Government Inspectorate for its purchase of 95% of AVG at 8,000 billion dong for an asset 
rumoured to be valued at 2,000 billion dong. (See: Ho Mai 2016, ‘Co phan hoa Mobifone: hon 10 nam 
ve trong tay van lo chuyen tau [Equitisation of Mobifone: more than 10 years having tickets but missing 
the train]’, 3 August, viewed 30 October 2016, http://www.vietnamfinance.vn)  
63 The new decision made on this issue was also neglected. (See: Ngoc Lan 2008, ‘Thue giam doc cho 
DNNN: kho kha thi [Hiring directors for the SOEs: not feasible]’, 28 January, viewed 30 October 2016, 
http://www.thesaigontimes.vn).  
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3.4.5 Dispersed Governance of State Capital in SOEs 
Efficiency rather than the fiscal implications of privatisation has been prioritised in 
Vietnamese equitisation 64. Hence it is ironic that the very system of governance of 
equitisation can create its own inefficiency. This is due to the dispersal of governing 
power within the bureaucracy, as explained below. Obviously, this dispersal of power 
is a consequence of the vacillation between neoliberalism and the developmental state, 
which was discussed earlier.  
 
By 2016, the Ministry of Finance was playing the central role in the policy-making 
process of SOE reform and equitisation. In addition to the Agency of Corporate 
Finance, which functions as a regulator in the field, the ministry has two other 
institutions: (i) a fund for supporting the rearrangement and development of 
enterprises65, which collects the revenue from equitisations to spend on the welfare of 
employees retrenched during the SOE reform, to capitalise SOEs, and on investment; 
and (ii) the State Capital Management Corporation (SCIC), operating as a portfolio 
investment company (of which the model is Temasek Holdings of Singapore)66, which 
manages the above fund, facilitates and represents state ownership in about 1,000 cases 
of equitisation and divestment of small and medium SOEs, and invests in new projects.  
 
Nevertheless, the role of the Ministry of Finance is still limited by various powerful 
hubs of decision-making that exist alongside it. First, the Office of Government 
continues to monitor large-scale projects and decisions that need the PM’s approval. 
As well as a department specialising in SOE reform, it has a Steering Committee for 
                                                          
64 Recently the budget contribution was raised when the Ministry of Finance asked two equitised state-
owned banks - BIDV (95.3%) and Vietinbank (64.5%) - to amend their dividend policies in favour of a 
cash payment that would be channelled to the state budget (with an expected total of about 5,000 
billion dong). In the state budgeting plan, total revenue for 2016 is 1,014,500 billion dong, of which 
55,000 billion (5.4%) is from dividend collection from state capital in the SOEs. It should be noted that 
the revenues obtained from equitisations are still channelled to the Fund. (See: Thu Hang 2016 ‘Don 
doc BIDV va Vietinbank nop co tuc bang tien mat la dung quy dinh phap luat [Facilitating BIDV and 
Vietinbank to pay dividend in cash is lawful]’, 16 June, viewed 6 September 2016, 
http://www.cafef.vn).    
65 The Fund operated from 1999 under Decision 177/1999/QD-TTg, and currently under Decision 
21/2012/QD-TTg (See: http://www.quyhtsxdn.vn).  
66 Established by Decision 151/QD-TTg in 2005, itcurrently operates under Decree 151/2013/ND-CP 
and Decree 57/2014/ND-CP (See: http://www.scic.vn).   
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Enterprise Reform and Development67, chaired by a Deputy Prime Minister, which 
acts as an inter-ministerial advisory council to assist the PM in policy making and 
monitoring SOE reform. In practice, the Office of Government exerts dominance over 
all ministries. Second, line ministries not only have their own departments to oversee 
the process of SOE reform and equitisation, but each ministry also controls BGs and 
GCs in relation to managerial appointments, monitoring and evaluation, and 
implementation of developmental policies in their areas, which are often designed by 
functional departments and regulatory structures within the ministries. Since these 
units are all on the same level, the head of a regulator can be the director of an SOE 
and vice versa. Third, as the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) has 
traditionally drafted laws relating to corporate governance such as the Enterprise Law, 
it continues to regulate the governance framework of different types of SOEs and 
privatised SOEs. This is not to mention the restructuring projects promoted by this 
ministry which cover all areas of the economy.  
 
Overall, the participation of many bureaux in the decision-making process leads to the 
perception that the SOEs are ownerless (Fforde 2004). Recognising this issue, the 12th 
VCP Congress (2016) identified finding a solution to the problem of decentralised 
governance of state capital in SOEs as one of the priorities of SOE reform and 
equitisation. Specifically, it recommended: facilitating equitisation; selling state capital 
where state or majority state ownership is not necessary, even in profitable enterprises;  
separating trading functions from political roles and utilities provision; separating the 
functions of state ownership, state regulation, and the firm’s business administration; 
abolishing the roles of ministries and local authorities as representatives of state 
ownership in SOEs; and creating a professional agency to control state capital in 
SOEs.   
 
The establishment of a state bureaucracy to control all of the state capital in SOEs has 
been a controversial topic in the discourse of SOE reform and equitisation. Under this 
general direction, the MPI has been charged with creating such a unified agency to 
                                                          
67 Established in 1993 by Decision 83-TTg, and currently operating under Decision 2092/QD-TTg and 
Decision 648/QD-TTg in 2012.  
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protect these huge assets, which are valued at around US$147-257 billion68. According 
to the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM, a unit of the MPI that is in 
charge of drafting the relevant legislation), two plans have been proposed: (i) 
establishing a new agency at ministerial-level, which will take over the governance of 
state capital at 30 or so of the largest BGs and GCs (including the SCIC); and (ii) 
upgrading the SCIC to become such an agency or continue as a holding company. The 
first plan proposes that all related ministries and the SCIC contribute to the human 
resources of the newly created agency, but concern has been expressed about the 
capacity of the agency to manage assets of such large scope and scale. In fact, a unified 
agency to manage state capital should have been created at the beginning of the SOE 
reform and equitisation process, as was done in both transition economies and the 
developmental states (e.g. Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, China and Singapore), as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Although the idea has been acknowledged, the policy-making 
process has been delayed and the ministries continue until the present day to discuss 
which model to follow.69 Given the dispersed structure of power and rents that has 
come to be embraced as a political economic tradition in the country, it has proved 
equally difficult to solve the problem of dispersed governance at lower levels. In fact, 
GCs, BGs and SCIC were created as pilot projects – a familiar policy-making 
technique in Vietnam. When the interests of certain groups have been accumulated in 
these institutions, they often resist rather than facilitate any subsequent reviews and 
reforms.    
 
3.4.6 Rationale for a Gradualist and Partial Approach 
One of the ways in which the process of SOE reform and equitisation in Vietnam most 
closely resembled those of the developmental states was its adoption of a gradualist 
                                                          
68 By 2014, 781 SOEs with 100% state ownership had assets equal to US$147 billion; the BGs and GCs 
accounted for 90%, with capital of US$58 billion. If the majority-state owned firms are included, the 
total assets are US$257 billion. (See: Ngoc 2016 ‘Nhung dieu can biet dang sau viec thanh lap sieu uy 
ban 5 trieu ty [What is behind the super agency in charge of 5,000 trillion dong]’, 11 June, viewed 11 
September 2016, http://www.cafef.vn).  
69 In practice, there is a variety of similar agencies across countries. They can be either a governmental 
agency as in China or a sovereign fund as in Hungary or Singapore. Certainly, Vietnam is familiar with 
the experience and SCIC constitutes an adaptation to such a model. Yet, as an entity of equal rank to 
other BGs and GCs, SCIC was not designed to govern these other enterprises. So, in fact SCIC has often 
been criticised as underperforming in relation to a mandate it had not been granted; on the other 
hand, SCIC did not easily accept the establishment of a new agency above it. (See: Le Viet – Quynh Nga 
2017, ‘Quan ly von nha nuoc: de xuat lap uy ban moi doc lap [Governing the state capitals: proposing to 
establish a new independent agency]’, 10 February, viewed 21 June 2017, http://www.cafef.vn).       
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and partial approach. In the showcase example of Japan’s railway privatisation, the 
gradual approach was implemented through careful calculation and planning, as was 
the partial privatisation of statutory boards in Singapore. In China and Vietnam, 
however, the approaches were more sophisticated. As well as reflecting the need to 
create favourable rules and conditions in preparation for equitisation, the gradualism 
evident in China and Vietnam was rooted not only in the party-state’s reluctance to 
concede its orthodox ideology but also in other considerations that are analysed in 
detail below.  
 
There are various explanations for the gradualist approach that has characterised 
Vietnam’s economic reform in general and the equitisation process in particular. 
Malesky and London (2014), drawing on a considerable amount of scholarship, 
describe Vietnamese gradualism as a cautious, incremental and exploratory step-by-
step sequence of reforms that was ‘antithetical to the “shock-therapies” adopted by the 
Soviet Union and other transitional economies’ (Masina 2012, p. 190). Although the 
governing elites in Vietnam who consistently deployed this strategy had learned from 
the transition experiences of the former socialist bloc, it was also influenced by a 
wealth of factors endogenous to the domestic political economy, in particular the 
embryonic nature of relevant institutions. The adoption of a gradualist tradition in 
governance at all levels of the Vietnamese party-state today70 appears to reflect a 
profound fear of making incorrect policy decisions, with failures potentially 
undermining state authority. Indeed, Vietnam appears to eschew radicalism. The 
confidence of Vietnamese governing elites in the gradualist methodology has been 
further strengthened by the bitter experiences of rural-land reform (1950s) and urban-
bourgeoisie oppression (1970s) – memories of which are still vivid – together with an 
obsessive preoccupation with the chaos that occurred in their former socialist 
counterparts when they implemented abrupt changes from the pre-existing social 
order, including the role of the communist party.  
 
                                                          
70 For example, a pedestrian zone at the centre of Hanoi was created as a pilot project. (See: Vy An 
2016, ‘Ha noi se thi diem tuyen pho di bo quanh Ho Guom [Hanoi will pilot the establishment of 
pedestrian streets around Hoan Kiem Lake]’, 20 June, viewed 4 November 2016, 
http://www.vnexpress.vn).   
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As emphasised in previous sections, the governing elites in the country were not 
composed of formally-trained technocrats; most of the leaders were promoted on the 
basis of their revolutionary background. Hence, when they launched the reform 
process, they had no effective long-term vision and failed to craft a planned trajectory 
of the development. This shortcoming is evidenced in the lack of clarity in key 
developmental strategies, objectives and norms (Beresford 2008; Masina 2012). 
Furthermore, the governing elites had little experience of the market economy, since 
Vietnam, unlike Eastern Europe, had no neighbouring capitalist economies nor did it 
have a capitalist history like the developmental states in East Asia. Social discourse 
around how a market economy works was poorly informed, given the limits imposed 
by the state on any discussion that went beyond the orthodox ideologies (Evans & Bui 
2005). Hence the party-state responded to challenges pragmatically by way of 
incremental and experimental policies that offered the opportunity to learn through 
trial and error, slowly achieving success in ways that may not have been obvious in the 
first place.  
 
Such a cautious and defensive strategy would also help policy makers contain social 
conflict and political challenges. Certainly, Vietnamese politicians often have to 
commit simultaneously to a syncretism of conservative and pro-reform ideas to secure 
their political positions in accordance with the ‘continue and change’ tradition of the 
party-state (Gainsborough 2010 cited in Malesky & London 2014). They need to 
accumulate evidence of small successes to build coalitions against opponents in the 
political arena and achieve the consensus that is necessary to override criticism from 
interest groups that might be adversely affected by the reforms. Of course, the rate of 
change could also be affected by legitimate concerns about the laying-off of employees 
and disruption of social welfare, as well as other issues created by the previous round 
of policies. The retreat from over-investment in non-core businesses of BGs and GCs 
was an example of this.  
 
In fact, gradualism is not just about how quickly reforms are unleashed but also about 
partiality, with which it is philosophically conflated. These are different aspects of the 
hesitant concession of the economic role of the state while retaining the state’s 
capacity for effective intervention. Nevertheless, the partial approach does not always 
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work as expected. It involves the matching of resources and wants71. By this I mean 
that the gradual and partial approach to equitisation must be accompanied by carefully-
crafted plans and effective implementation or regulations, otherwise there is no point 
in the state retaining 75% or 50% ownership. Alongside the benefits of a gradualist 
and partial approach, however, it also necessary to acknowledge possible negative 
effects on institutional consistency and time-lags that might be quite significant for 
equitised SOEs. For example, when Vietnam decided to develop a ship-building 
industry its plan was hit by the global financial crisis (GFC), which thereafter also 
retarded the progress of disinvestment of SOEs in non-core businesses via the stock 
market. 
 
In summary, the gradualist and partial approach should be considered, on one hand, as 
a strategy that was actively chosen by the Vietnamese governing elites and, on the 
other hand, as the most feasible adaptation to neoliberalism according to the internal 
logic of the local political economy. This kind of path dependency proved to be 
successful in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China. Why, then, was the 
gradualist and partial approach less effective in Vietnam? Although equitisation has 
not entailed the economic and social consequences observed in the wholesale 
privatisations of transition economies, neither has it produced the satisfactory 
outcomes achieved in developmental states. The main factor behind poor 
implementation lies in the distinctive arrangement of group interests in Vietnam.      
  
3.5. Policy-Implementation Gap and the Strategic Groups 
It would be a mistake to construe from the foregoing discussion of gradualism and 
partiality that the state has full control of equitisation. In fact, the biggest issue in 
Vietnamese equitisation is the gap between policy and implementation. Over 
generations of leadership, it has been normal for the party-state to kick off each 
congress with a well-shaped policy agenda, only to see its implementation produce 
quite different outcomes. Although limited state capacity is, of course, partly 
responsible for the low level of enforceability, the main reason is the influence of 
                                                          
71 Private investors in partially equitised SOEs claimed that if the state still held majority ownership, the 
unchanged management would undermine the meaning of equitisation, which is not necessarily true.  
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strategic groups whose competing interests defy reconciliation. Under the slogan of 
commercial nationalism, these endeavours are taken for granted.    
 
In the following discussion of the individualisation of state capacity, I use the term 
‘strategic groups’ (Heberer 2003) to avoid both the particularity of ‘interest groups’ 
and the generality of ‘class’. Heberer (2003, p. 3) defines strategic groups as:  
 
a group of people linked by a common interest in protecting or enhancing their 
common chances of appropriation [which]… does not refer only to material 
goods, but also to immaterial ones... The members of such groups share a 
distinct strategy of acting and the self-understanding to eventually constitute on 
the long run [sic] an important social actor... Strategic groups do not intend to 
achieve limited interests within a short time, but conceive themselves as an 
essential force in the balance of power of all strategic groups within an entire 
society… Strategic groups attempt to improve those opportunities by altering 
and reshaping the framework to suit their own interests… Concurrently, they 
work to form coalitions with other strategic groups.   
 
Vietnamese SOE reform and equitisation have largely involved five strategic groups 
interacting in three main configurations: bureaucrats and SOE managers; privateers; 
and alliances between donors and elites.  
 
3.5.1 Bureaucrats and SOE Managers 
In a monolithic party-state system like Vietnam’s, the relationship between bureaucrats 
and SOE managers takes a hierarchical paternalistic form, with the latter reporting to 
the former. Holding administrative posts, bureaucrats do not only govern the pace of 
equitisation, but also have access to information about industry-wide policies. Hence, 
they are often superior players in the policy-making process. Nevertheless, SOE 
managers are, in practice, the real controllers of their ‘ownerless’ enterprises72, thanks 
                                                          
72 The issue of ‘ownerless’ enterprises is frequently discussed in Vietnam in the context of wasteful 
usage of public assets. Arguably, it is due to the lack of institutions rather than ‘collective 
responsibility’. As explained by Fforde (2004, p. 17), the disincentives resulted from the practices of 
‘encouraging people to take credit for things that go well, and blaming the collective when there are 
problems’ were particularly evident in collective farms in the period before Doi moi. However, 
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to their privileged access to corporate-level information (Fforde 2004). As well, some 
managers might have become de facto owners of these businesses, especially when 
economic incentives for employees were introduced to facilitate equitisation. Like 
insider (spontaneous) privatisation in the CEE and former CIS, most of the shares held 
by the employees eventually ended up in the hands of the managers. In this context, 
the bargaining power of bureaucrats in dealing with SOE managers is weakened, given 
the former’s political and economic interests in the businesses. Critically, their 
economic interests include rents. On one hand, bureaucrats inevitably rely on the 
cooperation of SOE managers when they seek to promote the policy agenda. On the 
other hand, their economic rents are secure as long as their administrative power over 
the SOEs is not undermined. The close interrelationship between political authority 
and economic stakes enables the managers and their cronies to appropriate SOE 
ownership in a variety of ways (Gainsborough 2008, pp. 14-15). This explains why 
bureaucrats often lean towards restraining the progress of reform, or at least keeping 
the SOEs in ‘a climate of uncertainty’, even after they have been privatised, so that the 
SOE managers have to depend on them for favourable use of their discretionary 
powers (Gainsborough 2008, pp. 18-21). 
 
The reform process will only be advanced when the outcomes are distributed 
satisfactorily according to the interests of the two strategic groups. Their relationship, 
however, is based on contestation rather than alliance because this interwoven network 
of rents must be realised through a regulatory system in which ambiguous legal 
documents created by upper levels essentially rely on the interpretation of those at 
lower levels. In effect, the process of regulation is captured by the lower levels of the 
state bureaucracy (Painter 2003). Furthermore, the ‘fragmentation of control’ has been 
unintentionally fortified by the culture of ‘consensual decision making’, which allows 
‘no major move to be taken until all have been consulted and, in some way, included’ 
(Painter 2003, p. 21).   
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
collectives are still successful in developed countries. So, this underscores the role of institutions in 
improving the issue.   
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3.5.2 Privateers 
This contestation is made more animated and complex when privateers are involved. 
These are private investors who have built coalitions with either bureaucrats or SOE 
managers to compete with each other in seeking rents from equitisation. Unlike their 
allies, who can always act ostensibly in the public interest, thereby creating a 
semblance of legality, the privateers’ profit-maximising hustles are rarely exposed. 
Further, while the former can blame the institutional framework for any wrongdoing – 
usually the overall system, higher-level policies or collectiveness – the latter lack any 
such justification, particularly for activities that may be illegal. In fact, there is little 
disclosure of information about privateers’ activities, since charges have to be laid 
before evidence can be presented in public. Often the public only knows that these 
actors (bureaucrats, SOE managers, and privateers) swap on-stage and backstage 
positions and only hears about fraudulent behaviour when deals turn into a scandal that 
provokes prosecution. There are several ways in which private enrichment can occur 
on the cheap at the expense of public assets.  
 
First, during the heyday of financialisation in 2007-2008, the burgeoning stock market 
enabled all publicly listed companies to earn quick profits. Equitised SOEs and newly 
established non-core businesses involving joint investments by SOEs and private 
entrepreneurs emerged rapidly. As previously explained, sharing an SOE brand was 
valuable because it signalled access to market monopolies, licenses, undervalued 
properties, favourable credits, and contracts from other members of the network. The 
new companies were usually created with virtual shares reserved for specified 
privateers who would resell the equities, in the companies’ IPOs, to small and amateur 
investors; they would receive increased amounts of real money in return, pay a part of 
this as equity capital in the firms (at face value), and keep the surplus. This explains 
why the GCs and BGs were so eager to spread out into non-core businesses during this 
period, since state-owned capital could be easily extracted.        
 
Second, land acquisition is a favourite target of privateers in equitisation. Historically, 
SOEs were granted locations at a notional fee for land-use rights. As the cities 
expanded, these lands have become potential business centres and have commanded 
enormous prices. Thus, SOE equitisation provided privateers with the opportunity to 
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buy the land-use rights at much cheaper prices than those officially regulated by the 
state, not to mention the market price. The privateers would convert the usage of these 
locations from manufacturing to residential or retail. Because the mandate for 
‘commercial nationalism’ bestows on mercantilism a certain kind of normality73 
(Nguyen-Thu 2016), such activities have not met with any great antipathy from the 
population at large. In any case, the old SOEs plants or outlets – lacking new 
investment, innovation and competitiveness – have become so ugly that any changes 
are welcomed as a symbol of ‘progress’, regardless of who is known to be capitalising 
that ‘prosperity’ (Hayton 2010, p. xii). To be fair, the impact of urbanisation has meant 
that some industrial facilities have to be relocated out of the inner cities to provide 
space for residential and commercial developments. In other cases, however, SOE 
managers who are connected with privateers might deliberately let the firms 
underperform. Hence, the evaluation and pricing of public assets is an issue of great 
concern; it has been reported that the land-use rights purchased from the sale of a state-
owned hotel could be resold in the market at double the price74. The privateers also 
target SOEs for licenses to engage in profitable industries such as mineral resources or 
telecommunications. There has also been a reverse form of privatisation, in which the 
SOEs have overpaid to buy shares in a privateer’s company. Because of their 
grandiose scope and scale, such schemes have not been numerous.  
 
All these patronage transactions between bureaucrats, SOE managers, and privateers – 
which vary by context and ties – have produced numerous interest groups vying with 
each other to appropriate public rents in an underdeveloped institutional environment 
(especially, perhaps, with regard to information disclosure). It is worth noting that 
while the private and public gains are at odds, those within the private sphere are no 
less contradictory. Outsiders to the equitisation process, for instance, may have no idea 
that a privateer can acquire an SOE only to discover that its assets and contracts have 
                                                          
73 It should be noted that the official salary of a public-sector employee is scarcely enough to live on. 
Despite several overhauls of salary scales in the public sector, the minimum salary is around 3,000,000 
dong/month (equal to USD 130/month), which is insufficient to meet the needs of an individual or 
family. (See: Hoang Phuong 2016, ‘Tang 11 lan, he thong luong van nhu thoi bao cap [Increasing 11 
times, the salary scale system is still no better than in the command period]’, 21 November, viewed 2 
December 2016, http://www.vnexpress.vn).        
74 The average successful bidding price on 23.059 public assets was just 8% over the starting price, far 
below the average rate of 20-50% in other countries. (See: Dau Anh Tuan 2016, ‘Kiem loi bang tai san 
cong [Seeking rents on public assets]’, 12 October, viewed 21 November 2016, 
http://www.vnexpress.net)  
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already been transferred or looted by the former managers. The unpublicised 
implications, however, relate not only to distribution (inequity disguised as those 
market-determined increases in the efficiency of resource allocation often claimed for 
privatisation by neoliberals), but also to distortions in SOE reforms and equitisation 
policies. In stark contrast to the neoliberal assertion that state ownership and 
intervention distort the market, experience has shown that it is the unconstrained self-
interested activities of the strategic groups that distort state policy75.    
 
3.5.3 Alliances between Elites and Donors  
While bureaucrats, SOE managers and privateers engage in their contests, elites and 
donors seem to have established their own alliances. ‘Elites’ here refer to local leaders 
of the political and intellectual establishment who are most influential in the policy-
making process. International donors include multilateral organisations and countries 
that provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) on an annual basis to Vietnam; 
among these, the most prominent are the WB and the IMF76. Unlike the strategic 
groups discussed earlier, the elites and donors do not engage directly with particular 
SOEs or equitisation; rather, they are involved in shaping overall policies at the macro 
level and controlling the tenor of the reform. This leads to a different approach.  
 
Since Vietnam became integrated into the world in the mid-1990s, it has vigorously 
pursued not only trade and investment but access to sound knowledge about economic 
and social development. There has been an increasing outflow of local officials and 
                                                          
75 It is important to emphasise that not every bureaucrat, SOE managers or private entrepreneur is 
corrupt. However, the contestation between them has been so evident that the Party’s leader has 
admitted that ‘nowadays, the interests are interlacing with each other’ to influence policy. (See: 
Vietnamnet 2015, ‘Chong tham nhung kho vi loi ich kinh te, chinh tri chang chit [It is difficult to fight 
corruption as the economic and political interests are interlacing with each other]’, 28 December, 
viewed 2 December 2016, http://www.vietnamnet.vn)      
76 ODA has played a significant role in Vietnamese development during Doi moi. In 1993-2012, the total 
amount from both multilateral and bilateral commitments (as announced at annual International 
donor conferences) was US$80 billion, of which US$58.4 billion was pledged and US$37.59 billion was 
disbursed. While the WB and ADB are the largest multilateral donors, Japan and European nations are 
the largest bilateral donors. After a steep increase (from US$1.8 billion in 1993 to US$8 billion in 2009, 
for the year 2010), the annual commitment of ODA has declined considerably as Vietnam has moved 
into the ranks of middle-income countries. It has also become less of a priority for the Vietnamese 
government due to awareness of public debt and quality of disbursement, though the other terms of 
these sources of aid are generally favourable. (See: Huong Giang 2013, ‘Nhin lai 20 nam thu hut von 
ODA [Reviewing 20 years of ODA attraction]’, 15 October, viewed 25 November 2016, 
http://www.baochinhphu.vn)   
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scholars for training abroad in mainstream economics, and international donors have 
come to Vietnam to convey neoliberal ideas. Arguably, this like-mindedness has led to 
the establishment of an effective complex of consultative channels between elites and 
donors which allow them to jointly formulate ‘a wide-ranging strategy that links 
structural adjustment and economic reform [including SOE reform and equitisation 
policies] with poverty reduction goals’ (Painter 2003, pp. 13-14). The donors’ 
recommendations are rhetorically incorporated into the party-state’s ten-year 
strategies, five-year plans, or even legal documents. The extent to which they are 
enforced, however, is another matter, and the pressure exerted by donors has not been 
as influential as is generally believed (Painter 2003; Engel 2007). Overall, the reform 
is led by readily neoliberal-inspired local politicians who retain ‘a fair degree of 
autonomy’ (Engel 2007, p. 148): international donors need only to try to accommodate 
reformers rather than to impose their usual influence on the discourse. As Painter 
(2003, p. 15) observed: 
 
In general, the conditions set out typically do not demand more than might be 
feasibly delivered … They are a mixture of re-iterated government objectives 
and a few additional specific encouragements … In sum, the extent to which 
the SOEs program is shaped by the external pressures of lenders and donors 
should not be exaggerated … In this alliance, the donors as much follow the 
lead of the reformers as try to impose a different direction, treading carefully 
for fear of creating a political backlash from forces opposed to specific 
reforms. 
              
Clearly, as long as the foreign aid and technical assistance have been substantially 
supportive of the country’s various needs (infrastructure projects, poverty reduction 
programs, funding the legal-drafting process), the elites’ reform agenda is vindicated 
and the legitimacy and bargaining power of their coalition against political opponents 
are consolidated (Painter 2003; Gainsborough 2010). At the same time, lack of local 
knowledge makes it difficult for expatriate representatives of donors to confidently 
interrogate ‘project quality or implementation [which] is less important than hitting 
disbursement targets’, particularly as Vietnam has already been represented as a 
showcase for the developing world (Gainsborough 2010, p. 484). Hence, despite 
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concern that the indigenous and external forces cannot be reconciled, the elites and 
donors realise mutual benefit through a ‘marriage of convenience’ (Gainsborough 
2010, p. 485). This does not mean that enforceability is not considered important, but it 
is so little prioritised that poor implementation has not affected the alliance between 
elites and donors. As a result, donors have always been able to praise some 
achievements, express a little dissatisfaction, propose several ideas, and find a 
rationale for continued collaboration.              
 
3.6. Social Impacts of SOE Reforms and Equitisation  
Employment and income equality are the two main issues that need to be investigated 
here. Normally, mass redundancies and job layoffs are of most concern during the 
restructuring and privatisation of SOEs. Thanks to the gradualist and partial approach, 
however, Vietnam has largely avoided this problem. Another contributing factor has 
been the development by the party-state of favourable policies for vulnerable members 
of the workforce, including an option scheme for employees to buy shares at 
discounted rates and the provision of compensation and pension rights for those being 
retrenched; in practice, these were merely notional due to the workers’ lack of 
purchasing capacity and information, the bureaucracy’s failure to engage fully, and the 
timidity of trade unions (Evans & Bui 2005). In fact, the impact of Vietnamese 
equitisation on employment should have been minimised by practices embedded in the 
‘socialist’ tradition of equitable reconciliation of interests to avoid conflict in a 
collective setting. Gainsborough (2008, p. 14) describes one manager who was so 
irresolute in the face of employment issues that his solution was to ‘keep everyone!’. 
Quite significant levels of unemployment could have resulted from the reorganisation 
and equitisation of SOEs. Labour statistics in Vietnam are so unreliable that it is 
impossible to know how many former SOE employees have moved to other sectors, 
started their own private and household businesses, or become unemployed.  
 
Among the most alarming issues raised by academics are the ‘arduous working 
conditions’ of Vietnamese workers in general (Masina 2012, p. 205) and the ‘erosion 
of social welfare entitlements… [and] poor vocational training for workers’, 
particularly after equitisation (Evans & Bui 2005, p. 234). It is noteworthy that the lack 
of a formal social safety net and a developed civil society in Vietnam has put those 
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families who were affected by SOE equitisation at risk of becoming financially 
marginalised and unprotected (Evans & Bui 2005). According to Evans and Bui 
(2005), women are the most vulnerable group during equitisation, Similarly, Beresford 
(2008) points to the undermining effects of the process on female empowerment, since 
their relative lack of skills, education and connections often exposes them to 
retrenchment and a return to unpaid housework, where their voices remain unheard.  
 
A kind of ‘trickle-down’ may occur when managers of privatised SOEs have to share 
the fruits of spontaneous privatisations with employees. Yet, because these privileges 
are controlled and distributed according to position and connections, low-skilled, low-
paid workers often get the least. These practices seem to occur at the expense of the 
public assets. Yet because managers and employees perceive the accumulated assets of 
SOEs as their ‘own capital’ or ‘the fruits of the workers’ own efforts’ (Gainsborough 
2008, p. 12), the ‘public–private’ distinction within SOEs is often blurred (Beresford 
2008). This explains why, although spontaneous privatisation has certainly had an 
adverse effect on the economy, it is eagerly pursued by SOE employees when the 
process of equitisation is not well governed or when no compensation is offered. What 
is evident is the widening income inequality that favours those in possession of 
production factors, be they SOE managers or private investors – a cumulative 
causation. 
 
Indeed, the income gap may be the most alarming social impact of equitisation in 
Vietnam. If public ownership, as is often assumed, does lead to the most equitable 
distribution of income, this would be reversed as private ownership (i.e. equitisation) 
expands – and at an increasing rate if it is unfairly handled. Beresford (2008, p. 238) 
argues:  
 
[I]nequality in Vietnam is increasingly based on new mechanisms of capital 
accumulation in which control over the means of production – whether 
indirectly, through management of state-owned assets, including land, or 
directly through private ownership – is confined to a small proportion of the 
population while strong redistributive mechanisms are absent.  
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Such interpenetration of state and market has resulted in the formation of a new 
capitalist class within and related to the state (Cheshier 2010). Moreover, the 
widespread public perception of ‘equitisation as a corrupt practice’ (Evans & Bui 
2005, p. 235) will not only erode popular belief in the role of the state but also 
encourage further selfishness and self-interested appropriation (Stiglitz 2008a). All of 
this is antithetical to the goal of equitable and inclusive growth and the model of the 
developmental state that the Vietnamese party-state has pursued.  
 
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
Over the past three decades, Vietnam has conducted comprehensive economic reform 
by opening its economy to trade and investment, establishing fledgeling market 
institutions and pursuing structural reforms in which the SOEs were reorganised and 
equitised. During the 1990s, the number of SOEs declined sharply, mostly due to 
administrative measures that concentrated them into general corporations; only a few 
SOEs were experimentally equitised. In the following period, after Vietnam joined the 
WTO and financial markets were developed, thousands of small and medium 
equitisations were undertaken and major SOEs were consolidated into business groups 
that rapidly expanded into non-core businesses. Due to corporate scandals and 
overinvestment, the SOEs have been restructured in an attempt to maintain the role 
envisaged for them in party-state policies as the driver of economic growth.  
 
The evolution of SOE reform and equitisation is best analysed against the backdrop of 
the country’s political economy. Arguably, Vietnamese governing elites have 
vacillated between neoliberalism and a developmental state, with neither being 
achieved fully or successfully. On one hand, to achieve political legitimacy based on 
economic performance, the party-state adopted the neoliberal-informed agenda. In 
doing so it was also responding to the impact of global integration and pressure from 
donors, which was based on neoliberal beliefs rather than empirical evidence that 
privatisation promotes national economic performance. On the other hand, to secure 
the role of the state, and in the face of the contrasting experiences of post-socialist 
transition economies and successful economic development in East Asia, the most 
suitable option was deemed to be the emulation of developmental states. In general, 
however, the country’s political economy was characterised by inconsistencies that 
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hindered the state’s capacity to follow a developmental state model, such as the lack of 
an effective bureaucracy and the individualised ‘commercial nationalism’ that allows 
group interests to burgeon instead of concentrating private rents under state 
coordination for developmental objectives.   
 
Particularly in relation to SOE reform and equitisation, Vietnam has managed to adopt 
the main features of the developmental states, including the ‘retain the big, release the 
small’ policy, keiretsu and chaebol corporate governance structures, a gradualist and 
partial approach, ‘guided’ competition, transparency, hard-budget constraints and 
managerial professionalism. Yet, successes77 have been rare; most attempts were 
diverted towards serving the interests of strategic groups in the context of institutional 
inadequacy. Thanks to the gradualist and partial approach, Vietnamese equitisation has 
not caused the massive rupture of welfare that occurred in transition economies in the 
CEE and former CIS; nonetheless, it did not produce the effective outcomes that were 
achieved in the developmental states. Bureaucrats, SOE managers and privateers 
competed to enhance their own opportunities for appropriation of public assets, using 
the bargaining power that came from their positions and resources. Donors and elites 
proved indifferent to the gap between good policies and poor implementation of SOE 
reform and equitisation in Vietnam. Although there have been no reports of large-scale 
unemployment, there have been adverse impacts on unskilled and unconnected 
workers, especially women, who have been retrenched. Income inequality has emerged 
as a growing concern. Of equal concern is the possibility that, in the course of 
equitisation, the politics of the strategic groups could overwhelm the national interest 
arguments, thereby limiting the state’s capacity to coordinate production, investment 
and distribution for developmental purposes. 
 
  
                                                          
77 The criteria of success refer to improving the productive efficiency, which include financial 
performance of the enterprise and the broad contribution to social and economic development.  
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Chapter 4 
Governing Privatisation in Vietnam 
 
The title of this chapter deliberately echoes Robert Wade’s construct of ‘governing the 
market’ (Wade 1990). Clearly, if privatisation is to expand the role of the market, as 
advocated in mainstream economics, it should be governed not only to protect 
consumers’ interests but also to achieve national economic and social development. As 
explained in previous chapters, there has been a large gap between the neoliberal 
advocacy of privatisation and the actual impact of privatisation in practice. This has 
resulted in the adoption of different policy approaches in different countries.   
 
In Vietnam’s privatisation, as analysed in Chapter 3, the outcomes have been neither 
adverse, as in the transition economies of the CEE and former CIS, nor successful as in 
the East Asian developmental states. This is due to the overall vacillation in economic 
reform between neoliberalism and the developmental state approach. It is concerning 
that the poor performance of the SOEs – the result of underdeveloped market 
institutions and the endeavours of strategic groups – continues to undermine the faith 
of the governing elites and the population in the economic role of the state, which may 
induce further movement towards neoliberalism. Wholesale privatisation is looming as 
policy makers and the public blame SOEs for all the problems in the economy. It is 
argued, however, that the association between ownership transfer and enhanced 
productive efficiency is largely underpinned by ideological bias against the 
intervention of the state and by political interests, rather than being driven solely by 
economic considerations. Essentially, the centrality of privatisation in economic 
reform is politically constructed. The question is whether the politics serves broad 
national economic and social development objectives or the enrichment of a few. If 
broad national economic and social development is identified with greater productive 
efficiency, further issues arise. Developing countries, which are characterised by the 
prevalence of market failures, often lack those institutions that neoliberals traditionally 
assume will be available to advance their agenda; these include enabling institutions 
such as market institutions, complementary non-state institutions, and state regulatory 
institutions. Even if productive efficiency and, thence, shareholder value were 
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improved by privatisation – which is notoriously difficult to assess – shareholders are 
not the only stakeholders: these include, among others, the state capacity itself.  
 
State capacity is crucially important for the coordination of business and investment. A 
developmental state needs to retain its coordinating capacity, including the bargaining 
power to achieve a competitive industrial structure and regulate conflicts between 
stakeholders. The contrasting practical experiences of privatisation in transition 
economies in the CEE and former CIS and in the developmental states in East Asia 
have shown that it is only possible to achieve productive efficiency and secure the state 
capacity for industrialisation when privatisation policy is implemented as part of other 
reforms and is subject to rules and conditions. For Vietnam, the necessity to emulate 
the developmental state is made the more urgent because of the challenges associated 
with sustaining growth by enhancing the indigenous business sector’s capacity for 
industrial innovation. This is the central argument of this thesis, and also the rationale 
for the proposition of governing privatisation presented in this chapter.  
 
The first section examines political aspects of the efficiency argument, and the role of 
enabling institutions. The second section considers the implications of a stakeholder 
approach versus concentration on improving shareholder values. This is followed by 
an analysis of the developmental state’s capacity for industrialisation, sustaining 
growth and innovation. The final section proposes a framework of governing 
privatisation for broad national economic and social development objectives.  
 
4.1 The Myth of the Efficiency Argument: Politics and Enabling 
Institutions78 
In mainstream thinking, privatisation is represented as a means of improving the 
productive efficiency of SOEs in particular and, thus, the economy as a whole (see 
Chapter 1). Greater productive efficiency is seen as increasing shareholder values. Yet 
the ‘efficient market’ argument – on which this ideal is based – is largely mythical. 
Today’s markets are not like those which existed in circumstances of simple 
commodity production; they are not some sort of natural phenomenon, but have to be 
constructed (Polanyi 1944), often politically (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robison 2005). 
                                                          
78 The title draws on Burke et al. (2014). 
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According to King and Pitchford (1998, p. 314), the neoliberal belief in the superiority 
of market forces and private ownership is ‘superficially attractive … [but lacking in] 
intellectual rigour’. That the efficiency argument for privatisation is a political 
construction has been proved in the practice of privatisation in transition economies in 
the CEE and former CIS (see Chapter 2). As analysed in Chapter 3, the Vietnamese 
experience of equitisation has also revealed the influence of both the ideological 
pendulum and the endeavours of strategic groups, which have hindered the country’s 
success in adopting the developmental state model. The underperformance of a 
Vietnamese SOE provides an opportunity for ideological bias and group interests to 
push the efficiency argument for equitisation further towards a wholesale approach, 
without adequate consideration of the role of institutions in realising improvement in 
the productive efficiency of equitised firms.      
 
4.1.1 Selling-off for Efficiency: A Politically Constructed Argument 
Comprehensive reviews of the copious literature on privatisation have been published 
by Megginson and Netter (2001) and Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005). These reviews – 
which, interestingly, arrived at opposite conclusions – analysed a large amount of 
empirical research on the effects of privatisation, almost all of which focused on the 
issue of efficiency, particularly as illustrated by financial performance. According to 
Megginson and Netter (2001, p. 329):   
 
Implicitly, we assume that the goal of government is to promote efficiency. 
Thus, we discuss the efficiency implications of government ownership and, 
more importantly, the movement from government ownership to privatisation. 
To a large extent, we ignore the arguments regarding the importance of 
equitable [sic] concerns such as income distribution… The effects of 
privatisation on productive efficiency, or at least observable variables that are 
proxies for productive efficiency, is the focus of most of the empirical literature 
we review here. 
 
The contrasting findings of the above-mentioned reviews and the focus on efficiency 
have been acknowledged by the indigenous literature in Vietnam. Truong and Ngo 
(2016), building on their previous work, used empirical data to compare the 
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performance of 301 privatised firms (2007-2010) and 127 SOEs. They concluded that 
privatisation has positive impacts on an array of financial indexes, such as return on 
assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), but no similar effects on productivity were 
evident. Furthermore, while the reduction of financial leverage (the ratio of total debts 
to total assets) may be interpreted as a positive sign of the firm’s financial restructuring 
after privatisation, the decline in employment with unchanged productivity (the ratio of 
revenue to number of employees) may be seen as indicating reduced output. In other 
words, just as empirical research in other developing countries (Megginson & Netter 
2001; Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005) and transition economies (Hanousek, Kocenda & 
Svejnar 2008) failed to clearly identify the impact of privatisation on efficiency, 
neither has it produced definite results for Vietnam.    
 
These mixed results and questions about the validity of the assumed relationship 
between ‘efficiency’ and financial performance are discussed in more detail below. For 
now, what needs to be noted is that this kind of empirical research is rarely represented 
in Vietnamese policy discourse. Instead, the arguments are often based on normative 
assumptions, influenced by public disbelief in the state sector as a whole. According to 
the analysis presented in Chapter 3, the more an economic reform idea inclines 
towards neoliberalism, the more it is perceived by the Vietnamese population as being 
‘pro-reform’ or ‘progressive’. Consequently, a wholesale approach to equitisation is 
being advocated in which the government is urged to disinvest from industries where 
the private sector does better. Illustrative of this proposition are recent efforts to sell 
off all of the state-owned equities at profitable dairy- and brewery-manufacturing 
SOEs (Habeco, Sabeco and Vinamilk), with official instructions that the privatised 
businesses will not be constrained as long as they preserve the national brands and 
generate maximum profit and efficiency for the state, whose only responsibility is to 
use the resulting revenue in a transparent way (Bao Anh 2016)79. These instructions 
were praised by the representatives of investors as good for every party except the 
                                                          
79 Hanoi Beer-Alcohol & Beverage JS Company and Saigon Beer-Alcohol & Beverage Corporation are 
the two largest and most profitable brewery companies in Vietnam (similar to Vinamilk). Habeco has 
been equitised with the following breakdown of ownership: state 81.79%, employees 0.56%, other 
shareholders 1.88%, Carlsberg (strategic partner) 15.77%. A plan has been approved to sell an 
additional 5.77% to Carlsberg and then all of the state-owned equities by public offerings after the 
company was publicly listed in 2016. Sabeco has 89.59% state ownership; it was planned to sell 53.59% 
in 2016 and 36% following public listing in 2017. (Bao Anh 2016).   
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interest groups of bureaucrats and SOE managers (who resist the sale)80 on the 
argument that the financial market will create more transparency and stronger 
monitoring pressures on management boards to focus only on the interests of this 
business; this, in turn, will lead to enhanced efficiency and greater tax revenues for the 
state.  
 
Such ideas are all in accordance with neoclassical economics (see Chapter 1). Quiggin 
(1999, p. 50) seeks to balance the distribution of activities between the public and 
private sectors by suggesting endorsement of private ownership in businesses 
producing private goods, in competitive markets, with few externalities or economy-
wide risks and, often, labour-intensive production methods. Vickers and Yarrow 
(1988, p. 426) also discuss the conditionality of privatisation:  
 
[P]rivate ownership is most efficient – and hence privatization is most suitable 
– in markets where effective (actual or potential) competition prevails…. 
Where monopoly exists […] the case for preferring private ownership to public 
ownership weakens considerably; privately efficient profit seeking can no 
longer be expected to lead to socially efficient results. 
 
The equitisation agenda in Vietnam, however, is not confined to selling off 
manufacturing SOEs, but goes beyond these formulae and warnings. The recent 
Decision 58/2016/QD-TTg entails plans to sell a majority of state-ownership in most 
BGs, GCs and utilities-providing SOEs (see Chapter 3), including regional electricity 
companies that control both the power grid and distribution and urban water-supply 
enterprises. Thus, the developmental philosophy in Vietnam appears to have been 
overwhelmed by neoliberalism rather than the approach of the developmental state. A 
new phase of Doi moi seems about to be ushered in, in which the party-state promotes 
the private sector as the sole driver of economic growth, in contrast to its previous 
endorsement of a public-private mix that typifies the developmental states. 
                                                          
80 Interviews with economists suggest that these instructions showed the determination of the 
government to withdraw from industries in which the state does not have to intervene, in order to give 
the private sector ‘more space to perform’ and allow healthy market development so capital can be 
invested in other industries. (See: Phuong Dung 2016, ‘Chinh phu khong di ban bia, ban sua: mot quyet 
dinh tot cho tat ca [The government is not seller of beer or milk: a good decision for all]’, 1 September, 
viewed 21 January 2017, http://www.dantri.com.vn).  
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Belief in the superiority of private ownership is supported by the popular ideological 
bias against the economic role of the state rather than by any clear empirical evidence 
that the private sector performs better in terms of productive efficiency (whatever the 
evidence suggests in relation to shareholder values). According to this one-sided 
observation, SOEs are perceived as inherently deficient, especially since many cases of 
wasteful public investments and corruption scandals in SOEs have been made public. 
Currently, three SOE managers have fled abroad to escape charges associated with 
their accountability for company losses81. Twelve SOEs and public investment projects 
have been classified as unprofitable and bankrupt82. These state-owned projects, often 
mocked by the population as ‘the more they run the more unprofitable they become’, 
have ignited huge public resentment, especially after it was revealed that some of the 
managers were subsequently promoted to other leadership positions in the 
bureaucracy.  
 
It can be argued that these accusations of poor SOE performance do not focus enough 
on the low quality of governance and soft-budget constraints which, admittedly, are 
prevalent not only within the SOE sphere. The evaluations did not take account of 
other factors, such as unusual changes in world market prices for the products of some 
SOEs. There is little consideration of alternative policies in SOE reform and 
equitisation. For example, even if equitisation is desired for fiscal gain, the state does 
not necessarily have to sell off all of the equity. Partial equitisations can be seen as 
good investments because national sovereign funds are moving around the world to 
seek similar opportunities. Furthermore, the private savings that are poured into the 
purchase of state-owned assets may be responding to brand recognition and ‘hype’ and 
                                                          
81 They were bosses of PVN’s member units – PVC (construction), PVTex (textile fibre) and PVPower 
(electricity). (See: Luong Bang 2016, ‘State owned corporation bosses travel abroad to avoid 
responsibilities]’, 17 December, viewed 22 January 2017, http://www.english.vietnamnet.vn).   
82 These are all projects of the Ministry of Industry and Trade: Dinh Vu petroleum textile fiber plant; 
Dung Quat Bio-ethanol plant; 2nd stage expansion of the Thai Nguyen steel production plant; Phuong 
Nam paper powder plant; Ninh Binh Urea fertilizer plant; Ha Bac Urea fertilizer plant; Lao Cai DAP 1 
fertilizer plant; Hai Phong DAP2 fertilizer plant; Binh Phuoc Ethanol; Phu Tho Ethanol; Dung Quat 
shipyard; joint venture of Quy Sa mine; and Lao Cai steel production plant. (See: Bao Quyen, ‘Them 7 
du an lon cua nganh cong thuong thua lo nang [Seven more projects of the industry and trade are 
unprofitable]’, 20 December 2016, viewed 22 January 2017, http://www.vneconomy.vn). Initially, 5 
projects were questioned by the National Assembly, with a total investment value of about 30 trillion 
dong; 7 other unprofitable projects were subsequently added.  
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may be less effectively invested than if they were deployed in other productive 
opportunities; thus economic growth might be hindered rather than helped (Bortolotti 
& Milella 2008; Jomo 2008). Why does the state not channel private investment into 
innovative areas within an industrial policy agenda? The ‘sell-off-to-boost-efficiency’ 
approach towards even well-performing SOEs might mean that some of the revenue 
that could have been invested in improving the SOEs’ productivity is converted to 
private profit. 
 
In the face of the popular appeal of neoliberalism, which shows far less tolerance for 
the SOEs than for the private business sector, the bureaucrats choose duplicity as the 
safest strategy. The public and the state-controlled media ignore both the 
unprofitability and corruption scandals of many private sector firms (especially the 
violation of minority shareholders’ property rights) and the profitability and large 
contributions of tax-paying SOEs. The bias is strengthened (if that is possible) by the 
widely-held view – mainly promulgated by the bureaucracy – that the SOEs have 
benefitted unfairly from favourable conditions and policies that do not apply to their 
private competitors. Perkins and Vu (2009) rank the SOEs as the most cosseted form 
of ownership thanks to their ties to ministerial interests, followed by foreign investors 
who can take advantage of a vast array of governmental and local incentives designed 
to attract them (FDI). Luong and Vu (2014) also claim that the SOEs and FDI 
corporations are more easily able to access loans and skilled labour than are their local 
private counterparts. Hence, local private businesses – which are perceived by 
domestic academics and policy makers as intrinsically more efficient – are represented 
as the most vulnerable sector, crowded-out by the SOEs and subject to adverse rules, 
to the detriment of the efficient allocation of resources in the economy as a whole. 
Who, however, should be blamed for the ‘soft-budget constraint’ in the SOEs? 
According to the CIEM (2015) report, which describes soft treatment of SOEs as 
‘market distortions’83, it should be blamed on the government itself. The report listed 
                                                          
83 According to CIEM (2015), the SOEs are responsible for three kinds of ‘market distortion’:  
(i) market entry and accessibility to production factors, including: the rising costs and barriers 
created for other forms of business ownership by monopolistic economies of scale and regulated 
conditions; easy accessibility to credit from state-owned banks, which prefer SOEs because they are 
likely to be protected by the bureaucracy; favourable access to foreign sources of finance that are 
guaranteed or re-lent by the government; funding from the state budget for targeted or social 
projects; and historical accessibility to land;  
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nearly 20 letters from the Office of Government in 2014 allowing commercial banks to 
finance the SOEs over the official limits on the amount of credit that can be drawn 
from state-owned banks, thereby demonstrating the discretionary way in which budget 
constraints are administered (CIEM 2015, p. 22). In other words, the bureaucracy as 
well as SOE managers are the sources of both poor governance and duplicity in the 
engagement with neoliberal reforms.  
 
In summary, as explained in Chapter 3, the party-state has so far vacillated between 
neoliberalism and the developmental state strategy. Emulation of the developmental 
states has been hesitant and unsure, and the governing elites have responded to the 
popular appeal of neoliberalism by committing to a wholesale approach to equitisation 
without a clear improvement in public administration. This is reflected in the 
prevailing discourse of SOE reform and equitisation, rather than a careful and detailed 
economic justification of partial or full equitisation. Worryingly, if the trajectory fails 
to deliver – as evidenced in Chapter 2 – the trend towards neoliberalism will gain 
further momentum.     
 
4.1.2 The Role of Enabling Institutions84 
Mainstream economics views the establishment of SOEs – that is, mechanisms of state 
governance – as distortions of the market. On the other hand, corporate governance is 
held to defer to market principles. The phrase ‘deferring to market principles’ is 
ubiquitous in Vietnamese policy discourse, as if market principles and efficient 
markets are already out there. This is a salient difference from the view of heterodox 
economics (Polanyi 1944).  
 
For the heterodox economist, the presumption that markets are generally ‘perfect’ or 
‘efficient’ is unfounded. There is a variety of markets. The establishment of each 
                                                                                                                                                                        
(ii) market competition, such as: many forms of input are not fully accounted, creating unfair pricing; 
some utilities are still priced by the state; business groups are not subject to competition law; 
favourable policies are designed by owner-ministries; soft-budget constraints, including taxes and 
managers’ incentives, and accountability in financial performance;  
(iii) market withdrawal: insufficient frameworks to ensure that unprofitable SOEs are foreclosed. 
 
84 Institutions are defined as ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)’. (North 1991, p. 97)   
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reflects a different set of circumstances or political and economic forces that are 
locally specific and, in each case, the market requires a particular set of 
complementary institutions or rules (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robison 2005; Rodrik 
2005). Admittedly the quality of an institution may be deficient (property law may 
accommodate corruption, for example) (Dixit 2009). Since a market may be subject to 
failures and markets may not signal what responses are appropriate, it may be argued 
that SOEs and state policies towards them are not distortions of the market but a set of 
rules complementing an underdeveloped market. Dutt, Kim and Singh (1994, p. 10) 
describe them as ‘the institutional arrangements which sustain the norms which set the 
boundaries within which buyers and sellers compete in market’. Hence, SOE reform 
should include the possibility of revising complementary or supportive institutions as 
well as some degree of privatisation approached more institutionally. What deserves to 
be examined is the set of factors that has created the success stories, rather than 
dismissing them as anomalous, as popular discourse would have it. 
 
It is possible that privatisation enhances productive efficiency within privatised 
enterprises in various ways – such as by ‘influences on managerial style and 
organization structure directly and strategic orientation indirectly’ (Brouthers, 
Gelderman & Aren 2007, p. 238) or through changes in management and corporate 
governance which lead to improvements in goals, incentives and control, followed by 
strategy, structure and culture (Cuervo & Villalonga 2000). There is, however, no 
guarantee that this will occur in the context of developing countries that lack enabling 
institutions.  
 
The more we experience privatisation, the more we have come to acknowledge its 
complexity. Since the beginning of the 1990s, even leading proponents of privatisation 
have ceased presenting ownership transfer on its own as a panacea for firm 
performance. According to Shirley (1992, p. S29), ‘privatisation works best when it is 
only one part of a larger program of reforms designed to create an environment that 
promotes efficiency’. Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley (1992, p. 13) also noted: 
 
Privatisation is a complement to, not a replacement for, the other aspects of the 
development of the private sector in member countries of the World Bank. In 
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many instances privatization will be less important for the growth of the private 
sector than the emergence of new private businesses.  
 
Echoing other contemporary authors in their emphasis on the importance of 
competitive markets and regulatory capacity (as discussed in Chapter 1), Kikeri, Nellis 
and Shirley (1992) interpreted the ‘conditions for success’ to include the ‘overall 
macroeconomic policy framework’. Shirley (1992) also suggested a series of tasks for 
the government in order to achieve the best valuation, transparency, and sustained 
efficiency after privatisation.  
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the assertion that ownership ‘itself matters’ 
(Kikeri, Nellis & Shirley 1992, p. 3) has been further discredited through improved 
understanding of institutions. According to Megginson and Netter (2001, p. 364), 
institutional quality determines the impact of privatisation on the national economy:  
 
[T]he gains from privatisation come from change in ownership combined with 
other reforms such as institutions to address incentive and contracting issues, 
hardened budget constraints, removal of barriers to entry, and an effective legal 
and regulatory framework. 
 
Specifically, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005, pp. 526-527) explain why privatisations in 
developing countries are less fruitful than those in developed ones in this way: 
 
[P]rivatisation developed as a policy strategy in the developed economies. 
These economies benefit from mature capital markets with stock exchanges, 
venture capitalists, banks and other loan creditors, a well-functioning legal 
system that protects private property rights, and conventional standards of 
business behaviour (‘business ethics’) that facilitate market exchange. None of 
these institutions can necessarily be taken for granted in developing economies.  
 
According to Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005, pp. 526-528), developing countries are 
often outperformed by developed ones in relation to several sets of rules and 
conditions that affect privatisation outcomes. The deficiencies of developing countries 
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include: (i) imperfectly competitive and incomplete product markets and under-
developed capital markets; (ii) the absence of an organised and competitive labour 
market, and managerial capacity; (iii) poor protection of property rights, under-
developed business codes of behaviour, and a low level of probity in public 
administration; (iv) inadequate state regulatory and supervisory capabilities; and (v) a 
lack of overarching targets for poverty reduction and sustainable economic 
development.  
 
Thus, the role of institutions in determining efficiency improvements at either firm or 
national economy levels, not to speak of broad national economic and social 
development, is just as – if not more – important than ownership transfer. The 
contributions of privatisation in developed countries should not be presumed in 
developing countries, where the institutional arrangements are often embryonic (Cook 
& Uchida 2003). In other words, privatisation is easier in developed economies mainly 
because they have the appropriate rules and conditions, while privatisation in 
developing countries is unlikely to be successful because these rules and conditions are 
under-developed.  
 
The experiences of privatisation analysed in Chapters 1 and 2 illustrate how the 
application of different rules leads to different outcomes. Privatisers in developed 
economies are more informed, capable, flexible and self-confident in implementing 
policies. In the face of certain imperatives at the point of privatisation, they do not 
typically rush to sell off the SOEs’ assets without careful planning (although there 
have been notable examples of governments rushing headlong into privatisations – 
such as in the case of the privatisation of parts of electricity markets in the Australian 
states). Furthermore, the sizable domestic markets for goods and services and the 
developed labour and financial markets provide these privatisers with effective tools 
that are not available in developing countries. On the contrary, privatisers in the third 
world have to cope with various constraints at the same time as coping with deficient 
supportive and regulatory institutions.  
 
This discussion is not complete without comment on the conditions that may be 
imposed by the state on privatisations. These may include conditions attached to the 
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method of equitisation. A certain proportion of the total equity being off-loaded might 
be sold to foreign investors regardless of the attractiveness of the sales offer in relation 
to other offers the investors may be considering. Such conditions can be said to 
overload privatisation with objectives, as occurred in some privatisation projects in 
transition economies in the CEE and former CIS in the 1990s. A particular case in 
point is that of Bolivia, where the state imposed a requirement on the vendor of 
reticulated fresh water that the network supply be expanded. The sale did not go 
through (Hailu, Osorio & Tsukada 2009). The rules and regulations pertaining to sales 
of state enterprises and assets can undermine the regulation necessary to guide the 
consequences of privatisation into conformity with development goals. 
 
4.1.3 Examples of Vietnamese Institutions and Capacity 
There is empirical evidence for Vietnam on a few enabling institutions and 
capabilities. I will focus on the quality of three categories of rules and conditions 
suggested by Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005): market-based competition, managerial 
capacity, and corporate governance – transparency and protection of property rights.  
 
Market-based competition. According to CIEM (2015, pp. 16-53), although the legal 
framework ensures an equal platform for SOEs and private businesses, the former have 
still been favoured by informal government practices or by the nature of their industry, 
which helps them to maintain their dominant position in the market. These same issues 
can, however, be viewed as governing rules rather than ‘market distortions’. Hence, it 
is possible to think of devising new institutional arrangements rather than changing 
ownership. For example, if SOEs tend to ‘crowd out’ private firms in key industries 
(such as energy, telecommunications, chemicals, mineral exploration, and utilities 
provision) thanks to a range of favourable rules (market entry regulations, government-
sponsored loans and funds from both domestic and foreign sources, non-market pricing 
and favourable access to land and governmental projects) (CIEM 2015), the 
appropriate strategy may be to change the rules. Putting all one’s eggs into the basket 
of transferring ownership to the private sector may simply substitute a private 
monopoly for a public one. Private corporations are quite capable of capturing the 
regulatory framework and limiting the market entries of other firms, and of 
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concentrating control of factors of production to an extent that really does distort the 
market (Kay & Thompson 1986; Van De Walle 1989, p. 605).   
 
Managerial capacity. SOE managers are widely perceived to have low levels of 
qualifications and managerial capabilities in comparison with their counterparts in 
other sectors. According to Edwards and Phan (2013, p. 33), SOE managers show ‘less 
profit-maximisation, low efficiency, low responsiveness, and bureaucratic-political 
management style’ while the opposite is true of managers of domestic private 
enterprises (DPEs) and, especially, of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). In fact, if 
such a gap does exist, it may only reflect what King and Pitchford (1998, p. 317) claim 
about ‘the difference between the incentives that face private and public managers’. In 
this case, institutional improvement – that is, establishing ‘competitive managerial 
labour markets and institutionalised managerial training’ (Parker & Kirkpatrick, p. 
527) – is the solution. In practice, this means reducing the reliance of SOE managers 
on their networks of relationships and their influence over the regulatory regimes, and 
to enhance their engagement with employees, commitment to developing a firmly 
established corporate strategy, willingness to learn, and understanding of how to create 
a productive, creative and rewarding business environment (Edwards & Phan 2013, p. 
34).  
 
It is generally believed that private managers should be more business-oriented and 
more inclined to profitability maximisation than public ones. However, this difference 
may reflect little more than the fact that most SOEs are larger than private enterprises. 
Truong and Nguyen (2002), for example, argue that SOE managers are more 
bureaucratic than private managers mainly because of the relative scope of their 
corporations. According to these authors, all of the managers in three groups of 
enterprises (state, private and joint venture) are mostly characterised by a style that is 
bureaucratic, familial and conservative rather than entrepreneurial. In relation to other 
leadership qualities, such as avoidance of a paternalistic approach and delegation of 
power, the two domestic sectors are almost the same in displaying a style that is more 
authoritarian than participative. Joint ventures seem to have a more progressive 
managerial style than the two domestic sectors, and thus outperform them in respect of 
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employee satisfaction, financial strength and public good will85. Therefore, if the 
institutional environment is improved by competitive labour markets, professional 
training and merit-based managerial appointments, SOE managers are not intrinsically 
less capable than those in the private sector, though all these indigenous human 
resources need to develop advanced skills like those of their counterparts in the 
developed economies. Hence, while privatisation is often expected to improve 
management, it should not be taken for granted that this will happen in the absence of 
rules or plans designed to achieve that goal.  
 
Corporate governance. Transparency and protection of property rights are two of the 
greatest concerns in the Vietnamese business environment around privatisation. On the 
World Bank’s annual Ease of Doing Business Index, Vietnam’s overall ranking is 
often in the middle. However, its ranking on the sub-index of Protecting Minority 
Investors (PMI)86 is much lower than that of most countries. In Doing Business 2015, 
Vietnam’s overall ranking was 78th out of 189 countries, with a score of 64.62/100 and 
the PMI was 117/189, scored as 46.67/100. In 2016, the overall ranking was 90/189 
countries (62.1/100) and the PMI was 122/189 (45.0/100). Even when compared with 
other countries in the region, Vietnam’s performance on this indicator was poor; 
Indonesia, for instance, ranked 109 overall, but its PMI was 88 with a score of 
53.33/100 (2016). Only by the Doing Business 2017 report does Vietnam improve on 
its position on this index, when it was ranked 82/190 (63.83) overall and 87/190 
(53.33) for PMI thanks to a series of reforms that helped to secure minority 
shareholders’ rights and reinforce corporate transparency (World Bank 2016). This 
supports the analysis by Smith et al. (2014, p. 31) who found that, although Decision 
929/QD/TTg enacted obligations for information disclosure and transparency by SOEs 
and related agencies in 2012 as part of the SOE restructuring plan, implementation has 
in fact lagged; as a consequence, ‘the public information is […] at best outdated, 
ambiguous and contradictory’. A less transparent legal environment clearly favours 
                                                          
85 It should be noted that since 2002, when Truong and Nguyen (2002) was published, the private 
businesses have demonstrated impressive development; thus, an underestimation of the private 
managers may be less appropriate.  
86 The PMI index is calculated by averaging two groups of indicators: (i) extent of conflict of interest 
regulation index, which consists of the extent of disclosure, director liability, and ease of shareholder 
suits; (ii) extent of shareholder governance index, based on extent of shareholder rights, ownership 
and control, and corporate transparency (World Bank 2016). 
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those strategic groups who seek to appropriate rents in SOE privatisation, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. Such violation of property rights – which Dixit (2009) views 
as corruption – adds further weight to the argument that the institutional frameworks of 
developing countries cannot be presumed to be appropriate for either efficiency or the 
realisation of socially optimal outcomes from privatision. 
 
Just as the push for privatisation can be shown to be politically constructed, the 
neoliberal proposition that ownership is linked to efficiency is more mythical than real. 
The empirical results of research on privatisation across different economies have been 
mixed in relation to the superiority or otherwise of private ownership in improving 
efficiency. Yet, the popular appeal of neoliberalism, which itself reflects resentment of 
SOEs, ensures that the efficiency argument continues to be accepted. In Vietnam, this 
state of affairs could well lead to wholesale privatisations, in which privatisers may 
ignore governance issues, namely, the quality of institutions and capacities that would 
enable privatisers to achieve broad economic and social development objectives, not 
just value for financial shareholders.   
 
4.2 Shareholder Value versus Stakeholder Approaches 
Undoubtedly, there are difficulties involved in assessing the impact of privatisation on 
efficiency. Yet a narrow focus on efficiency in relation to financial performance and 
shareholder value obscures the wider impact of privatisation on economic and social 
development. Even if shareholder value were improved by privatisation, shareholders 
are not the only stakeholders in privatisation and any shareholder benefits do not 
necessarily ‘trickle-down’ to wider benefits. This represents a counter argument to the 
use of the shareholder value approach to regulating privatisation, which privileges only 
one stakeholder – the owner of equity shares.  
 
4.2.1 Inaccuracies of Financially-based Efficiency Assessment 
Let us look first at the assessment of the impact of privatisation on shareholder value 
and financially-based efficiency. In empirical research, one of the most frequently used 
methodologies is the ‘pre- versus post-privatisation’ comparison of financial (or 
‘economic’) performance at firm, industry or country levels (Megginson & Netter 
2001; Truong & Ngo 2016) over an average 3-year period, which seeks to determine 
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whether or not there is a causal relationship between policy change and performance 
improvement. Another approach is to compare the differences between actually 
privatised enterprises and their non-privatised counterfactuals or between privatised 
and yet-to-be privatised SOEs in the same industry during the same period (Parker & 
Kirkpatrick 2005). Finally, the popular method of comparing performance between the 
SOE and private sectors seeks to contrast the influences of different ownership regimes 
(Megginson & Netter 2001). There are, however, a number of methodological 
limitations with all these approaches, which reduce the ‘internal and external 
validities’ of the efficiency assessment (Kellstedt & Whitten 2013, pp. 69-90 passim).  
 
First, it is enormously difficult to distinguish privatisation policy from numerous 
confounding variables in explaining changes: privatisation and performance 
improvement may be associated rather than causally related (Kellstedt & Whitten 
2013, pp. 51-68 passim):  
 
Performance may change because of other economic events contemporaneous 
with privatisation, including more macroeconomic stability, fiscal prudence, 
freer capital movements, promotion of competition and regulatory changes …, 
[and] also by institutional and structural factors (Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005, p. 
516).  
 
Secondly, the endogeneity of explanatory variables can easily lead to selection bias, 
subverting the external validity of the conclusion. Based on its own strategic plan, the 
government may choose particular industries or SOEs (small or large, in bad or good 
shape) to privatise first. As a result, the selection of a sample of privatised firms for 
empirical analysis risks being arbitrary. Furthermore, the government normally has 
more incentive to sell public assets when it needs to improve budget conditions, fund 
new infrastructure projects, or pursue an economic restructuring agenda. Whether it is 
possible to sell these assets, however, depends on the public’s ability and incentives to 
buy and invest. Therefore, according to Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005, p. 516), there is 
often greater ‘propensity to privatise’ in periods when the economy and financial 
markets thrive – as was evident in Vietnam before the credit crunch. Putting it another 
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way, as much as privatisation is perceived to have a positive impact on economic 
performance, a reverse causal relationship is also possible. 
 
Thirdly, weighing up the two sectors against each other is equally problematic. As 
Megginson and Netter (2001, p. 332) put it, ‘it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine the appropriate set of comparison firms or benchmarks, especially in 
developing economies with limited private sectors’. This is certainly true. During the 
1990s, hardly any Vietnamese private enterprises were equal in scope and scale to 
large SOEs. Yet, in all respects the average growth rates of the private sector 
outperformed those of the SOE sector, which had shrunk due to the equitisation 
process itself. Of course, the SOEs had traditionally been geared towards more 
strategic economic and social objectives, reflecting the rationale for their 
establishment. These included: initiating industrial production and creating 
employment in localities that needed it; managing natural monopolies; acquiring and 
domesticating foreign technologies and creating technical links between existing 
upstream and downstream industries; ensuring that certain basic necessities are 
available to people everywhere at about the same price; providing low-cost utilities to 
the low-income population or cheap inputs for other strategic industries; and 
promoting network expansion to rural and remote regions. One can expect that the 
financial indicators of these firms would have shown better performance than those of 
the private sector, since these social functions could be shifted to another part of the 
public budget. There must be a sophisticated approach to the assessment of efficiency 
within the SOE sector (before and after privatisation) and in comparison, with the 
private. If such an approach was pursued in the Vietnamese discourse, the SOEs would 
be assessed more fairly and the ideological bias towards wholesale privatisation could 
be checked.  
 
Indeed, privatisation and privatised firms should be assessed on grounds of both 
economic benefits (which sort of firm produces the most from what is provided) and 
social welfare (who is able to consume better from the stock of what is produced). 
Thus, an improvement in the financial performance of a privatised utilities-provider 
that results from raising prices may not be in the interests of consumers; a decision not 
to expand the distribution network to rural and remote areas may save costs for the 
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privatised SOE but not help the state achieve its social policies; a privatised company 
may delay technical upgrades to produce goods at lowest cost but also pollute the 
environment; a privatised firm changing from innovation and manufacturing to trading 
or real estate may serve the corporate strategy but not the national industrial policy. In 
summary, the focus on efficiency assessed by financial indicators represents a narrow 
approach to the impact of privatisation, which should also be considered in relation to 
national economic and social development.  
 
4.2.2 Distractions Resulting from Financially-based Assessment 
There is yet another concern about the distracting effects of financially-based 
assessment of privatisation. A focus on the single benchmark of financial indicators is 
likely to overshadow other important aspects of privatisation policy, notably, the 
distributional effects among different groups and the design of the program itself. As 
the discussion in previous chapters has shown, the differences in privatisation reflect 
the way in which privatisation is pursued and this determines the extent to which there 
is improvement in both productive efficiency and distributional equality (or fairness). 
 
In practice, privatisation could result in large-scale negative distributional impacts 
which in turn undermine the political credibility of the privatisation process (Vickers 
& Yarrow 1991; Birdsall & Nellis 2005; Stiglitz 2008a). For example, according to 
Stiglitz (2008a), if privatisation creates illegitimate wealth for a few, initial support for 
privatisation may give way to a call for re-nationalisation, thus creating a risky 
environment in which investors would be preoccupied with rent-seeking rather than 
investing productively. Other potential problems include the following: (i) under-
pricing of the divested assets, which can have a negative impact on government 
revenue, leading to future tax burdens; (ii) the possible regulatory capture of private 
monopolists if competition and a legal framework have not been introduced before 
privatisation (Stiglitz 2008a); (iii) conflicts of interest and adverse distributional 
impacts between indigenous local people and foreign investors (Cramer 1999); (iv) 
recombinant ownership, which intensifies social inequality and disruption (Marangos 
2002); (v) the frequent reduction of employment after privatisation; (vi) the 
interlocking issues of price, service quality and access to infrastructure that directly 
determine the distributional outcomes of privatisation for low income groups (Cramer 
169 
 
1999; Birdsall & Nellis 2005; see also Van De Walle 1989, p. 606, who expressed 
concern that ‘privatisation may affect the poor if the goods and services provided by 
the privatised enterprises become less accessible to them’). It can be concluded that 
 
the distributional effects of privatisation cannot be easily predicted … [as they] 
depend on at least three factors: initial conditions, the sale event, and the post-
privatisation political and economic environment… Unless governments take 
specific actions, the gains from reform take longer to reach the real poor than 
the richer segments of the population. (Birdsall & Nellis 2005, pp. 10-23) 
 
Focusing too much on financially-based assessment also diverts attention from the 
importance of the design of the policy implementation itself. The efficiency argument 
often leads to the taken-for- granted assumption that privatisation, regardless of how it 
is organised, will generate efficiency improvement. As explained in the previous 
section, however, the rules and conditions applied before, during and after privatisation 
are major determinants of not only the improvement in productive efficiency of the 
privatised firms but also the spill-over effects to the economy (or externalities to 
affected groups) as a whole. Fear of a reverse in popular sentiment regarding 
privatisation often leads ideologically-driven privatisers to endorse a wholesale 
approach, without checking whether alternative reforms would be equally effective or 
if enabling conditions have already been established. According to Megginson and 
Netter (2001), it is necessary to 
 
examine the sequencing and staging of privatisation…. Until these policies are 
identified, and the interactions between various policy options are established, 
launching large-scale privatisation programs will remain a leap of faith. 
(Megginson & Netter 2001, p. 382)  
 
4.2.3 Stakeholder Approach 
Essentially, the neoliberal advocacy of ownership transfer and profit maximisation as 
the determinants of financially-based efficiency improvement is supported by the 
shareholder value philosophy. According to Friedman (1970), ‘there is one and only 
one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities 
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designed to increase its profits’. The SOEs, however, were not established for profit-
maximising and nor were privatisers tasked with profit-maximisation. Neoclassicists 
acknowledge the need for SOEs to address market failures. The notion of market 
failures emerges within neoclassical theory, where it refers to ‘externalities and public 
goods, monopoly, information asymmetry, and distributional inequity’ (Megginson et 
al. 2001, p. 329; Wolf 1979, pp. 108-111). Yet some neoclassicists concede that, for 
markets to operate efficiently in both economic and social terms, state intervention is 
necessary to minimise those market failures. As some have argued, this is what largely 
laid the theoretical foundation for the establishment of SOEs after WWII.  
 
Neoliberals are quick to claim that, if state ownership is not evidently an effective 
solution to market failures, then privatisation can provide the market solution to the 
problem. Neoliberals also argue that there is an impressive range of government 
failures (Wolf 1979, pp. 116-131). Such failures may occur in ‘the procedures of 
management, the practices of workers and features of the organisations which made 
sense when they were established but have subsequently become anachronisms’ 
(Butler 1989, p. 7) but which are all reparable. In other words, the solution to the 
problem of government failures may be to repair the machinery rather than throw it out 
and reduce the capacity which SOEs provide to the state. It is necessary to move away 
from a view of government involvement in the political economy as being primarily 
one of dealing with market failures while avoiding government failures towards the 
approach adopted by the developmental states to state regulation, including regulation 
of SOEs. This approach sees the public and private sectors as interdependent and the 
interdependence as governed. Moreover, there is an implicit path dependency of 
governing institutional arrangements (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robison 2005; Lavi-Faur 
2005).  
 
Scholars who adopt a statist perspective acknowledge that SOEs provide governments 
with capacity to direct the development of the social and economic structure. In other 
words, much more than financial efficiency and performance of enterprises is at stake 
in economic and social development. There are many more issues on which the latter 
is dependent – there are many more stakeholders than private equity owners. The 
efficaciousness of SOEs ought to be assessed in relation to those tasks which they are 
171 
 
expected to achieve (King & Pitchford 1998, pp. 314-315). Thus, the appropriate 
question is not how much profit the SOEs make, but how effectively they have assisted 
the state to direct the economy along a developmental path. According to Butler (1989, 
pp. 6-7), there can be a ‘very long list of common objectives of public enterprises other 
than the “commercial” objective of making profits’. For example, the SOEs may be 
mandated to: guarantee a stable supply to another industry, often at lower prices; be 
‘capable of keeping to a minimum the quasi-rent component of the price charged for 
[a] monopoly’s output’; or, more generally, to engage in price formation for the sake 
of broad development objectives. In summary, they may be mandated to achieve quite 
different outcomes than financial benefits for shareholders. As illustrated in Chapter 2, 
these rules did work in the developmental states. Therefore, the mainstream 
assumption that financial efficiency and performance of enterprises is the only goal of 
the government is inappropriate. On the contrary, especially in the case of SOEs, the 
interests of the society at large are a more relevant concern.  
 
Stakeholder theory in the field of business administration defines the stakeholder as 
‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organisation’s objectives’ (Freeman cited in Mitchell, Agle & Wood 1997, p. 854). 
According to the concept of social responsibility of business in stakeholder theory, 
firm managers can guarantee business sustainability and fulfil ‘corporate citizenship’, 
but only at firm level. In the administration of privatisation, the stakeholders are not 
only suppliers and customers of businesses, private financiers, near geographic 
neighbours, and the firm’s workers. They also include the broader constituent groups 
within society – the policy-makers and bureaucracies in charge of governing 
privatisations must be economically and socially responsible at the level of the national 
economy and society.  
 
A useful model in the present context is provided by Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), 
who developed the normative theory of stakeholder identification and the descriptive 
theory of stakeholder salience. According to this model, there are three classes of 
stakeholders: (i) those with controlling powers over the course of privatisation – 
bureaucracy, SOE managers, investors, elites-donors, and the informed public; (ii) the 
state in respect of its capacity to coordinate industrial policies – consistency in the 
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supply chain and provision of utilities, contribution of privatised firms to 
industrialisation, and national sovereignty; and (iii) businesses, recipients of revenues 
from sales, and socio-economic groups within society. It should be noted that all three 
groups of stakeholders and their respective stakes intersect and are accorded equal 
significance, but are differently prioritised in different specific contexts. Each group of 
stakeholders is concerned with particular objectives or benefits in a particular 
privatisation. For example, if the purpose is to strengthen the SOE’s profitability, the 
strategy should be to choose financially capable and experienced investors, giving 
them together a large enough share of ownership to renovate the management but with 
less focus on fiscal impacts and distributional equity. For SOEs in key utilities and 
infrastructure, by contrast, the priorities may be to introduce competition, harden 
budget constraints, and improve the current management with less ownership sold to 
outsiders and regulation to provide greater access and lower prices for other industries 
and consumers.  
 
These ideas are not new to the current privatisation agenda of the party-state in 
Vietnam which, however, has been unclear and has had less of a developmental-state 
orientation. This is partly due to the vague and undifferentiated hostility towards 
domestic SOEs that has been evident in popular discourse. While the domestic SOEs 
are often characterised in terms of waste, inertia and low accountability, their 
counterparts in many other countries are perceived as socially responsible. For 
example, when the Vietnamese government recently attempted to award the EVN 
(Electricity Vietnam business group) an honour for its contribution to the country’s 
development, there was strong public protest. There was resentment about EVN’s 
pricing, unprofitability and other ‘inefficiencies’, such as excessive director pay and 
the inclusion of villas and tennis courts in the account balance. Many of these 
resentments may be real, but many may be based on misinterpretations (e.g. the power 
tariff is indeed inexpensive if compared to international prices). More critically, public 
opinion has ignored the contribution of thousands of EVN’s workers who have built a 
nation-wide network that currently reaches 90% of the population8788. By discrediting 
                                                          
87 Among the most popular comments were: the suggestion  that ‘EVN often asks to raise the price’ 
(due to its low price level, it is unlikely to attract investment); criticism of the EVN’s pricing formula, 
which is designed to reduce power consumption;  the more power used, the higher the rate at which it 
is charged, a system that favours the poor over the rich but which contravenes  the market principle of 
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the achievements of the corporation as a whole, the public fails to pay due respect to 
the ordinary workers while the perks which EVN directors enjoyed as a result of the 
soft-budget constraints remain in place.  
 
In summary, the assessment of privatisation should be approached within a broader 
framework of stakeholder governance than that provided by a focus on financial 
efficiency and shareholder values as the only benchmark. A corollary of the 
stakeholder approach is that it can preserve the state’s capacity for industrialisation and 
achievement of economic and social development goals.  
 
4.3 The Developmental State’s Capacity for Industrialisation and 
Equality 
Broad economic and social development requires the state to coordinate enterprises for 
the development of an industrial structure, which relies for its competitiveness on 
‘dynamic efficiency’ as opposed to ‘static (allocative) efficiency’. This is because the 
market is unable to coordinate investments, especially in non-traditional activities, 
which are the key factor in sustaining economic growth (Rodrik 2005, p. 999). Coping 
with a slow-down in growth since the financial turmoil, Vietnam has clearly perceived 
the threat of a ‘middle-income trap’ (Ohno 2009) in the movement between the two 
phases of development – igniting growth and sustaining growth (Rodrik 2005). Instead 
of designing institutional arrangements to address the coordination problem, however, 
the current restructuring agenda in Vietnam continues to focus on mitigating 
‘government failures’ – in other words, on further entrenching neoliberalism 
(Gainsborough 2010). It can be argued that the long history of the developmental states 
as a showcase for successful industrial policies and sustained growth has demonstrated 
the necessity of securing the state’s capacity both during and after privatisation in the 
pursuit of industrialisation and equality.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
cheaper cost for higher volume of purchased products; and the proposal that, if similar contributions 
to those of the EVN are taken into account, other industries, such as the rice-exporters, should also get 
an award (see Hoang Thuy 2015, ‘Bo Cong thuong ly giai de nghi phong anh hung lao dong cho EVN 
[Ministry of Industry and Trade explains the proposal of labour hero award for EVN]’, 29 October, 
viewed 14 February 2017, http://www.vnexpress.net).     
88 It should be stressed that the significant 500KV North-South line was built during the 1990s, when no 
private capacity for contracting-out had been developed. This means that the EVN’s work was 
indispensable.  
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In this discussion, state capacity refers to the entrepreneurial, coordinating and 
guidance capabilities of the state. In particular, it involves the ‘institutional/political 
arrangements for public- and private-sector interactions’ (Wade 2003, p. xvii) that 
‘induce socially desirable behavior on the part of economic agents’ (Rodrik 2005, p. 
1005) in pursuit of industrial policies, and the bargaining power that the state should 
retain for itself to secure its interests and influential edge over other parties. With this 
bargaining power, the state can mediate conflicts of interest among stakeholders 
(Butler 2015). Mazzucato has written of the state’s role in enabling a ‘smart, inclusive 
and sustainable growth’ (Mazzucato 2013, p. 331). She goes on to suggest that the 
experience of leading innovative economies has shown  
 
…the State acting as a force for innovation and change, not only ‘de-risking’ 
risk-averse private actors, but also boldly leading the way, with a clear and 
courageous vision […] State investments catalyse, influence and connect to the 
growth of business organisations on which we rely, ultimately, to deliver new 
technologies on a broad scale (Mazzucato 2013 pp. 48,332). 
 
As state capacity is affected by privatisation in various ways, this is of significant 
concern, even for developed countries, not least because of its impact on the effective 
capacity of the bureaucracy to make policies (Hodge 2002; Tingle 2015).  
 
4.3.1 Challenge of Sustaining Growth 
In Vietnam, the state has assumed legitimate responsibility for the country’s political, 
economic and social domains. By implication, it must secure its capacity to sustain the 
country’s development in periods of economic slowdown, such as the present. State 
capacity is blunted, however, when state interventionism is accused of causing 
inefficient allocation of economic resources and the economic governance model of 
the developmental state is displaced in favour of neoliberalism. Yet Vietnam’s GDP 
growth rate has seriously decelerated since the financial turmoil in 2008. Between 
1991 and 2008, the annual GDP growth rate was 7.6% on average (Ohno 2009, p. 25) 
but from 2008 to 2016 it averaged only roughly 6.0% (see Appendix 1). The recent 
record is such that the Vietnamese party-state should be seriously concerned about the 
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resilience of the local economy and about whether its own policies and performance 
are part of the problem. It is worth noting that, before the GFC, the economy was 
already on the brink of a credit crunch, faced with record inflation and trade deficits 
(Pincus & Vu 2008). In contrast to the short period of two years (1998-99) it took for 
the economy’s growth to recover after the Asian financial crisis, the later slowdown 
has continued since 2008 to the present.  
 
‘Vietnam is thus seemingly at a critical juncture. Decisions at this stage matter for 
meeting long-term income aspirations’ (WB-MPI 2016, p. 18). The report Vietnam 
2035, jointly prepared by the World Bank (WB) and Ministry of Planning and 
Investment of Vietnam (MPI), describes four scenarios of different growth rates in per 
capita GDP (in PPP), ranging from 4% to 7% per year. An average annual growth rate 
of 7% would be seen as evidence of a successful implementation of the ‘catch-up’ 
strategy, similar to China’s, that would make Vietnamese income by 2035 equal to that 
of South Korea in 2002. By contrast, a 4% growth rate would make Vietnam’s income 
equal to that of Thailand at present (i.e. US$12,000, half of what a 7% growth rate 
would produce) and it would likely be lagging behind other countries (WB-MPI 2016, 
pp. 15-18). 
 
The above-mentioned ‘juncture’ was described by Ohno (2009, p. 26) as a ‘middle-
income trap’89:     
 
[So far] growth has been supported by new trade opportunities as well as large 
inflows of foreign funds. Industrial activities – especially manufactured exports 
– continue to be dominated by foreign firms, and value creation by local firms 
and workers has been limited […]; productivity breakthrough is needed to 
climb further. Future growth must be fueled by skill and technology rather than 
a mere injection of purchasing power. 
 
Ohno’s prescription requires the exercise of state capacities. Largely consistent with it, 
but more market-orientated, is Rodrik’s (2005) claim that developing countries must 
                                                          
89 Despite not being the first author to coin the term, his analysis of Vietnam initiated a widespread 
debate in the literature on developing countries’ catch-up strategies. The concept is distinguished from 
the previously used terms ‘low-level equilibrium’ or ‘poverty trap’ (Felipe 2012, p. 2). 
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adopt different developmental strategies in two stages of growth, with the latter stage 
(progressing through the ‘middle-income trap’) being more challenging. Accordingly, 
igniting growth requires governmental efforts to improve the ‘low-equilibrium 
investment climate’ by removing failed institutions (such as those that create 
unnecessary delays, uncertainty and risk) to ‘unleash a flurry of new investments and 
entrepreneurship’; this would be accompanied by the ‘crowding-in’ effects of an array 
of governmental incentives and the use of the depreciation of the real exchange rate to 
stimulate ‘tradable activities’ (pp. 998-1002). At the same time, Rodrik (2005) 
continues, achieving long-term growth demands the comprehensive adoption of 
advanced ‘market–sustaining institutions’ to preserve the ‘productive dynamism and 
resilience’ of the economy (pp. 973, 1005-1006). In fact, the first two decades of 
Vietnam’s economic reform has seen the pursuit of policies to spur domestic 
entrepreneurship and attract foreign investment as much as possible, but without 
linkages between the two90. 
 
Yet, the concept of a middle-income trap is debatable. Perhaps it is more accurate to 
suggest that it is easier for a nation to achieve economic growth from a low base in 
stage 1 than continuing growth from a higher base in stage 2. While lower-income 
countries’ traditional advantages of cheap labour have been undermined by other 
emerging economies (Beeson 2004; Burke et. al. 2014), the complex challenges facing 
their entry into the more profitable segments of the global value chain – that is, to 
create an ‘internally articulated economy’ (Wade 2003, p. xlviii) and to upgrade 
‘internal strength’ or ‘industrial human capital’ (Ohno 2009, pp. 25, 27-28) – confront 
all developing economies, not just Vietnam. So, the issue is less about being trapped 
than about how to sustain the pace of economic growth. According to Felipe (2012a), a 
lower middle-income economy (US$2,000-7,250 GDP per capita in 1990 PPP) needs 
to grow at 4.7% per annum to achieve an upper middle-income ranking (US$7,250-
11,750), which takes 28 years. To reach the next threshold of US$11,750, it should 
                                                          
90 The story of how local producers can only supply low value products, such as packages for Samsung, 
attracted considerable public attention. By 2016, there were 190 local suppliers for Samsung in 
Vietnam, triple the number from the previous year, but only 3 firms were integrated into the 
electronics value chain, and then only as secondary suppliers. Most of the other local partners at 
primary and secondary levels provided packaging and low value items. (See: Nguyen Hoai 2016, 
‘SamSung tiep tuc tim nha cung cap oc vit, sac pin tai Vietnam [SamSung continues searching for 
suppliers of screws and chargers in Vietnam]’, 21 June, viewed 24 February 2017, 
http://www.vnexpress.net).   
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grow at least by 3.5% per annum in 14 years. In the case of Vietnam, an average 
annual growth rate of 4.3% would move the country out of lower middle-income status 
by 2030 (p. 24). Additionally, if the ‘flying geese’ pattern of industrial development is 
adopted, the shifting of resource-based and labour-intensive industries to less 
developed countries should be seen as an encouraging transformation of local 
manufacturing’s ability to export further-refined products and capital goods (Akamatsu 
1962). Thus, whether or not the middle-income trap is real, the challenge of sustaining 
growth is evident. 
 
4.3.2 Challenge of Innovation  
Growth is dependent on the ability of domestic businesses to enhance productivity and 
participate in innovative activities, which raises the issue of dynamic efficiency versus 
static efficiency. Both Ohno (2009) and WB-MPI (2016) prioritise the improvement of 
productivity as the key to growth sustainability. Comparing the present period with the 
period before the mid-1990s, it is clear that the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) 
rose and the contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) to growth declined over 
recent years, indicating an ‘investment-driven growth with low efficiency in capital 
use’ (Ohno 2009, p. 26). Expressing a similar view, but blaming the SOEs for the 
inefficiency, WB-MPI (2016) claimed that ‘[l]abour productivity actually declined in 
mining, public utilities, construction, and finance – all sectors in which SOEs have 
kept their dominant role’ (p. 19). Furthermore, according to the report, ‘the imperative 
to improve productivity growth is therefore clear and strong [especially] in the next 
phase of development [when] each of these compensatory factors91 is projected to have 
a sharply diminished impact (WB-MPI 2016, p. 21). Nevertheless, the policy-solution 
package suggested by WB-MPI (2016) does not vary from its traditional Washington 
Consensus agenda which, according to Ohno (2009), ‘may achieve middle income if 
[the policies] are properly executed, but that is […] insufficient to improve skill and 
technology’ to cater for the next stage of “catch-up industrialisation”’ (pp. 26, 28, 29). 
 
Ohno (2009) proposes the following: (i) within the narrowed ‘policy space’, it is still 
possible to support ‘industries and industrial human resources [in a manner which] 
                                                          
91 These factors include the rapid labour-force growth, structural transformations, and acceleration of 
capital accumulation, which have offset the low and declining productivity growth due to inefficiency, 
often assigned with the public sector (WB-MPI 2016). 
178 
 
does not violate WTO rules’ (pp. 29-30); (ii) firms should be ‘coordinated and 
assisted’ to ‘expand along the value chain to encompass higher value-added activities 
and uplift the whole value chain by raising productivity’ (pp. 30,32); (iii) first of all it 
is necessary ‘to acquire capability to embrace an appropriate industrial vision and 
implement effective measures towards it’, i.e. build state capacity and enforcement 
capabilities with ‘concrete strategies’ to achieve ‘internal value creation’ (pp. 29,31); 
(iv) it is equally important for the state to enrich its ‘experience and confidence … to 
encounter problems and challenges over time … [by allowing] trials and errors and 
learning by doing’ (p. 32). As can be seen, these are all characteristics of the 
developmental states.  
 
As suggested at the beginning of this section, it is necessary to go beyond a focus on 
productivity improvement and static efficiency: it is less important ‘to do things better’ 
than ‘to do new better things’. According to Klein (cited in Ghemawat & Costa 1993, 
p. 60), static efficiency reflects ‘the optimal combination of given inputs subject to the 
constraints imposed by a fixed production function’, whereas dynamic efficiency 
involves enlarging that production function by promoting ‘the ability to make good use 
of newly disclosed opportunities, be these opportunities for improving the production 
process or developing and producing new products’. Romer (1990) specifically assigns 
the role of major driver of growth to research and development (R&D), while 
Jorgenson and Vu (2005) attribute the development of the world economy since 1995 
to investment in IT equipment and software.  
 
In relation to ‘catching-up’ for developing countries, Felipe (2012b) affirms the 
significance of dynamic efficiency via a comparison of the range of new exported 
products from various economies over the different stages of their growth. The key to 
development is to possess the productive capabilities to export as many sophisticated 
and well-connected products as possible. For example, the Republic of Korea’s 
economy performed best when its export basket was most diversified and contained 
new ‘core products’ of knowledge-intensity rather than capital- and labour-intensity (p. 
16).  
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Given these findings, Vietnam’s challenge is to acquire productive capabilities similar 
to those of economies that have achieved sustained rapid growth, in contrast with its 
laggardly counterparts in Southeast Asia. These countries have either confined their 
pursuit of competitive advantage to labour-intensive products, as in The Philippines, or 
have sought to engage in sophisticated industries like electronics but with weak 
linkages to established indigenous industries, as has been the case with Malaysia 
(Felipe 2012b).  
 
By 2016, foreign direct invested (FDI) firms accounted for 71.6% of Vietnam’s 
exports – a figure that had risen rapidly from 54.2% in 2010 – while the share of 
domestic firms declined from 45.8% to 28.4% during the same period (see Appendix 
2A). The participation of the domestic sector in foreign trade activities overall has 
shrunk as the FDI firms also dominate imports. Appendix 2B compares the baskets of 
major exports and imports in 2010 and 2016. Though the data are less detailed and not 
equivalent to those in Felipe (2012b), they can suggest the structural development of 
the exporting activities of Vietnamese firms. There was a noticeable increase in the 
share of technologically sophisticated products during 2010-2016, which accords with 
a laudable propensity to expand exports from labour-intensive and resource-based 
products to capital-intensive ones92. On the other hand, the increased presence of 
manufacturing products among the leading exports has entailed equivalent amounts of 
imports of their components and parts; this suggests the possibility that there may only 
have been a growth in assembling activities, without greater value-adding than in 
labour-intensive production. The pace of diversification in exported products, which 
was rapid before 2010, seems to have slowed down during 2010-201693 as the shifts in 
ranking have occurred within the same group of exports without new additions. Hence, 
the structural transformation of Vietnamese exports towards more sophisticated 
products may have been associated with the surge of particular investments by FDI 
firms in these fields rather than growth of indigenous industrial capacity or of the 
                                                          
92 Labour-intensive and resource-based products (among 18 leading exports) accounted for 55.2% in 
2010, but only 37.5% of total exports in 2016; meanwhile the shares of technology-based and capital 
goods increased from 16% to 42.4% of total exports during the same period. (Source: GSO)  
93 Although the top 4 exporting products remained unchanged during 2001-2010, their proportion 
reduced from 57% to 36% of total exports, meaning that new exported products had been added. By 
2016, there have only been shifts among the rankings of the above exports but no new groups of 
products have been added. (Source: GSO) 
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connections between foreign invested and local enterprises. For example, since 2013 
Samsung has relocated the manufacturing of display and smartphones – its flagship 
products – from China, where the cost of labour has risen, to Vietnam, where the 
company enjoys favourable tax policies and cheap labour. Thanks to its intensive 
investment strategy, the company’s export value quickly achieved a record of US$39.9 
billion in 2016, accounting for 22.7% of Vietnam’s total exports. Yet, only 20 local 
suppliers have joined the value chain as primary suppliers (admittedly an increase from 
four primary suppliers and only three secondary suppliers of technological inputs in 
the previous year)94. Although this is a rapid rise and promises a wider structural 
transformation, at present most of these local vendors can only supply packaging, 
printing and mechanical inputs.  
 
In summary, the challenge for Vietnam is to build and coordinate innovative 
capabilities. Initially, this may involve the domestic industries absorbing spill-over 
effects created by the FDI firms. In the long term, however, local firms have also to 
realise new opportunities to enhance their competitive edge in the global economy. 
This is the sort of national economic development in which privatised SOEs may play 
a part, or at least where the active coordinating role of the state is required.     
 
4.3.3 Developmental State Capacity 
In order to enhance both static efficiency and – more importantly – dynamic 
efficiency, there needs to be ‘investment intensity’ in non-traditionally knowledge-
based industries and this in turn requires the backing of the state (Ghemawat & Costa 
1993). Yet Vietnam seems to be responding with a policy agenda that is increasingly 
shaped by neoliberalism. As mentioned earlier, the abuse of public ownership and the 
underperformance of some SOEs and public investment projects have intensified 
public resentment against the economic role of the state, fortifying the popular support 
for neoliberalism, which in turn influences the policy agenda of the state. For example, 
most of the press reports on recent inflows of imported cars from Southeast Asian 
countries to Vietnam blamed the state and its customs and tax policies that limited 
                                                          
94 Besides low connectedness, in practice, these assembling processes are rather labour-intensive. For 
example, Samsung Electronics in Vietnam employs 140,000 local workers. (See: Linh Anh 2017, ‘Bat 
chap su co Note 7, Samsung van dat doanh thu 46.3 ty USD [Despite the Note 7 saga, Samsung still 
achieves US$46.3 billion of revenues]’, 6 January, viewed 1 March 2017, http://www.cafef.vn). 
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expenditure on vehicles for fear of traffic jams in cities (thus reducing the market size) 
for the failure to develop the domestic car industry95. While the criticism is pertinent, 
Vietnam has actually developed two car and truck manufacturing clusters. One went 
bankrupt because it produced its own sedan in the absence of necessary assistance 
from the state. The other was successful using a model of public-private coordination 
of industry policy at the provincial level and because of its CEO’s clearly envisaged 
strategy of gradually enhancing the local content of the product rather than 
domesticating the whole value chain96.  
 
Innovative capabilities97 are listed among the key breakthroughs proposed by the WB-
MPI in Vietnam 2035, alongside the building of institutions for a ‘fully established 
market economy’ and economic modernisation with the private sector ‘firmly in the 
lead’ (p. 16). Nevertheless, aside from recommended strategies for ‘environmental 
sustainability’ and ‘equity and social inclusion’, the solutions proposed for problems in 
the economic and political domains reflect a modified version of neoliberalism. They 
recommend the same strategies for successful privatisation and public sector reform 
that the Bank has been proposing since the 1990s – a ‘market friendly intervention and 
good governance’ (Kiely 1998, pp. 686-688) and ‘politically desirable, politically 
feasible and credible’ foundations (Bayliss & Fine 1998, p. 844).  
 
After the 12th VCP Congress in 2016, the new government in Vietnam introduced the 
concept of nha nuoc kien tao, which loosely translates as ‘creative/enabling or 
developmental state’98. This, however, is unlikely to signal a move towards the East 
                                                          
95 The mocking sentiment is often expressed that Vietnam will be importing cars from countries like 
Laos and Cambodia (See: Ngoc Tuyen 2017, ‘Vietnam nhap hon 1,800 oto con tu Indonesia trong 1 
thang [Vietnam imports more than 1,800 cars from Indonesia within a month]’, 14 February, viewed 3 
March 2017, http://www.vnexpress.vn).    
96 Thaco Truong Hai’s chairman stated: ‘if each car product is sold with enhanced local content (over 
40%) it is a success’. The ratios of local content are currently 18% (cars), 40% (trucks), and 60% (buses). 
(See: Duc Tho & Bach Duong 2016, ‘Chu tich Thaco Truong Hai: chua bao gio toi nghi se lam oto con 
thuong hieu Viet [Chairman of Thaco Truong Hai: I have never thought to produce Vietnamese branded 
cars]’, 19 November, viewed 3 March 2017, http://www.vneconomy.vn).  
97 Chapter 3 of the WB-MPI report advocates developmental states in East Asia as role models for 
Vietnam, with suggestions of four foundations of an innovation-led economy to stimulate firms’ 
learning, including competitive pressures, human capital, R&D, and improving labour force skills, all of 
which emphasise the necessity of an enhanced state capacity (pp. 170-71). Yet these details are less 
evident in the executive summary of the report, which is often more accessible to the policy-makers. 
98 The meaning attached to nha nuoc kien tao still provides loosely defined space for the 
interpretation. (See: Nguyen Vu 2017, ‘Chinh phu kien tao, khi nha nuoc nhu mot doanh nghiep 
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Asian developmental state and, thus, tip the balance in the vacillation between 
developmental state and neoliberalism. In Vietnam, there have been few inquiries into 
the nature of existing market economies99, even though the ‘socialist-oriented market 
economy’ is often characterised as a contradictory model by the public at large. On the 
one hand, the new government wants to actively promote economic growth because 
the performance of the economy is pivotal to political legitimacy; on the other hand, it 
is constrained by neoliberalist warnings not to harm the business environment and 
macroeconomic stability by ‘meddling’, as it is said to have done during the credit 
crunch. A genuine trial of a new version of the developmental state might have been 
thwarted by the failure of the Vietnamese party-state to pursue the model of 
developmental states in the region due to inadequate state capacity, disorganised 
commercial nationalism and the activities of interest groups. The consequences have 
included macroeconomic instabilities, involving public debts, and a slowdown in the 
growth rate from 2008 up to the present. Instead, the preferred interpretation of nha 
nuoc kien tao is a state that merely creates market institutions and secures favourable 
conditions to enable the private sector to thrive as a major player and driver of new 
growth – including the encouragement of ‘start-ups’, facilitation of privatisation, 
endorsement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and deregulation. While all of 
these conditions – closely associated with the above-mentioned neoliberal agenda – in 
fact constitute the ‘more invasive form of neoliberalism’ that Gainsborough (2010) 
associated with the post-Washington Consensus (pp. 477-478), it is unlikely that the 
vacillation will be addressed. 
 
It is important to continue to correct or at least mitigate the government’s failure to 
develop institutions to support entrepreneurship and private investment (Rodrik 2005), 
yet not necessarily at the expense of state capacity. While belief in the superiority of 
private ownership tends to lead to support for a minimal state and a flourishing market, 
the developmental states’ technocracies have proved that a strong state and a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
[Enabling government, when the state is entrepreneurial]’, 13 January, viewed 6 March 2017, 
http://www.vneconomy.vn).    
99 Domestically, Hong and Thien (2014) present a rare, rigorous account acknowledging the theoretical 
foundations of the market economy which, the authors argue, is ‘not perfect’ but is ‘most suitable for 
the period when humankind is basically self-interested’. Accordingly, given the bounded rationality 
that can lead the market to work inefficiently, the market is still ‘self-regulated’; thus ‘the state should 
only play a neutral arbitration role to guarantee market competition, property rights, and social 
security and welfare’ (pp. 31,33,34).  
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flourishing market can co-exist. This is the message of the ideas behind ‘governed 
interdependence’ (Weiss 1995) and ‘coordinated market economies’ with various 
forms of effective regulation by the state, the private sector and global institutions 
(Braithwaite 2008, pp. 26-27). Indeed, the developmental state is ‘rule-based’ – that is, 
based on rules of some sort – and the distinction sometimes attempted by neoliberals is 
questionable at least. Market rules can be nurtured in a manner consistent with 
‘developmentalism’, as demonstrated by Levi-Faur (2013) in the East Asian nations, 
along with and by means of state regulation (formal institutions). Accordingly, as 
neither state nor market can be presumed superior in promoting (or deterring) 
development (Dutt, Kim & Singh 1994), ‘the central question for growth becomes, 
“What kind of institutional arrangements will best enable societies to generate new 
skills, knowledge and ideas and the networks needed to diffuse and take advantage of 
them?”’ (Evans 2008, p. 4).  
 
The respectable achievements of the ‘catch-up’ strategies adopted by the Northeast 
Asian developmental states show that ‘[d]evelopment was achieved by management of 
the market, industrial strategies, public investment, and export strategies reflecting 
state-business co-operation’ (Natsuda & Butler 2005, p. 332). Contrary to orthodox 
beliefs, the retreat of the state and ‘getting the basics right’ were not effective in 
sustaining growth and creating innovation (Amsden 1994; Rodrik 2005; Ohno 2009; 
Mazzucato 2013). Industrialisation was not automatically generated by the market and 
business alone, but as a result of state-crafted ‘deliberate policy’ and ‘national effort’ 
(Felipe 2012b). In practice, the role of the state in trade protection, export-reward 
schemes, pioneering R&D and financial sponsorship of industrial espionage has been 
evident throughout the history of advanced economies (Chang 2003). To promote 
entrepreneurship (Mazzucato 2013), the state needs the greatest capacity (Beeson 
2004).  
 
Yet, the developmental state model is not without its vulnerabilities. First, the state 
should not be captured by interest groups (Mazzucato 2013). While incentives are 
needed to improve the public service, their disposition should be monitored (Beeson 
2004).  
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Second, despite the fact that many developmental states have successfully utilised 
state-owned or state-linked businesses (Amsden 1994; Rodrik 2005), it does not follow 
that equitisation should be opposed. In Vietnam, this would be to repudiate the popular 
resentment of SOEs and would undermine the cooperation needed for widespread 
acceptance of a decisive developmental state. The challenges are to coordinate the 
privatised SOEs and other private firms in a ‘governed interdependence’ framework 
(Weiss 1995) and to harness them within an overall industrial strategy as a ‘national 
project’ (Evans 2008). This may mean that the state reserves powers for itself on the 
boards of directors of equitised or privatised enterprises. There are two further 
elements to this harnessing of SOE’s that are worthy of mention at this point: private 
investment should be encouraged out of ‘non-traditional activities below the social 
return’ into activities characterised by ‘scale economies and inter-linkages’100 (Rodrik 
2005, p. 981); and monitoring can only be effective if the “reciprocal principle” 
(industrial performance in exchange for state assistance) is secured in the state-
business alliance (Amsden 1994, p. 632).  
 
Third, while a high degree of vigilance is appropriate in dealing with SOEs, enough 
leeway must be provided for ‘trial and error’, as occurred in the development of 
Hyundai’s car engine with ‘2,888 design changes and ninety-seven tests … during 
fourteen months’ (Kim cited in Felipe 2012b, p. 16).  
 
Fourth, though rent-seeking behaviour may be exploited to encourage industrial 
achievements (Wade 2003), it should not be allowed to create a society of greed. 
Equality and the institutions that support it should not be traded off too easily for 
growth (Stiglitz 2014). Since ‘the expansion of human capabilities is both the key 
means and central goal of development’, the state’s capacities must be used to expand 
general social wellbeing and to distribute the gains from industrialisation widely for 
the benefit of otherwise under-rewarded sectors and underprivileged groups (Evans 
2008, p. 12), who in turn would help to sustain economic growth (Rodrik 2005).  
 
                                                          
100 Lacking an industrial policy, Vietnam is threatened with premature deindustrialisation (Felipe 
2012b) if private investment is attracted into the service sector. (See: Bach Duong 2016, ‘Ty phu bat 
dong san chiem mot nua top nguoi giau chung khoan 2016 [Billionaires in real-estate account for half 
of the top richest people on the stock exchange in 2016]’, 30 December, viewed 8 March 2017, 
http://www.vneconomy.vn).    
185 
 
These considerations about the role of the state, industrial policy and equality need to 
be carefully integrated into the privatisation strategy.  
 
4.4 Governance of Privatisation 
At a seminar in Hanoi, Stiglitz noted that: 
…liberalisation, privatisation and so on […] are just means to an end. The real 
objectives, in my view, are raising the living standards and social welfare of the 
Vietnamese people (Stiglitz cited in Evans & Bui 2005, p. 237).     
 
As suggested above, privatisation as a means of SOE reform should be regulated 
within an overall strategy for meeting economic and social development objectives. 
Clearly, it is necessary to avoid the experience of ideology-led privatisation in the 
transition economies of the CEE and former CIS, which so often benefited a new 
nomenklatura, while lessons should be learned from the rule-based, state-led 
privatisations of developmental states in East Asia. Overall, the gradual and partial 
approach is more effective than the wholesale approach. Accordingly, the governance 
of privatisation should be constructed on a case-by-case basis, but in accordance with 
common principles designed to ensure that privatisation not only contributes to 
improved productive efficiency but also promotes social and economic development. 
The three most important common principles are: the governance of privatisation must 
regulate conflicts between empowered players; it also has to consider the economic 
sustainability of privatisation in relation to fiscal impacts, business viability and 
distributional equity; and the state must have the capacity to coordinate privatised 
SOEs within a developmental state agenda.  This last principle is the central argument 
of this thesis.    
 
4.4.1 Rule-based, State-led and Gradualist Approach 
Worldwide historical experience shows that carefully designed and timely privatisation 
programs, with various institutional supports, are more effective than the strategy of 
selling as many state assets as quickly as possible. The latter strategy reflects the view 
that ‘even a flawed privatisation – and the more rushed the privatisation, the more 
likely was it that it would be flawed – [is] better than a postponed privatisation’ 
(Stiglitz 2008b, p. 45). A gradualist approach would allow the sale to be carefully 
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planned, accommodate trial and error, and conciliate conflicts of interests between 
stakeholders. In any case, gradualism is warranted when privatisation is to be partial, 
not only because state ownership may have to be maintained in industries of strategic 
significance in terms of national sovereignty, industrial policy or distributional effects, 
but also because of the superior performance of firms of mixed ownership (Gupta 
2005). This last is often the result of combining the supervision of market mechanisms 
and the reduction of transaction costs via linkages to the state. Most importantly, a 
gradualist approach is needed for development of various enabling institutions which 
are crucial for effective privatisation. 
 
4.4.2 Enabling Institutions 
Privatisation cannot achieve productive efficiency and other objectives without the 
development of three sorts of institutions: market institutions; non-state institutions; 
and state regulatory institutions.  
 
The vast array of market institutions ranges from ‘first-order economic principles’ 
such as protection of property rights, market-based competition, and contract 
enforcement (Rodrik 2005, p. 973) to formal institutions such as credit and financial 
markets, labour markets and intermediary institutions. Property rights are often 
underlined as the most important institution to nurture appropriate incentives for 
business and innovative activities (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robison 2005; Dixit 2009).  
 
In contemporary Vietnam, there is a popular call for the establishment of private 
property rights to land in order to stimulate growth. Although land notionally belongs 
to the nation or population as a whole, it is de facto privately owned. The only 
differences between the current land-use rights system and private ownership of land 
are that owners have to pay annual land-use tariffs and there is a time-limit (which is 
extendable) on land-use rights on production sites. Land-use rights can be mortgaged 
or used as collateral. While this system is beneficial for industrial purposes, current 
land-use rights under this system are secure and tradable and therefore do not affect 
privatisation. What should be of greater concern is the violation of property rights that 
occurs both in the public service (i.e. corruption or nepotism) and private ownership 
(i.e. abuse of corporate assets at the expense of minority shareholders’ interests). Thus, 
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securing property rights through anti-corruption legislation and procedures and 
preventing abuses in the public and private sectors is the only way to achieve ‘sound 
money’ and equity in both the distribution of business opportunities and income 
equality without requiring a trade-off between the two (Rodrik 2005).  
 
The introduction of market-based competition is another central condition for the 
success of privatisation (Vickers & Yarrow 1991; Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005). This 
depends not only on whether there is cooperation or collusion between the firms in a 
market but also on the scope and scale of private sector development (and, hence, the 
likelihood of competition for market entry, among other things), as well as state 
regulations addressing competition. Currently, Vietnamese courts do not reliably 
enforce contracts, so enforcement depends on the general practice of the rule of law 
and social conventions. Capital markets need to be mature (for equities to be tradable), 
well-capitalised and subject to transparency and to prudential and supervisory 
regulations. Labour markets must be competitive (workers compete on the basis of 
merit), extensive and diverse and there must be provision for on-the-job training 
(learning by doing), so that skilled and experienced workers and managers are 
available, able to enhance their skills and replaceable if they move on. No less 
important to privatisation are professional service firms in areas such as auditing, 
managerial and legal consulting, insurance and communications, as they help to 
evaluate assets, minimise transaction costs, and manage risks on behalf of investors. 
Sufficiently large numbers of such firms are necessary to ensure competition among 
them. 
 
Non-state institutions are formal and informal rules and conditions created by players 
other than the state. While the development of a solid basis of capital and labour 
markets and managerial capacities is necessary for successful privatisation, so too is 
the building of non-state institutions, which comprise the conventional codes of 
business conduct, especially in relation to ethics, transparency and protection of 
minority investors. The growth of self-regulation involving adherence to non-state 
formal and informal institutions must complement the state’s formal institutions 
(Braithwaite 2008). Business, professional and consumer protection associations, as 
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well as trade unions, are indispensable both to regulate their members’ behaviour and 
to reconcile the interests of stakeholders.  
 
State regulatory institutions need to be enhanced at the same time as state ownership 
declines and the role of the state is transformed to ‘steering rather than rowing’ (Lavi-
Faur 2005). As Vickers and Yarrow (1991) suggest, ‘what matters is how the 
combination of ownership and regulation under private ownership compares to 
ownership and (implicitly or explicitly) regulation in the public sector’ (p. 116). In 
other words, privatisation involves shifting ‘a public firm with imperfect corporate 
incentives’ to ‘a private firm with imperfect regulation [to protect public interests]’ 
(King & Pitchford 1998, p. 324). The regulatory agencies that are established should 
work independently of enterprises and even of ministries, since their role is to protect 
public interests (the interests of enterprises in general and of consumers) and not the 
sectional interests of either privatised businesses or the bureaucracy. As long as the 
regulatory system is smart and transparent, additional regulation is not antithetical to 
the administrative simplification efforts that have been widely undertaken in Vietnam 
to improve the investment climate. Hard-budget constraints and transparency should 
be priorities throughout the SOE reform and privatisation process. It is only by 
regulation, financial discipline and transparency that public interests can be secured. 
 
In summay, privatisation should be matched with the implementation of an overall 
program to reform the institutional environment. Transition economies in the CEE and 
former CIS rushed to undertake privatisation without preparing enabling rules and 
conditions. Since the financial markets and domestic private investment only existed in 
embryonic form, mass privatisation and free distribution of vouchers to the population 
only resulted in the accumulation of illegitimate wealth among a small number of 
privateers and foreign investors. Due to limited state regulatory capacity, national 
industrial production was not coordinated and consumer interests were unprotected. 
Similar outcomes were observed in privatisations in developing countries in Latin 
America, South Asia and sub-Sahara Africa. In contrast, privatisation in the East Asian 
developmental states and other advanced economies has largely been effective because 
the foundational institutions were already well developed and the privatisation process 
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was carefully planned, with specific, limited objectives and reckoning with all 
stakeholders. 
 
4.4.3 Uneven Power of Stakeholders 
Many social groups have a stake in the privatisation of SOEs. There can be no 
presumption that power to affect the outcomes of privatisation will be distributed 
evenly between, for example, the SOEs’ managers and bureaucrats, private 
entrepreneurs, foreign investors, elite-donors, employees, consumers, public media, 
and value chain partners such as suppliers and wholesalers. Moreover, the stakeholders 
and the distribution of power between them differ depending on the industry and the 
level of government in which an SOE is situated. The issue of power includes not only 
power to determine the terms of a privatisation but the extent to which a party to an 
agreement can challenge enforcement of it (Painter 2003). Given the spread and 
unevenness of power to influence privatisation, there is a risk of arbitrary and 
inconsistent outcomes. This points to the need to establish a single agency to govern 
state ownership in all enterprises and all cases of partial or complete divestment. The 
agency would need to be alert to many issues such as the different reasons for state 
ownership and the different roles of the specific SOEs established within an economy. 
 
There is an important question about possible contradictions between the power of 
some stakeholders and their commitment to the reform of an SOE. In the case of the 
managers of an enterprise, for example, too much power risks the suppression of other 
stakeholders’ interests; yet too tight a limit on the extent of their power may damage 
the incentive structure necessary to recruit superior management. The enforceability of 
privatisation policies and agreements would be consolidated by the inclusion, 
alongside the existing supervisory channels, of a more independent Government 
Inspectorate, State Audit of Vietnam, as well as obligations to submit annual reports to 
and attend hearings before the National Assembly and the participation of the public 
media. All of these institutions can be expected to appeal to private investors. As for 
elite-donors, while they may continue to be significant sources of funds and 
consultation, a domestic policy-making process that was both more sensitive to ‘the 
empirics’ and more open to discussion is likely to be welcomed. There is also a need to 
build sufficiently protective institutions for workers and consumers – who are 
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concerned, respectively, with issues of remuneration and working conditions and the 
stable supply and prices of utilities, for example – against the likelihood (certainty?) 
that they will be vulnerable in the face of the newly empowered owners of the 
privatised firms. The impact of the power of this group will reverberate throughout all 
supply chains in which the privatised enterprises are located.  
 
The point of this last section is that the interests of all of the various stakeholders in 
any privatisation are highly unlikely to be protected simultaneously. Thus, to ensure 
that all privatisations contribute to broad economic and social development, 
privatisation requires tough-minded, well-designed and enforceable state supervision 
and regulation. It also requires discussion of privatisations, case by case, especially of 
how and to what extent each privatisation may contribute to the national goal. In so far 
as any particular privatisation can have contradictory impacts on economic and social 
development, the contradictions need to be made transparent and handled in a public 
context. 
 
4.4.4 Ensuring the Objectives of Economic and Social Development 
Each privatisation plan should be carefully evaluated as a specific case (King & 
Pitchford 1998; Cramer 1999). For those industries that are more appropriately owned 
by the private sector (Vickers & Yarrow 1988; Quiggin 1999), the SOEs’ assets or 
equities may be fully or partially transferred to the private owners. In these cases, the 
major concerns of the state would be: (i) the viability of the business after 
privatisation/equitisation and, preferably, its capacity for long-run growth; (ii) the 
ability of the business to create linkages with other established and nascent industries, 
so maximising domestication of the particular activity and localisation of the supply 
chains; (iii) the fiscal effects of the privatisation – that is, the contribution to state 
revenue on the basis of a sound valuation of the assets or equities; and (iv) the 
distributional or social equity implications of the privatisation.  
 
The enhancement of business performance after privatisation in turn may require 
greater state commitment to the technical training of the workforce and to higher 
education. The state may also be required to assist in improving the management of 
privatised enterprises (Cuervo & Villalonga 2000; Brouthers, Gelderman & Aren 
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2007). Improvement may be best assured by choosing purchasers with track records of 
superior management skills and management expertise in the industry concerned. 
Purchase by an existing business group is unlikely to regenerate management, as has 
been evident in many BGs and CGs in Vietnam in recent years.  
 
If the combination of a private component to the management of the business and 
financial market pressure results in improved performance of the enterprise, the 
prospects for sustained growth would guarantee long-run fiscal benefits for the state in 
terms of both dividends and tax receipts. Vietnam Airlines is a good example of this 
strategy, in which the short-term revenues from the public offering of shares were 
reinvested back into the business so the SOE could purchase new planes to make it 
more financially competitive101. Of course, when partially privatised companies issue 
more shares as a main source of capitalisation, the state’s share of equity will 
inevitably shrink if it declines to buy any of the new shares.  
 
The effect of privatisation on the state’s revenue (and, thus, the finances available for 
economic and social development) depends in the first place on the valuation of the 
assets being sold. Yet establishing a sound valuation can be difficult; even in 
developed economies, undervaluation of assets often occurs. According to Quiggin 
(1995), evidence of this can be seen where the state’s proceeds are equal to just 50% of 
the projected earnings by the state-owned equities. In Vietnam, the most valued assets 
of unprofitable SOEs are often the land-use rights targeted by private investors, mainly 
for real-estate development. However, the value of land rights is not easy to determine, 
while official pricing by the state usually lags behind the market. Asset valuation is an 
important site of corruption. Particularly in the case of land rights, undervaluation can 
only be tackled through open auctions with full disclosure of information.  
 
                                                          
101 Vietnam Airlines has been privatised under a plan to reduce state ownership by 75%; 1.5% was for 
the employees and trade union, 3.5% was publicly offered (most of which was purchased by two 
domestic banks), and 20% was for institutional investors (nearly 8.8% was sold to ANA Holdings Inc. of 
Japan). Importantly, the share premium that the state can take over would be reinvested, so that the 
firm will be able to use further financial leverage to expand its fleet. It is planned to reduce the state’s 
ownership to a minimum of 65% in the second phase of privatisation (See: Anh Minh 2016, ‘Vietnam 
Airlines sam dan sieu may bay [Vietnam Airlines purchases modern fleet]’, 29 November, viewed 17 
March 2017, http://www.baodautu.vn).  
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Where privatisation opens up the possibility of the sale of assets, or any change in the 
nature of the enterprise concerned, stakeholders in the SOE may well be displaced. 
The well-being of and opportunities available to displaced workers in particular may 
be significantly reduced. To ensure that this group of people is not overlooked in 
national economic and social development, it may be necessary to expand 
compensation arrangements, with the participation of the affected group (through 
representatives such as delegates to trade unions), to cover financial compensation, re-
training, establishment of employment centres, and provision of training vouchers to 
retrenched workers, among other initiatives. New institutions might be required to 
ensure that the new ownership of an enterprise provides compensation and that, prior 
to equitisation, the obligations are made known to prospective buyers. Compensation 
may also need to be extended to people involved in other parts of the supply chain in 
which the privatised enterprise has been located. 
 
4.4.5 Ensuring Capacity for the Coordination of Industrialisation 
As discussed above, the governance of privatisation depends on what the state most 
wants to gain from it. Assuming that a principal goal is national social and economic 
development, a capacity to coordinate industrial investments is vital. A major 
contributor to the achievement of social and economic development objectives is the 
capacity of the state to coordinate investments. This is all the more necessary since 
state ownership of jointly owned enterprises (and thus the power of the state to instruct 
management) will be gradually diluted over time. The capacity for coordination can be 
preserved through the use of golden shares, retention of state ownership of a majority 
of shares, or restricting the sales of shares to domestic investors or investors from a 
certain range of countries with limits on possible transfers to third parties.  
 
In order to preserve state capacity to govern investments in industry development, any 
privatisation of utilities providers and other key industries must ensure: consistency of 
supply; price stability; commitment to the creation of opportunities for using 
environment-friendly but potentially less profitable technologies (such as the 
technology that enables households to sell their surplus solar energy to the 
distributors); and, especially, expansion of utilities networks to rural and remote areas 
where the population may be less able to afford them (in fulfillment of ‘community 
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service obligations’). Any market segmentation needs to be purposefully designed in a 
way that guarantees private investors’ profitability, if possible without state 
subsidisation. In the absence of carefully designed segmentation, newly privatised 
provision of either infrastructure or utilities may face ‘operational spillovers’, 
requiring the managerial and technical articulation of privatised firms in the same 
logistic or productive value chain. King and Pitchford (1998, pp. 321-322) use the 
example of how rescheduling of flights in one airport impacts on another, and argue 
that where there is little need for competition, the integrated operation of two (or more) 
such facilities could be desirable.   
 
The list above of conditions necessary to maintain governance of investments in 
industry development when privatisation occurs is long. It is so long, and the 
conditions so onerous, that one might conclude that privatisations will only rarely be 
consistent with national social and economic development. At the very least the 
responsibility on the shoulders of state leaders to support and articulate state 
governance of the process of privatisation is a heavy one. 
 
Where there is privatisation of significant industrial SOEs that had previously given 
effect to national industrial policy but which are not natural monopolies, the structure 
of regulation may incorporate competition but under the umbrella of state 
coordination. Since the SOEs have an ‘early-bird’ advantage, favourable state 
assistance to new entrants, granted conditionally and non-discriminately between firms 
of different ownership (foreign- or domestically-owned), may be necessary to create 
‘regulatory competition’. The state may divest equity before the original monopoly 
power of the SOE has been effectively governed by the competition of smaller rivals 
and undermined by the removal of special privileges; but in the meantime, the process 
of privatisation must include control of residual monopoly power. In other words, the 
state must simultaneously ‘crowd in’ the private investment required to form a 
sustainable and competitive incubation centre or industrial cluster, govern the 
transitions involved in privatisation, and coordinate the development of complexes of 
industries, in some cases entirely new industries, including the creation of measures to 
thwart monopoly positions along supply chains.  
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4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The mainstream or neoliberal view in economics emphasises (i) exposing enterprises 
to market forces to ensure productive efficiency and (ii) the superiority of private 
ownership. But the case for privatisation on these grounds is shaky and driven by 
ideological bias or conflict among many stakeholders in SOEs. Fundamentally, 
privatisation is politically constructed; only proper governance of the process can 
ensure that broad economic and social objectives are achieved. Appropriate 
governance is beyond the capacity of the finance market and separate corporate 
managements, and must inevitably involve politics and the state. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Vietnamese privatisation has been implemented 
in the context of a policy vacillation between the developmental state and 
neoliberalism. Due in particular to recent cases of abuse and corruption in the SOEs 
and public investment, popular resentment of the economic role of the state has pushed 
the privatisation agenda further towards neoliberalism and has encouraged a wholesale 
rather than case-by-case approach. Moreover, given the prominence of local and 
foreign neoliberals, the SOEs are viewed as market distortions, and bureaucrats and the 
public are exhorted to limit the scope of state ownership. 
 
Nevertheless, it is argued that the market is but one institution among many, and that 
its efficiency depends on a vast array of other institutions created by the state, 
embedded in the society, and interacting with businesses. Accordingly, to improve the 
productive efficiency of SOE activities, analysts who are sympathetic to the notion of a 
developmental state argue that privatisation policy be implemented only as part of a 
reform of the institutional framework and the development of institutions to support 
the market – privatisation alone is not a panacea.  Underdeveloped institutions and 
‘market failures’ or ‘distortions’ are all prevalent in developing economies. Yet 
‘market failures’ and ‘market distortions’ can be perceived as the products of deficient 
institutional development; Vietnamese examples of this include the low level of 
management principles in comparison with those in more developed countries, and 
rules for the protection of minority shareholders that are badly designed and barely 
known. 
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It should be noted that there are always huge problems in assessing the impact of 
privatisation on efficiency of production, not only because the variables are 
heterogeneous and difficult to measure but also because the SOEs deserve to be 
assessed according to the premises on which they were established, i.e., to tackle social 
and economic development where the private sector could not be expected to do so. 
Focusing on financial performance rather than productive efficiency (because that is so 
hard to measure) may distract attention from policies for broad social and economic 
development and social equity – the wider impacts of privatisation. The interests of 
some stakeholders in enterprises are difficult to reconcile with the interests of 
shareholders in maximum returns/maximum shareholder value, and there are 
stakeholders with different interests in the wider society beyond the walls of the 
enterprises The drive for financial performance at the level of the individual enterprise 
does not necessarily benefit these other stakeholders; that is to say, it does not reliably 
work – directly or indirectly – to meet the objectives of broad national economic and 
social development. Thus, at the very least, the shareholder approach should be 
replaced by a stakeholder approach to privatisation. 
 
State capacity should be the foremost consideration among the Vietnamese governing 
elites as they confront the challenge of enhancing the nation’s capabilities for sustained 
development. For example, while there may not be a middle-income trap, the present 
growth slowdown can only be tackled by improving the dynamic efficiency of 
indigenous businesses. That is more challenging than continuing to focus on necessary 
but not sufficient static efficiency, as recommended by the World Bank, as it calls for 
coordinated investments and innovation. The respectable long-term growth of 
developmental states in East Asia demonstrates that the coordinating role of the state is 
indispensable to the achievement of industrialisation and equality.  
 
Overall, the analysis presented in this dissertation leads to the following conclusions 
and recommendations. The governance of Vietnamese privatisation should be rule-
based and state-led. It must avoid ideology-led privatisation that tends to privilege 
particular private interests of the kind that has characterised transition economies in the 
CEE and former CIS. The governance of privatisation requires the development of 
enabling institutions, including market institutions, other formal and informal non-state 
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institutions, and state regulatory institutions, in order for the process to be based on 
appropriate valuation, to increase productive efficiency, and to protect public and 
consumer interests. As there are different stakeholders with different incentives, 
bargaining powers and interests that have, in practice, significantly hindered the 
implementation of privatisation policy in Vietnam, privatisation must be accompanied 
by: the creation of means of conflict reconciliation and supervisory channels so that 
transparency and accountability are improved; the hardening of budget-constraints; the 
representation of workers’ and consumers’ interests; and investment cooordination 
across the economy. On a case-by-case basis, privatisation should be designed to 
ensure transparency in relation to its targets – be they state revenue, greater business 
viability, redistribution of employment and opportunities for training, and so on. 
Contradictions between such targets must somehow be confronted in a public manner. 
 
Most importantly, however, it must be recognised that not all enterprises need to be 
privatised; there are valid arguments for keeping firms in industries that are basic to 
national sovereignty, utilities provision and industrial policy under state ownership. 
Often, partial privatisation may be more appropriate than complete privatisation. Here 
especially, the design of the process of privatisation presents complex requirements for 
institutional development. 
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation inquired into the governance of privatisation (equitisation) in 
Vietnam from an institutionalist perspective. It examined the political economy of 
privatisation policy, in terms of both theory and practice, to answer the research 
question: What constitutes and influences the discourse of privatisation policy and the 
process of its implementation? The conclusion of the dissertation is that privatisation 
needs to be governed in a developmental state approach to maximise its contribution to 
broad national economic and social development objectives – an industrialised 
economy and a ‘civilised and equitable’ society.  
 
Summary of Findings 
Chapter 1 explained that privatisation began as part of the resurgence of neoliberalism, 
pioneered by Thatcher’s administration in Britain. The implementation of this policy in 
developed countries thereafter has been relatively successful, albeit with many 
reservations; in fact, it is ongoing in Anglophone countries like Australia today, with 
uneven results and amidst vigorous debate. Privatisation was introduced into 
developing countries by the WB and IMF as a panacea within the framework of the 
Washington Consensus during the 1990s. This project, it is worth noting, was launched 
on the promise of productive efficiency improvement rather than evidence, with 
deliberate neglect of the foundational rationale for SOEs and, most significantly, with 
disregard for the embryonic nature of institutions in developing countries compared to 
those in developed economies. Indeed, privatisation was promoted on the basis of the 
new institutionalist traditions – the neoclassical theory of the firm, property rights 
theory, agency theory and public choice theory – all the philosophical flagships of the 
neoliberal agenda. There has been acknowledgement that the benefits of the policy 
have been exaggerated; at least, that it should only be pursued where an enabling 
institutional structure is available. Proponents should be wary of political contests to 
capture the process, of private appropriation of rents, and of privatisation’s effects in 
hollowing-out the state’s capacities. 
 
These lessons became evident in the practical experience of transition economies in the 
CEE and the former CIS, the East Asian developmental states and China, which were 
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analysed in Chapter 2. During the period of transition from central planning to a 
market economy in the CEE and the former CIS, the SOEs were accused of 
inefficiency due to ‘soft budget constraints’ and vaguely-defined property rights. The 
privatisation agenda, however, was overwhelmingly driven by political imperatives. 
With a biased hostility to the economic role of the state, the shock-therapy, wholesale 
approach and voucher distribution method were pursued in the absence of institution 
building. Needless to say, the consequences were worst where privatisation was most 
rapid, i.e. in Russia, where production levels plummeted, huge assets were sold 
cheaply in ungoverned auctions to a few oligarchs, and social welfare was disrupted. 
In contrast, the SOEs had been run effectively with state coordination in the 
developmental states of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore and made a significant 
contribution to the economic growth of these countries. When these countries also 
undertook privatisation, they did so with careful planning, using a gradual and partial 
approach with emphasis on the creation of favourable institutional structures and with 
public participation in eventual corporate governance. China is a transition economy 
yet it is adapting to the developmental state philosophy. As a result, its TVE 
transformation was a clear success, while large SOEs in key sectors were privatised 
only partially, if at all, and were backed by the state, as were privatised businesses in 
other sectors, all within the terms of a defined industrial policy. 
 
Chapter 3 analysed the political economy of Vietnamese privatisation. As in similar 
transition economies, Vietnam set out to transform itself into a market economy 
according to the many principles of neoliberalism. Yet, the developmental state also 
had great appeal to its governing elites, as was especially evident in respect of 
privatisation. The SOE sector has been continuously affirmed as the ‘cornerstone’ of 
the economy. Only a few privatisations were undertaken as pilot projects during the 
1990s. When a certain level of institutional development had been reached, e.g. in the 
financial markets, privatisation was then rapidly implemented and thousands of SOEs 
were equitised in 2003-2008. This occurred alongside the consolidation of the large 
BGs and GCs, mainly through financial leveraging, spontaneous privatisation of 
member companies, and over-investment in non-core businesses. When the credit 
crunch and GFC occurred, these keiretsu- and chaebol-like conglomerates were 
afflicted by irrecoverable debts, corruption and bankruptcies. Hence the party-state’s 
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policy was reversed to one characterised by withdrawal of the state, restructuring and a 
further push for privatisation. Nonetheless, economic growth has slowed down until 
the present, while the SOEs and privatisation have made little progress over the period. 
With respect to economic growth, Vietnam has achieved more than the transition 
economies in the CEE and the former CIS but less than the developmental states; the 
same can be said of privatisation as a consequence (not a cause).  
 
As argued in Chapter 3, this is because the Vietnamese party-state has vacillated 
between neoliberalism and the idea of the developmental state, with neither of these 
political economic ideologies being completely or successfully adapted. There has 
been too much state intervention in the Vietnamese growth experience to claim that it 
is fully neoliberal. Yet, there has been enough neoliberalism to spoil enthusiasm for 
the developmental state. Vietnam arguably lacks a sufficiently effective bureaucracy, a 
national industrial policy, and an effective state-business alliance and the necessary 
coordination for proper implementation of the policy. The neoliberal-inspired 
‘commercial nationalism’ in Vietnam diffuses the rents for individual enrichment at 
the expense of a collective ‘social mobilisation’ that is needed in developmental states. 
There is evidence in the implementation of SOE reforms and privatisation of a gap 
between the design and enforcement of policies caused by contestation between 
strategic groups. The fragmentation of the governance structure enables bureaucrats, 
SOE managers and privateers to form alliances with each other, to contest and 
compromise in different ways for the appropriation of public assets, while official aid 
donors and domestic elites have also pursued their own stakes, regardless of the 
policy-implementation gap. While the social impacts in Vietnam have not been as 
great as they were in transition economies in the CEE and the former CIS, there are 
concerns about widening income inequality, with the worst-affected groups usually 
being those who were already the most vulnerable – unskilled and female workers.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the central arguments of the dissertation and proposes a framework 
of governance of SOE privatisation. Based on the findings of previous chapters, it 
concludes that, at its heart, privatisation is politically constructed. Essentially, the 
argument that transfer of ownership will lead to improved efficiency as a result of the 
superiority of market forces and private ownership, is often driven by ideological bias 
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derived from neoliberal beliefs rather than empirical evidence. The implementation of 
the policy is shaped by conflicts of group interests rather than by ‘efficient markets’ – 
which should not be taken as given, especially in developing countries. Privatisation 
outcomes, therefore, depend on the availability and quality of market institutions, and 
of state and non-state regulations – and especially of state regulations. Hence, 
privatisation needs to be governed by the state to achieve productive efficiency 
improvement and to secure broad national economic and social development 
objectives – in Vietnam, an industrialised economy and a ‘civilised and equitable’ 
society. The neoliberal focus on financially-based efficiency is too narrow to enable 
adequate assessment of the performance of either SOEs or of privatised SOEs. 
Enrichment of shareholder values does not necessarily equate to enrichment of the 
economy and society at large, which requires regard for all stakeholders. As Vietnam 
seeks to cope with the challenges of sustaining its economic growth, the state’s 
capacity to coordinate investments, in accordance with the developmental state model, 
should be prioritised to ensure that privatisation is implemented to achieve 
industrialisation, innovation and social equity. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Overall, this dissertation makes four main contributions to knowledge about 
privatisation in general and Vietnam in particular.  
 
First, it continues the traditional counter-argument of heterodox economics against the 
neoliberal taken-for-granted efficiency argument for privatisation. Accordingly, the 
enhancement of productive efficiency in privatising firms should not be viewed as 
given. On the contrary, the impact of privatisation on productive efficiency is 
conditional. It depends on the governance of privatisation, i.e. on the rules for 
privatisation within the specific institutional structure of the economy. The way the 
state privatises largely determines what the outcomes will be – a wholesale or gradual 
approach, with or without careful planning, the stage of development of its enabling 
institutions, the presence (or absence) of regulations for competition, whether 
privatisation is driven by state-led national industrial policy or only by concern for 
private profits, whether the stakeholder or shareholder value approach is taken, and 
whether or not there are complementary policies to ensure the continuation of social 
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welfare. This is quite different to the neoliberal belief that if the SOEs are thrown to 
the winds of market forces, then efficiency improvement must be realised.  
 
Second, since governing privatisation is seen to be imperative for achieving broad 
national economic and social development objectives, politics is inevitably and 
conspicuously involved in privatisation. While the neoliberal proposition is that 
privatisation is a tool to isolate business from politics, the practical examples analysed 
in this dissertation clearly show that politics is at work throughout the privatisation 
process, from the policy discourse to implementation. What differentiates heterodox 
from orthodox economics is the view of what interest the politics serves – the 
development of political economic institutions that are organised to serve national 
industrial policy or public interest (for example, the stable supply of utilities), or 
private corporate interests and rent-seeking endeavours. As illustrated in different 
examples of privatisation in the CEE and former CIS transition economies and in 
developmental states in East Asia, the results of these approaches are clearly different.  
 
Third, institutions play an important role in enabling privatisation to improve 
productive efficiency. Privatisation is just one policy among different projects and 
agendas. It is not a panacea. Indeed, it must be complemented by key institutions such 
as regulations for competition, monopolies, financial markets, and corporate 
governance. A public-private mix in both ownership and management seems to work 
better than when SOEs are sold off entirely to the private sector. 
 
Fourth, particularly in regard to Vietnam, this dissertation has built on previous 
academic accounts to analyse in some detail the party-state’s vacillation between 
neoliberalism and the developmental state philosophy. In my view, sustainable 
economic and social development can only be achieved by adapting to the 
developmental state model in the pursuit of industrialisation and equity. Accordingly, 
the party-state should improve the effectiveness of bureaucracy (in relation to detailed 
knowledge of the diversity of industries, training, self-confidence and status), enhance 
the enforceability of policies with effective supervision and performance-based 
assessment, focus on state coordination of national industrial policy, and harness 
interest groups to achieve industrialisation goals.  
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Future Research 
In order to supplement this research on the political economic dimensions of the 
Vietnamese privatisation project, at a time when Vietnam is facing the challenge of 
sustaining economic growth, future research could usefully pursue several issues, as 
outlined below. 
 
First, there should be continued research into the political economy of state and market 
governance of the economy to enhance future economic growth. Given the policy 
vacillation that has been identified, current governance seems to lean more towards the 
popular appeal of neoliberal tenets, despite acknowledgement by the governing elites 
of the possible capture of the process of privatisation by private interests. The future 
trajectory of vacillation will influence the privatisation process, and is thus a 
worthwhile research topic.  
 
Second, the institutional structure required in specific industries should be analysed. 
Since this dissertation is concerned with the overall political economy of the 
privatisation process, there has been little room to examine particular institutions. To 
date, there have been few inquiries into privatisation by industry – perhaps not 
surprisingly, since the scope and scale of such work would be large. In oil exploration, 
for example, there are joint ventures with foreign enterprises; in dairy production, there 
has been a solid basis of competition between the privatised SOEs and private 
companies; in power generation, there have been many private entrants; in the grid-
management and retailing, however, privatisation is only now being planned. Global 
trade agreements, under the umbrella of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), have 
regulated the presence of foreign investors in a number of service-provision sectors, 
such as banking and securities. Privatisation on a case-by-case basis in these industries 
needs detailed investigation.  
 
Third, there should be more research on the social impacts of Vietnamese privatisation. 
For example, how are the various groups of SOE employees affected by privatisation?   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Annual GDP Growth Rate and Consumer Price Index (CPI y/o/y) 
 
Source: General Statistics Office 
 
Appendix 2A: Comparable Total Export-Import Values by Ownership (in 
US$ Billion) 
 
2010 2016 
Exports % Imports % Exports % Imports % 
Total value 71.63 
 
84.00 
 
175.94 
 
173.26 
 Domestic firms 32.80 45.8% 47.53 56.6% 50.04 28.4% 71.06 41.0%
FDI firms  38.83 54.2% 36.48 43.4% 125.90 71.6% 102.20 59.0% 
 
Source: General Statistics Office 
 
Appendix 2B: Comparable Exported and Imported Products in 2010 and 2016 
(US$) 
Order 
2010 2016 (est.) 
Major exports $ bil. Major imports $ bil. Major exports $ bil. Major imports $ bil. 
1 
Garments & 
textiles 11.17 
Machinery, 
tools & 
equipment 
13.49 
Mobile phones 
& parts 34.5 
Machinery, tools 
& equipment 28.08 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
GDP growth CPI
 
 
 
 
 
204 
 
2 
Footwear 
5.07 
Steel 
6.16 
Garments & 
textiles 23.56 
Electronics, 
computers & 
components 
27.77 
3 
Seafood 
4.95 
Petrol 
5.74 
Electronics, 
computers & 
components 
18.48 
Mobile phones 
& parts 10.55 
4 Crude oil 4.94 Cloth 5.38 Footwear 12.91 Cloth 10.49 
5 
Electronics, 
computers & 
components 
3.56 
Electronics, 
computers & 
components 
5.16 
Machinery, 
tools & 
equipment 
10.48 
Steel 
8.02 
6 
Woods & 
wooden 
products 
3.40 
Plastics 
3.76 
Seafood 
7.01 
Plastics 
6.28 
7 
Rice 
3.21 
Auto & parts 
2.87 
Woods & 
wooden 
products 
6.91 
Auto & parts 
5.87 
8 
Machinery, 
tools & 
equipment 
3.05 
Textile, 
footwear 
materials 
2.62 
Transport 
vehicles & 
parts 
5.98 
Textile, footwear 
materials 5.09 
9 
Precious stone 
and metal 
products 
2.86 
Other metals 
2.56 
Coffee 
3.35 
Other metals 
4.80 
10 
Rubber 
2.37 
Cattle feeds & 
stuffs 2.16 
Handbags & 
other leather 
products 
3.13 
Petrol 
4.71 
11 Coffee 1.76 Chemicals 2.10 Cashew nuts 2.85 Plastic products 4.40 
12 
Coal 
1.54 
Chemical 
products 
2.05 
Vegetable 
2.40 
Chemical 
products 
3.78 
13 
Transport 
vehicles & 
parts 
1.50 
Plastic 
products 1.43 
Crude oil 
2.34 
Cattle feedstuffs 
3.39 
14 
Petrol 
1.27 
Pharmaceuticals 
1.25 
Plastic 
products 
2.19 
Chemicals 
3.17 
15 
Electrical 
wires & cables 
1.31 
Fertilizer 
1.22 
Rice  
2.19 
Pharmaceuticals 
2.52 
16 
Cashew nuts 
1.13 
Textile fibers 
1.16 
Steel  
1.96 
Woods & 
wooden 
materials 
1.82 
17 
Plastic 
products 1.05 
Woods & 
wooden 
materials 
1.15 
Rubber 
1.66 
Textile fibers 
1.61 
18 
Steel 
1.01 
Other transport 
vehicles & 
parts 
0.82 
Electrical 
wires & cables 1.07 
Cotton 
1.63 
 
Source: General Statistics Office 
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